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Abstract
Each province in Pakistan has witnessed a significant population growth rate since
the 1970s—ranging between 2 to 4 percent per annum. Rapid population growth in
Pakistan hindered socio-economic development in the past, and Pakistan will have to
adopt a development model capable of absorbing the future increase in population.
The population growth is mostly due to the extended time lag between the mortality
decline and the fertility decline. Following the demographic transition theory, the birth
rates were expected to fall in the 1970s as a response to the decline in death rates.
However, due to political instability, low levels of socio-economic development and
ineffective population policies, the targets for reducing fertility were not accomplished
even until recently. The main objective of our research is to study the level and trends
of population and education retrospectively and prospectively for each province in
Pakistan. The projection results show that the population of Pakistan (at national and
provinces level) will be growing significantly in the next five decades. The substantial
growth of the population of Pakistan at national and provinces level in the future is due
to the “population momentum”. In 2010, approximately half of population growth
in Pakistan is due to population momentum. This would lead to further increase in
the working-age population. As population growth is beginning to level off, as part
of the demographic transition, Pakistan, including all provinces, will experience a
demographic window of opportunities. For the next 30 to 40 years, the majority of its
population will be of working age. Our Projections result reveals that Pakistan will
not be able to attain the Millennium development goals (MDGs) regarding education
in 2015 and not even in 2060, if it does not increase primary enrollment at a rate
significantly higher than in the recent past.
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Summary
Each province in Pakistan has witnessed a significant population growth rate since the
1970s—ranging between 2 to 4 percent per annum. Pakistan, at national and provinces
level, is likely to experience further population growth in the near and distant future at
least until 2050—more so than any other world countries except for some countries in
sub-Saharan African. Rapid population growth in Pakistan hindered socio-economic
development in the past, and Pakistan will have to adopt a development model ca-
pable of absorbing the future increase in population. If the country fails, it will be
confronted with several major risks ranging from political instability to having large
segments of the population trapped into poverty.
The population growth is mostly due to the extended time lag between the mortal-
ity decline and the fertility decline. Following the demographic transition theory, the
birth rates were expected to fall in the 1970s as a response to the decline in death
rates. However, due to political instability, low levels of socio-economic develop-
ment and ineffective population policies, the targets for reducing fertility were not
accomplished, even until recently. Thus, the fertility levels in the decades of 1970s
and 1980s in Pakistan remained exceptionally high, fluctuating between six and seven
children on average per women. It is only in the late 1980s that fertility started declin-
ing gaining momentum in the1990s. The main objective of our research is to study
the levels and trends of Population and Education retrospectively and prospectively
for each province in Pakistan. To study the population and educational levels for each
province in Pakistan in future, we used the probabilistic population projections and
multistate population projection methodology.
As population growth is beginning to level off, as part of the demographic transition,
Pakistan, including all provinces, will experience a demographic bonus—a period of
time when the share of the working age population is prominent compared to the de-
pendent groups, the youth and elderly population. For the next 30 to 40 years, the
majority of its population will be of working age — in 2010, 35 percent of the popu-
lation of Pakistan is below age 15 years and 60 percent of the population belongs to
the working-age groups (15-64 years). The projection results show that the popula-
tion of Pakistan (at national and provinces level) will be growing significantly in the
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next five decades, as Pakistan will only manage to achieve replacement level fertil-
ity by 2035-40. The substantial growth of the population of Pakistan at national and
provinces level in the future is due to the “population momentum”. Approximately
half of population growth in Pakistan at sub-national level in 2010 is due to popula-
tion momentum. This would lead to further increase in the working-age population
—from 105 million in 2010 to 194 million in 2060. Thus, Pakistan will need to adopt
a development strategy capable of absorbing the working age population. This large
labor force, if well educated, skilled and sufficiently employed could be a key asset for
the country to become socially and economically prosperous. In this context, human
capital will be central to the transformation of the demographic bonus into a window
of opportunity for rapid economic growth.
As fertility declines, the proportion of population aged 65+ will accelerate signif-
icantly. The proportion of the population aged 65+ is likely to increase six times
between 2010 and 2060, from 4 percent to 15 percent. This rapid population aging
poses many challenges for policy makers and for institutional adaption, including the
financing of pension and health care system for elderly. The large uneducated and
unskilled young population along with significant proportion of aged population in
future would place extreme burden on Pakistan economy, if not invested in education
and health. Furthermore, the school age (below 14 years) population will be stagnat-
ing during the next three decades (until 2030-35) — approximately at 61 million. This
implies that until 2035, more children will need to be enrolled in the schools. More
school will be needed and more teachers to be trained and hired, particularly in the
rural areas. The share of young population would however decline after 2035—from
61 million in 2035-40 to 51 million in 2055-60.
Pakistani educational system has failed to provide the basic infrastructure, eliminate
gender imbalances and the quality of education, which would be required to enjoy the
full collateral benefits of demographic bonus such as high levels of economic growth
and well-being. As expected, Pakistan will not be able to attain the Millennium de-
velopment goals (MDGs) regarding education (goal 2 and 3), if it does not increase
primary enrollment at a rate significantly higher than in the recent past. Our projec-
tions shows that the prolongation of present trends into the future would still leave 23
percent of boys and 18 percent of girls in the age group 5-9 not enrolled in school
by 2015. The projections show that the MDGs would not be reached, even by 2060.
This calls for effective educational policies and further investments in the education
sector particularly in rural areas. Moreover, the gender gap would not be eliminated
at all levels of education in the next two decades and even far from being eliminated
in 2060, except at the level of tertiary education, that has highly benefited women in
Pakistan in the last decade.
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Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Pakistan’s prospect for development
had not been very bright. The rising religious fundamentalism, political instability,
governance, stagnating economic growth, low level of education particularly, for fe-
male and low social status of women are among the widely discussed problems facing
Pakistan. The major demographic challenges lying ahead of Pakistan are rampant
population growth—mainly due to population momentum—and low socio-economic
development and the most essential one being the accumulation of human capital. The
spatial distribution of Pakistan consists of four provinces (i.e. Punjab, Sindh, KPK and
Balochistan) and four territories. A significant spatial heterogeneity exists in Pakistan
in terms of demographic and socio-economic development—from Punjab to Balochis-
tan. Pakistan comprises very small province in population size—such as Balochistan
with 7 million inhabitants—and very large ones—such as Punjab, with more than 100
million inhabitants in 2010. Indeed, the spatial demographic heterogeneity in Pakistan
is one of the main threads of this study. Rapid population growth rate has been virtu-
ally inevitable in Pakistan during the second half of the 20th century and will continue
to do so in the near future. This can be explained by the conventional demographic
transition theory—i.e. first mortality declined rapidly and later fertility declined grad-
ually. Pakistan is one of the largest countries (In 2010, Pakistan ranks 6th as most
populous country in the world and will stand at the 4th in 2050) in the world with very
a young age structure (UN 2010). In 2010, nearly two-thirds of the Pakistani popula-
tion is less than 30 years old with a median age of 21.7 years. The young age structure
has been persistent in all provinces in Pakistan in 2010. The population of Balochistan
is the youngest population in Pakistan, nearly 70 percent of the population is below
30 years of age in 2010. Each province in Pakistan will likely experience a signifi-
cant population growth in the near and distant future at least until 2050—more so than
any other world region except sub-Saharan Africa. Pakistan’s population will still be
young, and the median age is expected to be 31 years in 2040 (United-Nations, 2010).
Currently, South Asian region along with Sub-Saharan Africa are the only regions in
the world with young age structure and experienced rapid population growth. Within
South Asian region, Pakistan stands out dominantly.
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Pakistan is one of the world’s fastest-growing countries—an annual growth rate of 1.8
percent from 2005 to 2010-compared to 2.1 percent in Arab world and 2.4 percent in
sub-Saharan Africa (UN 2010). The rapid population growth rate has a universal phe-
nomenon and each province in Pakistan experienced a significant growth in the Past.
More than half of the population growth in each province of Pakistan has contributed
by the momentum in 2005-10. Even though, we assume that Pakistan will attain re-
placement level fertility in next three decades, the population would be increasing until
2060 due to the large number of male and female in reproductive age. Each province
in Pakistan will also experience significant population growth due to the momentum
(See more details in Chapter 3). This phenomenon requires strong policy implications
to curb population growth in Pakistan and not solely focus on the population policies
on fertility decline, access and provision of family planning services.
Until the late 1980s, the fertility decline in Pakistan had hardly begun. The fertility
level in the 1970s and 80s is considered exceptionally high (more than six children per
women) in Pakistan. There is ample evidence found in the literature (Sathar, 2007)
that the fertility decline in Pakistan had started since the late 1980s and strengthened
further in the decades of 1990s. However, the fertility transition has stalled during
the first decade of 21st century in Pakistan. Among the SAARC member states, Pak-
istan has the highest fertility rate–4.1 children per women in 2006-07. The spatial
heterogeneity in fertility transition varies substantially in Pakistan (See more details
in Chapter 2). Recent evidence shows that fertility transition has been now well un-
derway in most provinces of Pakistan, some of which have caused a significantly
rapid decline—i.e. Punjab (?). The number of socio-economic and cultural factors
are responsible and have contributed substantially in the fertility decline in Pakistan,
particularly female education. The overwhelming evidence found in the literature that
education and fertility were negatively correlated, and the small family-size norms are
more common in highly educated women (Bongaarts, 2008). The females have been
most vulnerable in Pakistan in every sector of the society since the independence in
1947. In 2010, nearly 60 percent of women have never attended schools in Pakistan
and the situation became worse in Balochistan—76 percent of women have no formal
education in 2010. The data shows that, the ideal family size in Pakistan stagnated
during the last two decades–at the level of 4.1 children per women. The important
question raised in the debate is whether Pakistan would ever experience a sustained
fertility decline toward replacement levels. In this context, female education plays a
vital role and is a core theme of this study (See chapter 5 and 6).
The levels of mortality in Pakistan showed significant improvement during the sec-
ond half of the 20th century. Life expectancy at birth has improved from 41 years for
male and 41.5 years for female in 1950-55 to 63.8 for male and 65.4 for female in
2005-2010 respectively. The infant mortality rate (IMR) in Pakistan has been declin-
ing substantially over the last five decades—from 177 deaths per 1000 live birth in
1950-55 to 71 deaths per 1000 live birth in 2005-10. A tremendous spatial variation
exists in Pakistan for infant mortality rate. IMR is very low in Balochistan—49 deaths
per 1000 live birth in 2006-07—and very high in Punjab and Sindh—81 deaths per
1000 live births in both province. Child mortality declined in a similar way as the in-
fant mortality in Pakistan. Maternal mortality has substantially high in Pakistan—276
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maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in 2006-07. The enormous diversity in the
maternal mortality ratio observed at the provincial level in Pakistan. For instance, in
Balochistan, high level of maternal mortality persists—785 maternal deaths in 2006-
07, whereas, maternal mortality ratio was low in Punjab—227 maternal deaths per
100,000 live births in 2006-07. The fact that explained the low maternal mortality
in Punjab is that more and more women receive prenatal care and a large proportion
of deliveries is attended by skilled birth attendants. The skilled birth attendance has
now been more common in most provinces in Pakistan, however, Balochistan lagged
behind in maternal care.
The story of the demographic development in Pakistan has not solely depended on
rapid population growth and high fertility, but also considering the significant inter-
nal and international migration. As Burki, 2010 argues, the four waves of migration
that happened in Pakistan had a profound impact on socio-economic and political de-
velopment. The first massive migration occurred during the partition in 1947, nearly
seven million Muslims migrants arrived in Pakistan from India (Visaria, 1969). It is
worth mentioning to note that before the partition in 1947, the percentage of Muslims
in Pakistan was 65 percent and due to the influx of large-scale Muslim’s migration
in Pakistan, the percentage rose to 95 percent (Burki, 2010). The second enormous
migration occurred internally in Pakistan after the independence in 1947, when the
significant number of Pashtuns from KPK (previously known as NWFP) migrated to
the capital of Sindh (i.e. Karachi) in South of Pakistan, mainly for searching of better
living condition, education and higher opportunities for jobs. This fickle ethnic mix,
writes Burki, 2010, “transformed Karachi into one of the most violent cities in devel-
oping world”, as we have seen recently in 2011, the ethnic conflict between Pashtuns
and Muhajirs. The third large-scale movement occurred from Pakistan toward many
regions of the world, such as North America, European Union, Persian Gulf and East
Asia in 1970s and 80s. Thus, Pakistan’s economy has benefited by generating the sub-
stantial amount of remittances from overseas Pakistanis. The last and fourth type of
migration was the arrival of millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan during 1980s and
2001s due to the wars in Afghanistan, which had a profound effect of ethnic mix in
different parts of the country. In recent years, Pakistan experienced rapid urbanization.
The urban population projection shows that about half of Pakistan’s population will
be living in cities by the year 2030. The population of Lahore (Capital of Punjab) will
exceed 10 million and becoming Pakistan’s second mega-city in 2030 after Karachi
(UN 2010). Therefore, urbanization is one of the core problems facing Pakistan in
near future and if the government is not well prepared then the economy will face a
trouble and furthermore, ethnic conflicts will intensify.
The “demographic window of opportunities”1 occurs when the ratio of the non-working-
age population (typically the school-aged children aged 0-14, and the elderly popula-
tion aged 65+) to the working-age population is low. The rising share of working-age
population can translate into the subsequent rise of the rate of economic growth if the
1Demographic bonus or demographic dividend are other terms used synonymously in the literature.
According to United Nations, the demographic dividend define as “the period when the proportion of
population aged (0-14) years old falls below 30 percent and the proportion of population aged 65+
years old is still below 15 percent.”
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economy can employ effectively and productively the growing labor force. The de-
mographic window of opportunity has a beginning and an end, closely associated with
the start and the pace of fertility decline, which influence the age structures. Currently,
each province in Pakistan has undergone the process of the demographic window of
opportunity. This period considered an important demographic potential for high eco-
nomic growth, as we have seen into East Asian countries and to some extent, in India.
However, the realization of this demographic window of opportunity is dependent on
several factors. Levels of educational attainment are important as too low level, for
instance, among women could limit participation in the labor force. Furthermore, the
economy should be able to absorb using employment, the growing working-age pop-
ulation. The high level of unemployment may limit the impact of those favorable age
structures. Therefore, if Pakistan manages to reap a demographic dividend, the effects
could be long term on the economic growth. In this context, one important point to
note here is that Pakistan is blessed with rich nature resources especially in Balochis-
tan and Sindh. The large youth bulge would be essential to exploit these resources
which would requires many highly educated professionals such as chemical analysts,
engineers and other experts to exploit these resources. If proper policy implications
are adopted, this could lead Pakistan to the track to development.
Indeed, human capital2 will play a vital role for future development of Pakistan in
the first half of 21st century, which will be influenced by the past and present educa-
tional policies. Virtually, by most measures, Pakistan has not achieved extraordinary
progress in educational development during the past few decades. Females are par-
ticularly at a disadvantage for gaining literacy skills, and enrollment at primary and
secondary school level in Pakistan. This is mainly because of two reasons: one is the
momentum of education and second is due to under-investment in education. Signifi-
cant spatial heterogeneity existed in the educational attainment level in Pakistan. Pun-
jab achieved significant progress in educational attainment and enrollment in recent
decades, particularly for females. Modest progress was observed in other provinces
in Pakistan, based on the current educational enrollment and investment pattern, the
targets of MDGs regarding education (goals 2 and 3) in Pakistan will not be attained
in 2015. Consequently, the pace for achieving universal primary education and gender
equity at provincial levels in Pakistan has never been sufficient, although the speed in
some provinces is faster as compared to the others. This calls for a further invest-
ment in the education sector, particularly in basic education to enjoy the benefits of
fostering economic growth and social change.
1.2 Objectives
This study aims at producing the population projections at the provincial level in Pak-
istan. So far, no population projections (neither deterministic nor probabilistic) in
Pakistan has ever been produced at the sub-national level. In our knowledge, this is
2Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2009 define the human capital as “as the number of people who are par-
ticipating in the work force, are in sufficiently good health and are differentiated by their skill levels
which is conveniently approximated by level of educational attainment.” We are here only considering
the educational dimension of the human capital.
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the first attempt to produce the probabilistic and population projection by level of ed-
ucational attainment for each province in Pakistan. The objectives of this work are
threefold.
The first aim is to document the educational progress and demographic development
in past and present in Pakistan for each province. In this regard, our focus is on the
three main indicators of educational development in Pakistan at the provincial level;
namely, educational attainment, literacy and enrollments rate (gross and net). We
discussed the policies regarding education in the past and present and figure out the
determinant of the failure of these policies. Currently, most of the studies that dealt
with demography, have focus on the national level in Pakistan. Our objective is to
analyze the current population dynamics at the provincial level in Pakistan, at least
during the last four decades. Such documentation is very essential to understand the
level, trends and determinant of the component of population change (fertility, mortal-
ity and migration) and assess the pace of demographic transition for each province in
Pakistan. Each province in Pakistan has a different level of socio-economic develop-
ment. Therefore, such analysis at the provincial levels are helpful in formulating the
assumptions for future level of fertility and mortality for each province in population
projection exercise. Using multiple data sources at provincial level in Pakistan, we
assess the available data in Pakistan on fertility, mortality, internal and international
migration. It ensues with an identification of data problem and an estimation of the
input variables for each province, which later used in the probabilistic and human cap-
ital population projection.
The second objective is to produce probabilistic population projections for each province
in Pakistan and improve the methodology used in the population projection by consid-
ering the internal migration component into the analysis. So far, little has been done
on the probabilistic population projection at the sub-national level. The uncertainty
of demographic variables at provincial levels, particularly, internal and international
migration, make sub-national population projection more complex. Deterministic ap-
proach has employed to project the provincial population which fails to address the
concern of demographic uncertainty into component of population change. Probabilis-
tic population projection models have the potential to conquer these shortcomings, but
these models have often been implemented at a national level. It is the first attempt to
execute the probabilistic projection model at the provincial level in Pakistan .
The third objective of the study is to produce the new data set at provincial level of
Pakistan by age, sex and level of educational attainment from 2010-2060 and assess
the likely effect of future changes by education in the population. In this context,
we used the method of multistate demographic modeling to project the population by
age, sex and level of educational attainment at national and provincial level in Pak-
istan from 2010-2060. Education specific population projections are imperative, not
because taking education into population projection improve the accuracy of the pro-
jection, but also information they produce is needed to economists, policy makers and
other stakeholders that use the demographic and human capital data. We will also as-
sess the potential for the achievement of the United Nations Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) regards education (goals 2 and 3) and education for all (EFA) goals-i.e.
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universal primary education and gender equality at a provincial level in Pakistan. It
will assess that how realistic the national goals of educational attainment are in view
of the current speed of change observed in the education sector in Pakistan at national
and provincial level. It is also necessary to assess the level of educational attainment
of working-age population in the recent and distant future at the provincial level in
Pakistan, which is important to formulate the economic and labor force policies. Thus
present research is primarily oriented towards the methodological and evaluation in
order to understand the current and the future patterns and directions of demographic
and educational changes in Pakistan at the sub-national level.
In a nutshell, this research focuses on the development of techniques to make optimal
use of the available data at provincial level in Pakistan and further utilize the different
data sources for producing probabilistic population projection and population projec-
tion by age and sex and level of education from 2010 to 2060. Moreover, we have
identified that the more than half of the population growth in the future contributes by
the momentum of the population and estimates the time and magnitude of the demo-
graphic dividend for each province in Pakistan. We are also assessing the potential
that whether Pakistan would achieve the MDGs goals based on the business-as-usual
scenario and evaluate the likely effect of future changes in educational structure on
the population.
1.3 Structure of the Report
This report is organized in seven chapters to answers the questions of what will be
the future of education and population in each province in Pakistan. The first step in-
volved in the analysis is an empirical assessment and construction of necessary inputs
for the projections. Therefore, the book is segregated into two parts. The first part
of the book focuses on the historical empirical assessment of the levels and trend of
fertility, mortality and migration in Pakistan at national and provincial level. Further-
more, we describe the history of population and educational policies and its causes of
failures in Pakistan. This chapter offer the basis for the arguments and assumptions
for future level of fertility, mortality and migration at a provincial level in Pakistan.
The second part constitutes the state of education and literacy in Pakistan. Moreover,
we have also discussed multistate modeling techniques to describe the population pro-
jection by level of education at a provincial level in Pakistan.
The second chapter depict the description of population dynamics in Pakistan for
each province in past and present. It elaborates the trends and patterns of popula-
tion growth, fertility, mortality and migration for each province in Pakistan during the
last four decades. It also represents the empirical analysis about the determinants and
regional difference for these indicators in Pakistan. Chapter 2 also provides the fruit-
ful overview of the population policies in Pakistan since independence. The chapter
concludes with a brief discussion of the relationship between education, demographic
indicators (fertility, mortality and migration) and socio-economic policies in Pakistan.
Chapter two also provides the final input data, which is used in the later section for
population projections. In Chapter 3, we illustrate the probabilistic population pro-
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jection method at a sub-national level in Pakistan. The emphasis is particular on the
methodological issues concerning with sub-national population projection and inter-
nal migration. After the brief introduction of the methodology and base year data, we
discuss the results of the probabilistic population projections at the provincial level in
Pakistan. It concludes with major outcome for each provinces derived from projection
exercise.
Chapter 4 review the state of educational attainment and literacy in Pakistan since
1970s for individual regions. We describe the three indicators to assess the past devel-
opment in the education sector in Pakistan; namely, educational attainment for broad
age groups, literacy and enrollment rate for all levels of education. It also gave the
brief overview of the past educational policies in Pakistan. The discussions focus on
the provincial level. This chapter concludes with the causes and determinants of the
failure of education in Pakistan.
In Chapter 5 and 6, we emphasis on the multistate population projection by level of
education at national and provincial levels in Pakistan—with a view of how education
has been and will be shaping the demographic future of each province in Pakistan.
After the concise overview of the literature review and methodology, we discuss the
different scenarios for education and fertility to analysis the concomitant effect of edu-
cation on population size and age structure. In the following section, we have analysis
the potential of achieving the MDGs and EFA goals for each province in Pakistan.
The important findings and results of multistate population projections are discussed
in the last section of this chapter.
Chapter 7 recapitulates the conclusion and discussion in the preceding chapters. This
chapter summarized the proposed research objectives with important findings and rec-
ommendations, limitations and the implication for further research on provincial de-
mographic research in Pakistan.
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Part I
Evolution of Population
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2
Population Dynamics of Pakistan at
Sub-national Level: Past and Present
Summary
This chapter thoroughly documents the population dynamics for each province in Pak-
istan during the last four decades. First, we describe the trends and levels of the total
population and population growth rate for each province in Pakistan. Second, we ex-
plain the sharp socio-economic inequalities between the provinces in Pakistan. For
this purpose, we rely on the Human Development index for each province in Pak-
istan to access the socio-economic progress. Furthermore, it evaluates the state of
demographic windows of opportunities and population momentum for each province
in Pakistan, which has a profound effect on the future population growth. Pakistan ex-
perienced a rapid urbanization in recent decades. Therefore, we described the urban
population growth at provincial levels and growth of major cities in Pakistan. More-
over, we assess the stage of demographic transition for Pakistan. It would help to
formulate the future trends of fertility in Pakistan. Third, we evaluate the trends, lev-
els and determinate of fertility, mortality and migration for each province in Pakistan.
On one hand, it is useful to understand the historical development of demographic
trends in Pakistan. On the other hand, it provides the basis for the scenarios devel-
opment for each province in Pakistan in the subsequent chapters of this book. In the
final section, we emphasize on the historical development of the population policies
in Pakistan during past six decades and shed the light on the causes of the failure of
population policies in Pakistan.
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2.1 Introduction
Pakistan is often perceived as a “failure state” rather than for its development. With
a population to some extent less than half of that the United States in 2010 and in
an area, approximately half of that the Iran, Pakistan is the 6th largest country in the
world—with total population of 174 million in 2010. The critical challenges faced
in Pakistan are rapidly growing population and a number of social, political and eco-
nomic problems. On one hand, the society has religious and traditional in terms of
family structure. On the other hand, it has enormous ethnic and cultural difference
from North to south. It is also worth mentioning that large diversity existed within
provinces in Pakistan in terms of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics—for
instance in Punjab—southern part of the Punjab dominates with Sariaki speaking peo-
ple. The significant gap found in socio-economic and demographic indicators between
Punjabi and Sariaki ethnic groups within Punjab.
Pakistan comprises of both very small and large regions – one with less than eight
million populations, i.e. Balochistan – and highly populated province such as Punjab
with a population of 101 million in 2010 (nearly 60 percent of the total population of
Pakistan). In 1998, Islamabad capital territory and Punjab were most densely popu-
lated areas in Pakistan with 888 and 359 inhabitants per square kilometer respectively,
whereas the Balochistan has the density less than 20 inhabitants per square kilome-
ter. Our focus of this study is to address the level and trends of socio-demographic
indicators in Pakistan at the provincial level and long-term future challenges inherent
to the current demographic constellation. This chapter serves as the base line of our
population projections exercise in the following chapters of this book. We will discuss
here the level and trends of the demographic variables (fertility, mortality and migra-
tion) at provincial level in Pakistan which is necessary to formulate the assumptions
for demographic variables in the future for each province in Pakistan.
2.1.1 Administrative division in Pakistan
The total land area of Pakistan is 796,100 sq km and consists of Himalayas in the north
to the Arabian Sea in the south, from the mountains of the Himalayas and the Hindu
Kush was forming the border with Afghanistan and Iran in the west to the politically
demarcated line partitioning the Punjab province and delineating Sindh boundary with
India in the east. In addition, about one-third of the disputed state of Jammu and Kash-
mir, forming Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas, has also territorial and politically
attached to Pakistan.(See Figure 2.1). Pakistan has a federation of four provinces, a
capital territory and a group of federally administered tribal areas (See Table 2.1).
Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan with an area of 347,190 sq km. Punjab
stands at the second position in terms of the land area (205,344 sq km). However, it has
the highest share of the population–60 percent of the total population of Pakistan. Due
to its population size, agricultural land and culture, Punjab is considered the hub of
Pakistani culture. With one mega metropolitan city Karachi and sea port with premier
commercial and industrial center, Sindh has an area of 140,914 sq km. Historically,
KPK and Balochistan are traditional, religious and tribal societies. The two provinces
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Figure 2.1: Geographical Map of Pakistan, Source: Table 2.1
Table 2.1: Administrative division in Pakistan
Administrative Unit Capital
Population Area Population
(%) (%) Density
*Balochistan Quetta 4.8 39.3 18.9
*Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Peshwar 12.9 8.5 238.1
*Punjab Lahore 53.7 23.3 358.5
*Sindh Karachi 22.2 16 216
Islamabad Capital Territory Islamabad 0.6 0.1 888.8
FATA - 2.3 3.1 116.7
Azad Kashmir Muzaffarabad 2.2 1.5 223.6
Gilgit-Baltistan Gilgit 1.3 8.2 24.8
FATA: Federally Administrate Tribal Area, Source: Wikipedia
*represent provinces
also includes the tribal territories which are self administrated, and bearers of distinct
subcultures. Their strong family and marital traditions are the basis of their political
and cultural role in Pakistan. Azad Kashmir and the Northern areas are nominally
autonomous territories.
2.2 Pakistan Population–Past and Present
Historically, the population growth had been untamable in Pakistan during the second
half of 20thcentury, albeit successive governments formulated various policies to cope
with population explosion and promote family planning, particularly among females,
but they had incapable of implemented these policies into action due to various polit-
ical, social and cultural obstacles. The population growth rate of Pakistan incessantly
increased in 1950s, approximately 27 percent gain had been observed in the popula-
tion of Pakistan during 1951-61-from 33.7 million to 42.8 million and were attributed
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mainly by large scale migration after the partition of India and also due to mortal-
ity transition. During the next four decades (1970-2010), the population of Pakistan
was growing rapidly, mainly due to high fertility. Consequently, the rapid population
growth in Pakistan has unavoidable—increasing from 33 millions according to the
first census taken in 1951 to 132 millions in 1998 and estimated at 173 millions in
2010. Thus rapid population growth has been a trait of Pakistani society in the 20th
century in the post colonial period. The population growth rate is the key determinant
of the progress in achieving the goals envisaged in every sector of society. With a
soaring population growth rate of 2.16 percent in 2005-2010, the government of Pak-
istan faces the challenges of the provision of education, health care, housing and every
other basic right while the economy remains under pressure.
Since Independence in 1947, the population growth has been rampant in each province
in Pakistan. The population of Pakistan at provincial levels experiences rapid growth
due to the mutual effect of declining mortality and slow decline in fertility. Figure
2.2 shows the population of Pakistan at the provincial level from 1951 to 2010. The
population of Punjab increased rapidly from 20 million in the 1951 census to 102
million in 2010, while the share of the population of Punjab to the national level
remains at one level - around 58 percent. The untamable population growth observed
in Sindh is due to high levels of fertility and internal migration from the other parts of
the country toward Sindh. The population of Sindh increased from 6 million in 1951
to 41 million in 2010 with a substantial gain in proportion to the national share from
18 percent in 1951 to 24 percent in 2010. The population of KPK and Balochistan was
growing significantly over the last five decades. However, the share of the population
of KPK and Balochistan to the total population of Pakistan has been stagnating during
the last five decades. However, approximately four-times the growth of the population
of KPK has been observed during the period of 1951 to 1998—from 5 million in 1951
to 18 million inhabitant in 1998 and 24 million in 2010. Interestingly, the population
of Balochistan increased nearly six times during the inter-censual period from 1951 to
1998—from 1.2 million in 1951 to 6.6 million in 1998 and estimated total population
of Balochistan in 2010 has 7.8 million inhabitants. Thus, rapid population growth
has a universal phenomenon in Pakistan and each province experienced a significant
growth during the last five decades.
2.2.1 Sustained Population growth since independence
During the second half of the 20th century, the population growth rate in Pakistan had
been fluctuating between 2 to 4 percent per annum. Inter-censual annual growth rate is
calculated for the period of 1951-61, 1961-1972, 1972-1981 and 1981-1998 from the
census data provided by the Federal Bureau of Statistics Pakistan and shown in Figure
2.3. The annual population growth rate in Pakistan during the period 1951-61 was 2.4
percent. The significant population growth observed in the Sindh—the annual popu-
lation growth during 1951-61 was 3.2 percent, due to the fact that the intensity of the
migration after partition in 1947 toward Sindh is substantially high. Approximately,
seven million people migrated from India after the partition in 1947 and most of them
had settled in Karachi, Sindh (Visaria, 1969). The Punjab and KPK also witnessed
a substantially high population growth rate during the period of 1951-61—more than
21
Figure 2.2: Total Population Of Pakistan at provincial level from 1951-2005
two percent in both provinces, whereas the Balochistan attained smallest population
growth. The inter-censual period of 1961-72 in Pakistan regarded as a period of mas-
sive population growth. During this period, Pakistan experienced the rapid population
growth rate, approximately four percent annually during the period 1961-72. Each
province in Pakistan also bore significant population growth during 1960s. The pop-
ulation in Sindh and Balochistan increased nearly five percent annually during the
period of 1961-72. However, nearly 3.5percent rise in the population of KPK and
Punjab had witnessed annually during the decades of 1960s.
The two major factors are responsible for rapid population growth in Pakistan at na-
tional and provincial level during the decade of 1960s. First, the objectives of the
population policy were not clear enough and socio-economic development during the
period had been scarcely improved particularly for less-developed provinces. Thus,
the rapid population growth rampant everywhere in Pakistan in 1960s. Second, the
two wars with India in 1965 and 1971 which accounts lot of casualties and prompted
refugees in Pakistan. During the next two inter-censual period, the population growth
rate had been declining systematically in all provinces in Pakistan except in Balochis-
tan, where the population growth rate jumped during the period of 1972-81 and later
had been level-off in next inter-censual period.
2.3 Diverse demographic transition
The demographic transition is a process where the societies make progress from tra-
ditional cultures-where birth and death rates are high - to the industrialized economic
societies where birth and death rates are low (Lee, 2003). Before the onset of demo-
graphic transition, births were numerous, life span was short, economic growth was
slow and population was young. In the beginning of demographic transition, first death
rate and then birth rate declined, causing the population growth rate first to acceler-
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Figure 2.3: Annual Population Growth rate
ate (creating young age structure of the population, this phenomenon being known as
the demographic dividend) and then slow down. Furthermore, when the demographic
transition well advances, this would cause lower birth rate, longer life expectancy
and relatively older population. In the framework of demographic transition, educa-
tion received a lot of importance because it proved that education (particularly female
education) would increase the likelihood and the pace of the transition due to the re-
lationship with fertility and mortality.
Based on several studies on the mortality in Pakistan after the independence, mortal-
ity had been declining since 1950s with an accelerated trend in the decades of 1960s
(Yousuf, 1969; Davis, 1968). According to the figure 2.4, the demographic transi-
tion model during the second half of the 20th century in Pakistan indicates that the
transition had not begun until the late 1980s. The mortality rate declined substan-
tially during the last 50 years in Pakistan. For instance, in 1950s, the crude death
rate (deaths per 1000 population) was 24 in Pakistan, which was very high among the
other South Asian countries except Sri-Lanka at that time. On average, approximately
67 percent decline in the crude death rate occurred during the period of 1950 to 2005
in Pakistan. However, pace of the decline of crude birth rate in Pakistan until the late
1980s stagnated at or above 40 births per 1000 population. This high birth rate hin-
dered the progress towards demographic transition in Pakistan. In the mid 1980s, the
first evidence unveiled from Pakistan DHS that the fertility transition initiated in Pak-
istan and also confirmed from Figure 2.4. It is worth mentioning that approximately,
2 percent decline in crude birth rate in Pakistan had been observed from 1950 to 1980,
and nearly 36 percent decline had attained from 1985 to 2005 . Thus, it is evident that
demographic transition in Pakistan had started in late 1980s and further quickened in
the decade of 1990s.
The fact that the pace of demographic transition is also assessed by net reproduction
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Figure 2.4: The Demographic Transition in Pakistan, Source: UN 2010
rate (NRR).1 The NRR fluctuated around 2 to 2.5 in Pakistan until late 1980s due to
the high fertility in the Past. NRR rose very rapidly from 1.82 percent in 1950-55 to
3.41 percent in 1980-85 and slowed down to the level of 1.8 in 2005-2010, due to the
decline in a death rate while the birth rate remained high. Therefore, the demographic
transition certainly has underway in Pakistan. The availability of the data on crude
birth and death rates at the provincial level in Pakistan hindered the analysis to assess
the demographic transition for each province. However, it is likely to assume that the
demographic transition has initiated in each province in Pakistan with diverse pace.
2.3.1 Socio-economic Inequalities between Provinces
The geographical variation with demographic, economic and social heterogeneity at
the provincial level in Pakistan goes simultaneously. Table 2.2 illustrates the socio-
economic and demographic characteristics of Pakistan at the provincial level around
the year 2005. The share of children aged 0-14 years was 38 percent in Pakistan
in 2005. Punjab has the least share in Pakistan of children aged 0-14 years, due to
the fact that Punjab has well advanced in fertility transition, whereas Balochistan has
the highest share of children aged 0-14 years—43 percent in 2005. The majority of
the provinces seen, on average, 58 percent of working-age population aged 15-64
in 2005 (see table 2.2). Balochistan considered less advance province in Pakistan in
term of demographic transition and socio-economic development as compared to other
provinces—the GDP per capita income was very low at US$ 410 in 2005. The GDP
per capita in Sindh is significantly higher in Pakistan—US$ 760 in 2005—due to the
fact that Capital of Sindh (Karachi) considered a larger hub of industries in Pakistan
and only working seaport as well as known as financial capital in Pakistan. According
to the Asian development bank (2005), the contribution of Karachi into the national
1The NRR is defined as the average number of potential daughter would be born to a female during
her reproductive life span conforming with the age-specific fertility and mortality rate in given years.
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GDP of Pakistan was 20 percent in 2005 (ADB, 2005). Punjab is the second largest
province in terms of GDP per capital income in Pakistan—580 US$ in 2005.
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Table 2.2: Socio-demographic Characteristics of Pakistan, 2005
Region
Pop. (%) HDI TFR GDPpc
SRB
Population Illiterate Pop (%)
0-14 15-64 2005 2006 US$ Dent. 1998 Male Female
Pakistan 38.1 57.8 0.48 4.1 600 108.5 166.3 30.3 51.6
Balochistan 42.9 54.2 0.56 4.1 410 114.6 18.9 45.7 69.5
KPK 41.1 55.1 0.61 4.3 480 105.0 238.1 28.9 61.9
Punjab 36.5 58.7 0.67 3.9 580 107.2 358.5 27.8 46.0
Sindh 39.3 57.3 0.63 4.3 760 112.2 216.0 34.1 56.4
Source: FBS , Govt. of Pakistan, PDHS 2006-07, UN 2010, UN HDI report (2008)
HDI = Human development Index, GDPpc = per capita GDP, SRB = Sex ratio at birth
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The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary indicator to access the social and
economic progress in a given country. It consists of three dimension namely, educa-
tion, health and standard of living to measure the socio-economic development2. It is
also used to address the policy questions that what is the level of human development
beside the economic growth in a given country—because economic growth alone does
not provide the guaranty that human development is also improved. For example dur-
ing the decades of 1980s, economic growth in Pakistan had been very high in the
history of Pakistan—nearly 6.6 percent GDP growth rate was observed during 1977-
88 (Hussain, 2010). However, the human development was not impressive during the
same period in Pakistan—i.e. the level of HDI was 0.38 in 19853. Thus, it is evident
that, economic growth is not solely responsible for the human development unless the
other sectors also accelerated i.e. education and health. Pakistan is the least-developed
region in the world after sub-Saharan Africa. In 2005, the human development index
(HDI) was 0.48 in Pakistan—falling in the low human development category. Ta-
ble 2.2 shows that the level of Human development Index at the provincial level in
Pakistan in 2005. On average, each province in Pakistan has a medium HDI value
ranging from 0.5-0.7. Balochistan is the least-developed region in the country with
HDI value approaching 0.55 in 2005, whereas the Punjab is more advanced in terms
of human development and standard of living with HDI value at 0.67. The data is also
available at the district level in Pakistan for HDI. The Islamabad Capital Territory ad-
vanced in human development—the HDI value for Islamabad in 2005 was 0.80. The
district of Karachi (Sindh) and Jhelum (Punjab) is well advanced in human develop-
ment and socio-economic progress in Pakistan. These districts have been approaching
a high HDI value (0.79 and 0.77 respectively) in 2005, whereas, the few districts in
Balochistan and KPK at the bottom of the list (Jamal and Khan, 2005).
Pakistan is one of the highly densely populated countries in the world. Table 2.2 illus-
trates that the population density at provincial level in Pakistan from census 1998. In
1998, the population density was 166 per sq.km in Pakistan. The adjusted population
density calculated (by Fouberg and Murphy, 2009) consists of population density per
sq.km of arable land. According to Fouberg and Murphy (2009), the real population
density in Pakistan was 834 per sq.km in 2005. Unfortunately, the recent data on pop-
ulation density at provincial level in Pakistan is not available. In 1998, a significant
provincial heterogeneity existed for population density in Pakistan, which ranges from
358 inhabitants per sq.km in Punjab, to an average of just 19 inhabitants per sq.km
in Balochistan. The fact that the low density in Balochistan the largest province,
in respect to the land area and bears the lowest share of the population in Pakistan.
2.3.2 Evolution of Age and sex population composition
Age and sex population distribution is the most essential population characteristics,
even more worthwhile than total population size. Age and sex composition of pop-
ulation provides the comprehensive picture of the population movement and charac-
teristics of the population reproduction and consequently in terms of of working-age
2http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/
3hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/PAK.html
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Figure 2.5: Population of Pakistan by age and sex from 1972-1998
population. Age and sex composition of the population consists of two factors; regu-
lar or evolutionary factor; which distinguish the smoothness of demographic processes
and demographic transition, excluding any discontinuities. Second, the crisis factor
which disturbs the normal demographic process such as war, famine and mass repres-
sion and massive migration; For example, migration after the partition of India and
Pakistan in 1947. Keyfitz, 1987 has established the concept of demographic discon-
tinuities to describe these interruptions. Demographic discontinuities caused by the
sudden changes in fertility, as an illustration, (e.g. Baby boom in Europe) and mor-
tality levels, for instance, (e.g. World War 1 & II, and Spanish influenza in 1920) of
different cohorts that are affected by these distractions. In a long term, these demo-
graphic discontinuities generate the hump in age structures. In the following section,
we will discuss the age and sex distribution of population in Pakistan at the provincial
level.
Pakistan is the youngest nation in the world after sub-Sahara African countries with
a median age 21.2 years in 2010.4 We have calculated the Median age at provincial
level in Pakistan for the year 2010 (United-Nations, 2010). Balochistan and KPK are
the youngest provinces in Pakistan—the median age has 19.9 years in 2010 for both
provinces. The median age is high in Punjab—22.3 years in 2010—because of the fact
that Punjab has well advanced in fertility transition as compared to other provinces in
Pakistan. Median age, a crude measure of young population reveals that three con-
trasting situations inherited from the process of demographic transition. The young
population, contrasts observed in all provinces since 1972 where the fertility transi-
tion had hardly started until the 1990s, and the population was particularly young. In
1998, the Punjab and Balochistan were the youngest population (median age was 16.3
and 16.7 respectively), whereas in Sindh and KPK all of which engage in the fertility
transition, median age was on average 18 years (See Table 2.3).
4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_median_age
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Since 1972, all provinces in Pakistan had the population with large proportion of
young peoples aged 0-14 years. Table 2.3 illustrates the proportion of two broad
age groups (0-14 and 15-64), median age and sex ratio at birth for each province in
Pakistan during the last four decades. The highest share of the young population in
last census 1998 observed in KPK-which increased from 45 percent in 1972 to 47.3
percent in 1998. The pace of growth for young population aged (0-14) is more rapid
in Balochistan, 9 percent increase occurred in young population aged 0-14 year-from
42 percent in 1972 to 47 in 1998. The Punjab and Sindh had relatively a similar share
of young aged children (0-14) in 1998—42.5 percent in Punjab and 42.8 percent in
Sindh, respectively. Interestingly, the proportion of young population was stagnating
during the last three decades in Punjab and Sindh (See Table 2.3). On aggregate level,
the proportion of younger population under aged 15 years had more than 40 percent
in all provinces in Pakistan during the last four decades. Furthermore, the proportion
of working-age population people aged 15-64 increased during last four decades in
all provinces except KPK where the proportion of working-age population actually
declined. The further increase will be expected in all provinces due to the population
momentum and slow pace of fertility decline that each province in Pakistan experi-
enced in the recent past. The phase where dependency ratio (the proportion has above
60 percent for working aged and has less than 30 percent of young population aged 0-
14) is very low regarded as “demographic window." During this phase, countries have
the opportunity for development, since the dependency ratio is low and expenditure of
education and health of young children (aged 0-14) has negligible, health and pension
costs of older people reduced the burden on the economic growth. Pakistan is now
in a position to benefit from this opportunity, and this would be possible only as the
working-age population must be employed and educated.
The population pyramid by age and sex for each province in Pakistan shows in figure
2.5 and 2.6 for the last three censuses of 1972, 1981, 1998. The base of the population
pyramid of Pakistan prolonged since 1972 in response of high fertility. This pattern
observed universally in Pakistan, and each province experienced a substantial rise in
birth rate. Two main conclusions can be made here from population pyramid presented
in figure 2.5 and 2.6. First, the young age structure is prominent in response of early
phase of demographic transition. On one hand, the young population is an opportunity
because if this large labor force is well educated, skilled and effectively employed, it
could be a key asset for the country. On the other hand, the substantial concentration
of people and working-age population (if not educated and unemployed) puts severe
pressure on the government to provide basic needs for life, education, health and em-
ployment to their peoples. Second, each province in Pakistan has now well advanced
in their fertility transition and enters into the phase of the demographic windows of
opportunities. Due to the high fertility in the past, the large cohorts now enter into the
childbearing age. This implies that two major conclusions here; one, Pakistan experi-
enced a large youth bulge which is most favorable for socio-economic development.
Second, due to the momentum of the population, rapid population growth would be
unavoidable in near and distant future—at least 40 to 50 years—because the large
youth cohorts would enter childbearing ages.
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Figure 2.6: Population by age and sex of Pakistan at provincial level from 1972-1998
The population of Pakistan at the provincial level is also differentiated by sex ratio.
The sex ratio is an important indicator to measure the sex imbalance. Sex ratio at
birth is defined here as the number of females per 100 males. Table 2.3 presents
the sex ratio at birth for each province in Pakistan for the period of 1998, 1981 and
1972. The sex imbalance at birth was affected in all provinces in Pakistan except
Balochistan, where the female surplus was found during the last three census. The sex
ratio at birth in Balochistan was in favor of female during last four decades, reflecting
that infant mortality rate has been very low, particularly for girls. On the other hand,
the sex imbalance prominent in other three provinces in Pakistan— the sex ratio at
birth was 94 females per 100 male in KPK and Sindh in 1998, and slightly higher in
Punjab in 1998. This indicates the stronger son’s preference in these provinces. The
large sex imbalance at birth was mainly due to the interplay of several factors, such
as sex selective migration/abortion, and discrimination against girl children in these
provinces.
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Table 2.3: Indicator of Age-sex composition of population in Pakistan at provincial level 1972-1998
Region
Median Age Population 0-14 (%) Population 15-64 (%) Sex ratio at birth
1972 1981 1998 1972 1981 1998 1972 1981 1998 1972 1981 1998
Pakistan 18.7 17.9 18.2 43.3 44.5 43.4 52.4 51.2 53.1 96.9 99.0 94.9
Balochistan 19.1 15.8 16.7 42.2 48.5 46.5 54.8 48.5 61.8 108.2 114.9 102.2
KPK 17.8 16.8 18.6 45.0 46.7 47.3 51.6 49.5 49.8 96.1 101.6 93.7
Punjab 18.7 18.4 16.3 43.2 43.4 42.5 51.7 51.7 53.4 96.0 92.9 95.2
Sindh 18.8 17.7 18.5 43.3 45.1 42.8 53.3 51.6 54.5 98.8 110.9 93.5
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Govt. of Pakistan
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2.3.3 Urbanization and urban population growth
Pakistan experienced rapid urban population growth and urbanization during the last
four decades.5 Approximately, 18 percent of the total population in Pakistan had ur-
banized in 1951, and increased to 33 percent in 1998 and estimated the 35 percent
in 2005 (United-Nations, 2010). The proportion of people living in urban dwelling
increased sharply during the past fifty years in Pakistan. The urban population of Pak-
istan increased from 6 million in 1951 to 43 million in 1998, representing a nearly
seven fold increase over five decades (see Table 2.4). Pakistan is a country in the
South Asia region with the utmost percentage of urban population in 2005. Whereas,
the lower level of urbanization observed in Sri-Lanka and Nepal, only 15 percent of
the inhabitants has urban dwellers in 2005(Veron et al., 2008). The major factors
that are responsible for urban population growth in Pakistan were natural increase and
internal migration. Recently, the urban population growth dominated by natural in-
crease, and about one-fifth (1/5) of urban growth was attributed by internal migration
(Arif and Hamid, 2009).
The profound heterogeneity in urban population existed at provincial level in Pak-
istan. Sindh is the most urbanized province of Pakistan mainly due to the share of
the population of metropolitan city Karachi–which accounts for 33 percent of the total
population of the province. In 1998, almost 50 percent of the population of Sindh
lived in the urban areas6. Although, Punjab carries the highest number of urban popu-
lation, it constitutes of only 32 percent of the entire population of Punjab. The share of
urban population was 17 and 24 percent in KPK and Balochistan, respectively in 1998.
The pace of change in urban population in Pakistan differs greatly between the peri-
ods and provinces. For instance, particularly in Punjab, the pace of change very rapid
during the inter-censual periods from 1951-1998. The urban population in Punjab was
growing from 3.57 million to 5.47 million during the period 1951-61, and reached at
13 million and 23 million in 1981 and 1998, respectively. This represents 8 times
increase in the urban population in Punjab from 1951 to 1998. The urban population
grew rapidly in Balochistan from 1951 to 1998-approximately 10 times increase in
urban population from 0.14 million in 1950 to 1.6 million in 1998. The growth of
urban population in the remaining two provinces (KPK and Sindh) in Pakistan had
moderate from 1951 to 1998-about 7 time increase. The urban population projection
shows that about half of Pakistan’s population will be living in cities by the year 2030.
According to the United Nation forecast in 20097, Pakistan will remain on the top of
the list of most urbanized country in the South Asian region up to 2050, with nearly
three in five inhabitants living in cities (60 percent of total population).
The huge diversity exists between the cities in Pakistan with respect to total popula-
tion size. Karachi-capital of Sindh province-is the largest metropolitan city in Pakistan
5“The concept of ‘urban growth’ is different from ‘urbanization’, which refers to the rise in the
proportion of total population living in urban areas due to rural-urban migration, whereas urban growth
refers to the increasing population living in urban areas”.
6It is interesting to note that, by excluding the population of Karachi, the level of urbanization in
Sindh declines to 28 percent.
7http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/unup/index.asp?panel=1
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Table 2.4: Urban Population and Percentage of Urban Population at Provincial level of Pak-
istan 1951-1998
Region 1951 1961 1972 1981 1998
Pakistan
5,985,497 9,654,572 16,593,651 23,841,471 43,036,404
17.7 22.5 25.4 28.3 32.5
Balochistan
144,549 228,468 399,584 676,772 1,568,780
12 17 16 16 24
KPK
504,745 758,516 1,195,655 1,665,653 2,994,084
11 13 14 15 17
Punjab
3,568,076 5,475,922 9,182,695 13,051,646 23,019,025
17 22 24 28 31
Sindh
1,768,127 3,167,018 5,725,776 8,243,036 14,839,862
29.2 37.9 40.4 43.3 48.8
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Govt. of Pakistan, UN urban prospects 2009
with an estimated population of 10 million in 2000 and is include in the world’s thir-
teen largest cities. Lahore-capital of Punjab-is second-largest city in Pakistan with
5.44 million inhabitants in 2000 and forecast shows that the population of Lahore
would be 10 million inhabitants in 2030. It is also noteworthy that ten largest cities in
Pakistan have the population greater than one million except Quetta and Islamabad in
2000 and projection shows that the enormous growth will be observed for the cities in
Pakistan in the next two decades. The most spectacular growth over the last fifty years
was observed in Lahore, the population increased from 0.83 million in 1950 to 5.45
million in 2000 and should be approximately doubled during the next two decades.
The Faisalabad, second largest city of Punjab is most populous city in Northern Pun-
jab. Almost twenty-fold increase has observed in the population of Faisalabad from
0.16 million to 2.14 million during the period of 1950-2000. The pace of population
growth of Quetta has faster than that of Islamabad where population increased nearly
six fold. The population of Peshwar and Rawalpindi grew by a factor of 10-12 times
over the period of 1950-2000 (See Table 2.5).
Table 2.5 presents the percentage of the urban population of big cities in Pakistan from
1950 to 2030. The comparison in the last fifty years in Pakistan shows that, Karachi
and Lahore have the largest urban agglomeration in Pakistan with 20.4 percent and 11
percent urban population in 2000 respectively, which is higher than the largest urban
agglomeration in India (Delhi and Mumbai). The weight of the capital cities in their
respective provinces to the total population of the Pakistan also varies. Karachi has the
home of 7 percent of the population of Pakistan, while almost 4 percent of inhabitants
of Pakistan live in Lahore. The Population of Peshawar and Quetta, the capital of
KPK and Balochistan respectively, represents less than 1 percent of the Pakistan’s
population. Islamabad–the capital of Pakistan–has recorded the highest annual urban
growth rate of 4.28 in the period of 2000-2005 mainly due to internal migration from
other parts of the country.
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Table 2.5: Population change in selected largest cities in Pakistan between 1950-2005
City
Population (000) Percentage of urban population Change
1950 1975 2000 2030 1950 1975 2000 2030 2000-05
Faisalabad 168 907 2140 4200 2.3 4.8 4.4 4.1 3.08
Gujranwala 118 427 1224 2464 1.6 2.3 2.5 2.4 3.26
Hyderabad 232 667 1222 2373 3.2 3.6 2.5 2.3 2.64
Islamabad 36 107 595 1295 0.5 0.6 1.2 1.3 4.28
Karachi 1055 3989 10021 18725 14.6 21.3 20.4 18.5 2.96
Lahore 836 2399 5449 10308 11.6 12.8 11.1 10.1 2.88
Multan 186 599 1263 2474 2.6 3.2 2.6 2.4 2.8
Peshawar 153 347 1066 2128 2.1 1.9 2.2 2.1 3.05
Quetta 83 190 614 1272 1.1 1 1.3 1.2 3.45
Rawalpindi 233 670 1520 3008 3.2 3.6 3.1 2.9 3.07
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Govt. of Pakistan
Change: Annual Rate of change
2.4 Ethnic and religious Population composition in Pak-
istan
Pakistan is a multi-lingual and multi-cultural society. In Pakistan, ethnicity is closely
bound up with provincial societies, which are further desegregated internally into
tribes, caste, regional and local communities of distinct dialects of languages and tra-
ditions. The ethnic composition presents here is roughly based on the linguistic distri-
bution of population. Ethnically, Pakistan’s society is divided into six major groups,
with each group having a distinct cultural and linguistic mores, namely as Punjabi,
Sindhi, Pushtu, Baluchi, Saraiki and Urdu. Table 2.6 shows the ethnic-linguistic pop-
ulation composition in Pakistan from 1998 census. In the 1998, the largest ethos-
linguistic group was Punjabi, who comprised 44 percent of the total population of
Pakistan. The Punjabi speaking population mostly dominated in Punjab (about 75
percent of the population in Punjab has Punjabi dialect) following with 7 percent in
Sindh in 1998. The second most commonly spoken language in Pakistan is Pushtu,
nearly 15 percent of the population has Pushtu dialect in 1998. The Pushton speaking
population mainly lived in KPK and Balochistan, 74 percent and 30 percent respec-
tively. The third largest ethnic group in Pakistan is Sindhi; nearly 14 percent of the
total population of Pakistan has Sindhi dialect in 1998 and residing in Sindh province
(60 percent of the Sindh population has Sindhi language in 1998). Although Urdu is
the official national language of Pakistan, only 8 percent of the population has a native
Urdu speaking in Pakistan in 1998. The Urdu speaking population generally identified
as the Muhajirs (the people who migrated after the partition in 1947) in Pakistan. The
second largest ethnic group in Punjab is Saraiki, mainly situated in Southern Punjab.
They consist of 17 percent of the Population of Punjab and nearly 11 percent of the
total population of Pakistan in 1998.
The relationship of ethnicity and population growth is very strong in Pakistani set-
ting. The conflict between the different ethnic groups had started from the colonial
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Table 2.6: Ethnic Population composition at regional level in Pakistan 1998 (%)
Region Urdu Punjabi Sindhi Pushtu Baluchi Saraiki Others
Pakistan 7.57 44.15 14.1 15.42 3.57 10.53 4.66
Balochistan 0.97 2.52 5.58 29.64 54.76 2.42 4.11
KPK 0.78 0.97 0.04 73.9 0.01 3.86 20.43
Punjab 4.51 75.23 0.13 1.16 0.66 17.36 0.95
Sindh 21.05 6.99 59.73 4.19 2.11 1.00 4.93
Source: Census 1998, FBS Govt of Pakistan
Table 2.7: Religion Population distribution of Pakistan at provincial level: 1998
Region Muslim Christian Hindu Qadiani
Pakistan 96.3 1.6 1.6 0.2
Punjab 97.2 2.3 0.1 0.3
Sindh 91.3 1.0 6.5 0.1
KPK 99.4 0.2 0.0 0.2
Balochistan 98.8 0.4 0.5 0.1
Source: Census 1998, FBS Pakistan
era and was flourishing after independence in 1947. During the British colonial pe-
riod, the inequities of access to jobs, political power, cultural and religious autonomy
were vital factors in the struggle for the independence of Pakistan. Among other fac-
tors, struggling for a better economic development, maintaining cultural and linguistic
identity and political power were the motives that agitated ethnic interests. To main-
tain their identity, each ethnic group in Pakistan has focus on the higher number of
children. This phenomenon has confirmed in the recent PDHS 2006-07, where the
Saraiki speaking women have higher number of children—on average 6 children per
women—in Punjab. In recent years, the Saraiki speaking people now demand for a
separate province because of their economic and political power.
Islam is the state religion of Pakistan. Table 2.7 shows that the religious population
composition of Pakistan at regional levels from 1998 census. Historically, Pakistan is
an Islamic state with nearly 97 percent of its population is Muslim. The Christian and
Hindu comprise remaining 3 percent of the total population. The Muslim population
in Sindh has been least as compared to other provinces. The proportion of Muslim’s
population in Sindh was 91 percent in 1998. The majority of the Hindu population
has lived in Sindh province (7 percent of the Sindh population) while they were very
much a minority in other parts of the country. The proportion of Christians has been
exceeding just over 2 percent in Punjab and almost a negligible share in remaining
provinces.
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2.5 Fertility transition in Pakistan at regional level
2.5.1 Tantalizing Fertility decline
The measurement of the total fertility rates in Pakistan is relatively a complex task par-
ticularly at provinces level in past because information for the reproductive behavior
of women has not been published in censuses. Virtually, there is no vital registration
system existing in Pakistan. The only source about the reproductive behavior is from
different surveys conducted at the national and international level. Figure 2.7 shows
the total fertility rate in Pakistan from four different sources, namely Pakistan demo-
graphic and health survey (PDHS), UN 2010 World Population Prospects, US Census
bureau and official estimates, published by the Federal bureau Statistics Pakistan based
on different surveys conducted at the national level—such as Pakistan demographic
survey (PDS). Total Fertility rate (TFR) in Pakistan had been very high during the
decades of 1950s and 1960s ranging between six to seven children per women. Ac-
cording to a Population Growth experiment survey in 1962-65, indirect estimate of
the TFR was 7.95 children per women in Pakistan. On average, TFR in Pakistan in-
creased from 6.3 in the decade of 1960s to around 6.8 in the decade of 1970s (Sathar,
2007). In spite of the first family planning program implemented in Pakistan during
the Ayub regime in 1965. Due to lack of funds, political instability, social and cultural
obstacles, these programs were never successful during the 1960s and 1970s. There
are several reasons of such high fertility in Pakistan during the decades of 1960s and
1970s. On the one hand, the religious parties and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto attached the
family planning program as a part of the campaign against the Ayub Khan in 1970s,
and giving the general public the idea that, family planning program had a western
agenda against Pakistan. Thus, due to social-political changes during the decade of
1970s, family planning program became inactive during this regime.
The mean number of children per women fell sharply in late 1980s in Pakistan. The
evidence of first fertility decline came out from the Pakistan demographic and health
survey conducted in 1990-91, where the estimated TFR was 5.4 children per women.8
According to Figure 2.7, during the decade of 1980s, fertility declined sharply at a
rate of roughly 20 percent based on the estimates from official sources in Pakistan.
Whereas according to United Nations and the US census bureau, the decline was 18
percent during the decades of 1980s in Pakistan. Thus, there is an ample evidence
that the fertility transition in Pakistan had begun in late 1980s and quickened further
at a rate of one percent per annum during the decades of 1990s. It is worth mentioning
that during the period of two Demographic and Health survey in Pakistan from 1990 to
2006, the total fertility rate declined one percent per year. It implies that with the same
rate of decline, Pakistan will reach replacement level fertility in 20 years from 2005
(i.e TFR: 3.65 in 2005-2010 and with 0.07 children decline per year, TFR reaches 2.1
in 2025-30) which is far behind of the assumed year by United Nations 2010 World
Population Prospects (UN assumed in 30 years; TFR: 2.1 in 2035-40).
Figure 2.8 illustrates the total fertility rate at provincial level in Pakistan from Pak-
8The estimates are based on six years preceding the survey
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Figure 2.7: Total Fertility rate in Pakistan from 1950 to 2007
istan Demographic and Health Surveys (PDHS), which was carried out in 1990-91
and 2006-07. In 1990-91, total fertility rate in Pakistan at a national level was 5.4
children per woman. However, TFR had already slightly lowered—5.1 children per
women—in the southern province of Pakistan (i.e Sindh). The spatial structure of Pak-
istan segregated into three groups based on their level of fertility transition and socio-
economic development: a rapid fertility transition observed in Punjab and Balochistan
during 1990-2006; to slow pace of decline experienced in Sindh during 1990-2006;
and KPK stand in a middle position with moderating decline during the same period.
The fertility transition in Punjab and Balochistan was significantly faster compared
to other provinces in Pakistan. According to the PDHS, the total fertility rate fell
sharply in Punjab and Balochistan at the rate of 28 percent and 29 percent, respec-
tively during the period of 1991-2006–from 5.4 children to 3.9 children per women
in Punjab and from 5.8 children to 4.1 children per women in Balochistan. The total
fertility rate experienced a slow decline in Sindh during the period 1990-2006. Ap-
proximately, 16 percent decline in total fertility rate observed in Sindh—TFR from
5.1 children per women in 1990 to 4.3 in 2006. On the other hand, KPK accom-
plished a moderate fertility decline during the period 1990-2006. Roughly, 22 percent
decline in total fertility rate notified in KPK—from 5.5 children per women to 4.3
during 1990-2006. The pace of the decline in Balochistan had rapid during the last
two decades—29 percent from 1990 to 2006. Indeed, improved socio-economic de-
velopment and educational level in Punjab assumed the vital factors that contribute in
the fertility transition in Punjab. However, it is unclear yet in Balochistan and need
further extensive research to explore the causes and determinants of fertility transi-
tion in Balochistan. The human development Index in Punjab is the highest value in
Pakistan in recent years. The decline in fertility in Punjab was primarily achieved
through contraceptive prevalence. However, age at marriage, infant mortality rate and
female education also considerably improved in the recent past. Education reform
program in Punjab has set up with the assistant of World Bank to promote literacy and
universal primary enrollment particular for females in early 1990s. These programs
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Table 2.8: Total fertility rate in Pakistan at provincial level from 1990-2006
Region
Total fertility rate
1990-91 2006-07 % decline
Pakistan 5.4 4.1 24
Punjab 5.4 3.9 28
Sindh 5.1 4.3 16
KPK 5.5 4.3 22
Balochistan 5.8 4.1 29
Source: PDHS
seem to have been more important as compared to specific family planning program
initiative to convince the couples about the quantity-quality trade-off of children, a
well-known factor in fertility reduction. The level of socio-economic development
and urbanization has not a sole factor for accelerating the fertility transition in Pun-
jab and Balochistan. This needs a further call for investigation about the determinant
of the fertility transition at the provincial level, particularly in Punjab and Balochistan.
2.5.2 Age specific fertility rate
The Pakistan DHS reveals that the progress of fertility transition in Pakistan and sug-
gested that the age pattern has remained in place. The pattern of age specific fertility
rate in Pakistan during the period from 1975 to 2006 is based on the several sources at
a national and international level and shown in figure 2.8. In 1975, teenage births in
Pakistan had very common factors and was significantly at higher level. The fertility
decline has observed at all ages during 1975 to 2006, however, the high fertility seen
in the age group 25-29 (237 births per 1000 women). Figure 2.8 shows the timing of
childbearing in earlier ages during the mid 1970s, and thus moved the fertility upward.
Higher level of teenage births and substantially higher level of fertility from the age
group 25-29 onwards were reflecting the lower level of contraceptive prevalence and
an early age at marriage in respective age groups in Pakistan. In 1975, the highest
age specific fertility rate observed for age group 25-29 in Pakistan (above 300 births
per 1000 women) and explained by the fact that the contraception prevalence among
married women was very low at that time. The relatively high fertility kept constant
for age group 25-29 throughout the decades of 1970 and 1980 in Pakistan.
Although, the TFR declined steadily during the period from 1975 to 2006, age pat-
tern did not shift toward the latter childbearing and explained by the fact that fertility
preference has not changed and ideal family size still high in Pakistan. The fertility
rate was very high in Pakistan in teenage, slightly over 100 births per 1000 women in
1975 and 50 births per 1000 women in 2006-07 for age group 15-19 (See figure 2.8).
This explains the fact the early marriages are very common throughout the history of
Pakistan. The age-specific fertility rate in Pakistan is a characteristic of population
where later entry into childbearing, substantially low age at marriage and use of con-
traception in the early years of marriages has not been yet widespread particularly, in
rural areas of Pakistan. It shows that at all ages the fertility of women in Pakistan and
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Figure 2.8: Age specific fertility rate in Pakistan from 1975-2006
likely for all provinces declined. However the pattern of the fertility curve is the same
and only the level of fertility curve declined. This pattern of the fertility curve may
bring down by rising age at marriage and relatively high prevalence of contraception
practiced by older women. The vivid fertility decline in all age groups in Pakistan
during 1975 to 2006 suggested that simultaneously, young couples were starting their
childbearing later, married women were postponed their births afterward and older
women were stopping their childbearing. Figure 2.8 shows this behavior that explains
the moderate decline in total fertility rates that had occurred in Pakistan since the late
1980s.
Figure 2.9 shows the age-specific fertility rate at the provincial level in Pakistan during
the last two decades. The trend of the age specific fertility rates at national and provin-
cial level in Pakistan resembled during last two decades - concentrate in the early and
middle ages of childbearing before the transition start in the late 1980s, a decline start
in 1990s followed by a slow decline during 1990 to 2006. At provincial level, fertility
declined at all ages during 1990 to 2006. In Punjab, fertility rate was at its peak at
age 25-29 (261 births per 100 women) followed by age group 30-34 (223 births per
1000 women) in 1990. The shape of the age-specific fertility curve has similar char-
acteristics in the 2006 curve, highest fertility rates recorded in the age group 25-29
(243 births per 1000 women). The teenage childbearing is common in every province
in Pakistan, where the median age at first marriage of women age 25-49 in Pakistan
has 19.1 years (PDHS 2006-07). The median age at first marriage is very high in
Punjab (19.6 years) and lowest in Sindh (18.1 years). Interestingly, in Balochistan,
the teenage births was high as compared to other provinces in 1990-91 (132 births per
1000 women), Whereas, in 2006 the fertility rate in Balochistan for age group 15-19
has lowest in Pakistan (34 births per 1000 women). Thus, Pakistani women had a rela-
tively early childbearing pattern until 1990s although the pro-natalist policies adopted
by the government of Pakistan since 1965. This pattern did not sustain longer. As the
age at first marriage increased, fertility shifted to a relatively later childbearing pattern.
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Figure 2.9: Age specific fertility rate at the provincial level in Pakistan from 1990-2006
2.5.3 Total fertility rate by background characteristics in Pakistan
Based on the experience of other contemporary less-developed counties, the substan-
tial difference exists in urban-rural fertility. For instance, if a country is in early or
middle stage of the transition, the difference is significant (for example, in Pakistan,
the difference of urban to rural TFRs has 1.0 children per women in 2006-07), while
on the other hand, if the country is well advanced in demographic transition, the dif-
ference is negligible (e.g. In Iran, the difference of urban-rural TFRs has 0.4 children
per women in 2006-1.7 and 2.1 children per women in urban and rural areas respec-
tively; Abbasi-Shavazi et al. (2009)). Table 2.9 sheds the light on the trend of TFR
by woman’s place of residence and educational level in Pakistan from 1990-2006.
Here, we examine the urban-rural fertility differentials in Pakistan at the provincial
level during the last two decades. The urban population growth has been very rapid in
Pakistan during the last four decades. During the decade of 1970s, the urban fertility
had slightly lower the rural fertility in Pakistan (Yusuf and Retherford, 1981). They
had estimated that in 1975, the total fertility rate in rural and urban areas in Pakistan
had 6.98 and 7.07 respectively. The table 2.9 shows that the substantial fertility dif-
ferentials observed by place of residence in Pakistan at the provincial level. The total
fertility rate in urban areas has less than rural areas by 1.2 children per women in Pak-
istan. As depicted, fertility rates were much higher in rural areas than in urban areas
during 1990-2006. The difference of 1.0 child per women between urban and rural
areas in Punjab, 1.7 in Sindh, 0.9 in KPK and 1.0 child per women in Balochistan
has observed (See table 2.9).Table 2.9 shows that urban areas are at the forefront of
fertility decline with fertility going down by more than a child in all provinces (except
KPK where the decline is 0.9 child) from 1990 to 2006.
The survey data on fertility levels by women’s educational attainment detailed in Table
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Table 2.9: Total fertility rate by background characteristics in Pakistan at provincial level:
1990-2006
Region Years
Place of Residence Level of Education
Urban Rural E1 E2 E3 E4
Pakistan
2006-07 3.3 4.5 4.8 4.0 3.1 2.3
1990-91 4.5 5.1 5.2 4.3 4.0 2.9
Punjab
2006-07 3.4 4.4 4.7 4.1 3.3 2.4
1990-91 4.7 5.3 5.4 4.2 4.4 3.7
Sindh
2006-07 3.2 4.9 4.8 3.9 2.8 2.2
1990-91 4.3 4.4 5.2 4.5 2.9 -
KPK
2006-07 3.7 4.6 4.9 3.6 3.3 2.4
1990-91 4.5 5.4 5.5 3.7 3.4 -
Balochistan
2006-07 3.4 4.4 4.4 3.2 3.0 1.3
1990-91 4.6 4.1 4.4 4.3 - -
Source:Author’s Calculation from PDHS, 1990-91 and 2006-07
E1= No education, E2= Primary, E3= Secondary, E4= Tertiary
2.10 show a consistent difference of 2-3 children between those women who did not
receive any education, and those who received a secondary or post-secondary educa-
tion. In 2006, the latest study available on fertility differentials by education showed
that those are quite significant in Pakistan, with women with no education having
more than twice the fertility of those who have a university education. This negative
relationship between education and fertility recognized in all countries at all stages
of development, particularly very strong in those countries that are in the middle of
the demographic transition (Cleland, 2000; Martin and Juarez, 1995), as is currently
Pakistan. Soomro and Mahmood (2004) argue that any family planning program in
Pakistan would be weak in reaching illiterate women and therefore investment in fe-
male education should be prioritized. The educated couples will be more prone to use
modern birth control techniques, towards which they will have a better perception and
an easier access than less educated couples (Saleem and Bobak, 2005). Thus, if the
woman’s education was improved, significant decline in fertility and consequently in
population growth would be achieve (see Abadian, 1996; Jejeebhoy, 1995; Martin and
Juarez, 1995 on relationship between women’s education and fertility).
The educational differentials in fertility were quite high in Pakistan at the provincial
level during last two decades. Table 2.9 illustrates the differential by level of education
at the provincial level in Pakistan from 1990 to 2006. The differentials by educational
level have very wide in Pakistan in 2006-07; women with no education have on av-
erage 4.8 children versus only 2.3 children of women who had a university degree.
During the period of 1990-2006 in Pakistan, 8 percent decline in TFR of women with
no education has observed. Whereas, the intriguing decline of 21 percent happened in
fertility of women with tertiary education in Pakistan. In Punjab, the difference of 2.3
children per women observed in TFR between the women with no education and ter-
tiary education in 2006-07. However, in Sindh, the difference of 2.6 children between
women with lowest and highest educational levels observed in 2006. Consequently,
women with no education on average have more than twice the fertility of those with
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Table 2.10: Total fertility rate (TFR) by level of educational attainment from 1975-2006-07
level 1975a 1990-91b 1997c 2006-07b
No Education 6.5 5.7 6.0 4.8
Primary 5.9 4.9 4.9 4.0
Middle
3.4
4.5 4.4 3.2
Secondary
3.6
3.1 3.1
Tertiary 3.5 2.3
Total 6.3 4.9 4.0 4.1
Note:(a) Pakistan Fertility survey, (b) PDHS
(c) Pakistan Fertility and family planning survey
a tertiary education in each province in Pakistan, who already have close to replace-
ment level fertility in 2006-07. This low fertility level of tertiary educated women
means that although few women have a tertiary education, the opportunities of the
higher-education act as disincentives to “investing” in having many children. Thus, if
the education of women was to increase, an important decline in fertility would po-
tentially follow.
2.5.4 Proximate Determinants of fertility
There is an ample evidence found in the literature that changes in socio-economic
factors often accounted for changes in reproductive behavior of the women. These
factors cannot affect directly, but through intermediate variable which Bongaarts,
1978 named as “proximate determinants." The most imperative are of which relate
to marriage, contraception and breastfeeding. The national population policy of var-
ious countries has attempted to reduce population growth through these proximate
determinants, such as fixing the minimum legal age of marriage of women, the avail-
ability of family planning and access to legal abortion. In the following sections, we
will discuss the proximate determinants of Pakistan at provincial level.
2.5.4.1 Marriage
The marriages are the social and religious compulsions in Pakistan. The births outside
marriage have very rare and unacceptable in Pakistani culture. The length of the pe-
riod of women in childbearing influences the number of the children women can bear.
Therefore, in this context, age at marriage plays a vital role in fertility transition in
Pakistan. In Pakistan, marriages are virtually universal and considered as the onset of
childbearing in the society. Thus, women who get married early will have longer years
of exposure for pregnancy that often leads the higher fertility. Currently, the minimum
legal age at marriage in Pakistan is 18 years for male and 16 years for female. Table
2.11 illustrates the median age at first marriage and first birth among ever married
women aged 25-49 by background characteristics, at provincial level and at national
level in Pakistan for the period of 1990-91 and 2006-07. It shows that median age at
marriage in Pakistan very likely to rose over time—from 18.6 year in 1990-91 to 19.1
years in 2006-07. This tendency is likely to accelerate into the future because the level
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Table 2.11: Median age at marriage and birth at provincial level in Pakistan: 1990-2006
Median Age Median Age
at 1st marriage at 1st birth
2006-07 1990-91 2006-07 1990-91
Pakistan 19.1 18.6 21.8 21.3
Punjab 19.6 19.0 22.1 21.6
Sindh 18.1 17.1 21.1 20.6
KPK 18.7 19.3 21.2 21.4
Balochistan 19.3 17.7 22.3 20.3
Urban 19.7 19.1 22.2 21.3
Rural 18.8 18.4 21.5 21.3
No Education 18.7 18.3 21.0 21.0
Primary 19.8 18.7 21.8 21.1
Secondary 22.0 22.5 23.0 24.0
Source: PDHS: 2006-07 & 1990-91
of education and empowerment of women increases. Age at marriage in urban areas
is slightly higher than rural areas in Pakistan during the period of 1990-2006. The
difference of a 0.9 year in age at marriage is observed between urban and rural areas
in 2006-07, while a 0.7 year difference is notified in 1990-91. Education considered
the strongest factor of heterogeneity in age at marriage in Pakistan. A woman with no
education tends to marry earlier than women with higher education—3.3 years differ-
ence in age at marriages between women of no education and women with secondary
education in 2006-07 (See table 2.11). At provincial level, women in Sindh tend to
marry earlier as compared to other provinces in Pakistan (18.1 year in 2006-07). The
age at marriage has been highest in Punjab in 2006-07 (19.6 years). The women in
Punjab want to marry later because of the improvement in educational level in recent
decades, particularly for females. The important factors that explain the rise of age
at marriages at the provincial level in Pakistan are female education and labor-force
participation.
Table 2.11 also shows the age at first birth in Pakistan was quite high as compared
to age at marriage. In 2006-07, on average, the Pakistani women give their first birth
2.7 years after first marriage. This trend is common among women in urban and rural
areas in Pakistan. At the provincial level in Pakistan, the duration varies between 2.5
to three years in 2006-07. Since the age at first marriage increased, the age at first birth
also mounted over time. With continuing socio-economic development, particularly
female education and integration of mass media with more advanced urban-values,
there is a considerable increase in age at marriage and consequently further prolonging
the age at first birth in Pakistan will have been inhibiting influence on the fertility
transition.
2.5.4.2 Contraception
The success story of family planning program in Pakistan has not been stunning, al-
though Pakistan became one of the first countries in South Asia to launch a family
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Figure 2.10: Trend in Contraception Use (in percent) for both Modern and Traditional meth-
ods in Pakistan: 1975-2006; Source: PDHS 2006-07 & 1990-91
planning program in 1965. During his tenure, President Ayub (1958-1969) referred
to the consequence of rapid population growth in Pakistan and the need of the fam-
ily planning program. Thus, in third five year plan of Pakistan (1965-70), the family
planning program was installed. The program had not been successful during the
decades of 1960s and 1970s due to many social, political and religious obstacles. As
shown by figure 2.10, the CPR had 5.5 percent among currently married women in
1970s. During next two decades (1969-88), the inconsistency of political support
and lack of access of family planning in Pakistan was widely noted (Rukanuddin and
Hardee-Cleaveland, 1992; Mehmood and Ringheim, 1996). Soon after Ayub Khan
in 1969, neither President Yahya Khan (1969-71) nor Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto (1972-77) had shown fragile interest in promoting family planning in Pak-
istan. The President Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88) period considered the most fundamental
and Islamization era with a little public and political support of family planning in
Pakistan. However, during the next decade (1988-99), the family planning programs
shown increasingly positive public and government support and CPR increased sig-
nificantly.
Figure 2.10 shows the trend of the contraception use in Pakistan for currently mar-
ried women using any method from 1975 to 2006. The percentage of currently mar-
ried women who use any contraceptive method increased from 5.5 percent in 1975
(Pakistan Fertility survey) to 30 percent in 2006-07 in latest PDHS. The contraception
prevalence rates had hardly changed during the period of 1975-1991 and consequently,
the marital fertility transition did not start significantly until the late 1980s. A contra-
ceptive prevalence rate (CPR) increased from 5.5 percent in 1975 to 12 percent in
1990-91 and was the evidence of beginning of fertility transition in Pakistan particu-
lar, for marital fertility. The decade of 1990s were the period of secular departure from
this trend—the CPR increased significantly by more than twice during 1990s— from
12 percent in 1990-91 to 28 percent 2000-01 (PFFPS). The SWRHFPS 2003 shows
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Figure 2.11: Distribution of the contraception method (Modern and Traditional) in Pakistan:
2006-07; Source: PDHS 2006-07
a contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) rose to 32 percent (NIPS 2007). However, the
Pakistan Demographic Health Survey (2006-07) shows the stagnation (even reversal)
in overall CPR in Pakistan, and signifies that the CPR declined to 30 percent. The two
percent increase per annum in CPR during the 1990s shows the strong political com-
mitment to curb population growth in Pakistan and public support for family planning.
However, in the recent years, the CPR slowdown because a significant proportion of
women that had used contraception, and discontinued use.
Figure 2.11 breaksdown the contraceptive usage in Pakistan by the different method
(Modern and Traditional) of the married women in reproductive age in 2006-07. The
sterilization methods for birth control is very popular in Pakistan in recent years—about
27 percent of the married women use female sterilization method as a means of lim-
iting their family size. On the other hand, though male sterilization has a less accept-
able method for birth control because of the male dominance in society. The uses of
condoms are second most accepted way for hindering births in Pakistan—23 percent
of married women used condoms in 2006-07. Recently, the modern contraception
methods among Pakistani women have been less common, except for female steril-
ization and condoms. The traditional ways are famous (14 percent and 12 percent of
with-drawal and Rhythm respectively) with married women in Pakistan. The higher
prevalence of natural methods have been observed in Pakistan, as compared to any
other South Asian countries. In 2006-07, the natural methods (condoms, withdrawal
and Rhythm) were accounted for 39 percent of the total contraception prevalence rate
in Pakistan.
The CPR was not available at the provincial level in 1970s and 1980s. Thus, it is diffi-
cult to access the level and trends at provincial during the decades of 1970s and 1980s.
Figure 2.12 shows that the trend of contraception prevalence (from Pakistan Demo-
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Figure 2.12: Trend in contraception prevalence rate (in percent) at provincial level in Pak-
istan: 1990-2006; Source: PDHS 1990-91 & 2006-07
graphic and Health Survey) at the provincial level in Pakistan for currently married
women using any method from 1990 to 2006. The figure 2.15 reveals that the con-
traception prevalence in every province in Pakistan increased over time as observed
at the national level in Pakistan during the past two decades. The percentage of cur-
rently married women who used any contraceptive method increased from 13 percent
in 1990-91 to 33 percent in 2006-07 in latest PDHS in Punjab—more than three times
increase in CPR was observed. The percentage of contraception users for any meth-
ods has been higher in Punjab (33 percent) and lowers in Balochistan (14 percent)
in 2006-07. A contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) substantially increased during the
last two decades, was the evidence of beginning of fertility transition in Pakistan at
the provincial level as well. The raise of one percent per annum in CPR recorded in
Punjab during 1990-2006. Whereas, less than one percent per annum was notified in
the remaining provinces in Pakistan during the same period.
Figure 2.13 illustrates the contraceptive prevalence in Pakistan at provincial level by
the different method (Modern and Traditional) for married women in reproductive age
in 2006-07. The female sterilization has the dominant method of contraception in
Punjab and Sindh—about 28 and 34 percent of the married women respectively. The
condoms and with-drawal in the KPK and pills and female sterilization in Balochis-
tan have the foremost way of controlling family size. It is worth mentioning that the
modern contraception methods among women in KPK and Balochistan have been less
common, except that being compared to Punjab and Sindh.
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Figure 2.13: breakdown of methods of contraception at provincial level in Pakistan: 2006-07; Source: PDHS 2006-07
(a) Punjab (b) Sindh
(c) KPK (d) Balochistan
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Table 2.12: Percentage of currently married women aged 15-49, who want no more children
No. of Living Child 2 3 4 Total
PDHS: 2006-07
Pakistan 26.6 54.5 73.1 51.6
Punjab 29.0 57.8 78.6 54.4
Sindh 26.1 55.3 68.7 48.4
KPK 21.3 47.0 65.9 50.0
Balochistan 12.7 20.5 40.4 36.6
PDHS: 1990-91
Pakistan 16.6 35.8 51.5 39.9
Punjab 17.6 40.8 60.4 44.4
Sindh 15.4 33.0 39.5 35.8
KPK 19.2 26.6 41.7 36.7
Balochistan 0.5 2.8 15.7 9.2
Source: PDHS
2.5.4.3 Fertility preference
The fertility preference of women is of fundamental importance in formulating the
population policies and family planning program for future reproductive patterns and
level. Furthermore, a detail study of the fertility preference of the population is crucial
for determining the unmet need of family planning and predicting for future fertility
level. Table 2.12 illustrates that the percentage of currently married women aged 15-
49 years want no more children at the provincial level in Pakistan from 1990-2006.
At the national level in Pakistan, the proportions of the women who want no more
children significantly increased during last two decades. The increase of eleven per-
centage points of women who want no more children was observed from 1990 to 2006
(from 39.9 percent in 1990-91 to 51.4 percent in 2006-07). At the provincial level in
2006-07, the women in Punjab who most likely want no more children, while the
women in Balochistan do (54.4 percent and 36.6 percent respectively). Moreover, the
table 2.12 indicates that women in Punjab desire to limit childbearing at lower pari-
ties as compared to women in Balochistan. For instance, in 2006-07, 58 percent of
women who have three children in Punjab want to stop childbearing whereas, the pro-
portion of women in Balochistan has 20 percent—nearly three times less as compared
to Punjab. The progress becomes significant in Balochistan. The rapid increase of the
percentage of women who want no more children in Balochistan observed during 1990
to 2006 rose nearly four times from 9.2 percent in 1990-91 to 36.6 percent in 2006-07.
We focused here on the three indicators for fertility preference in Pakistan, namely,
the mean ideal number of children, unmet needs of family planning and wanted to-
tal fertility Rate (WTFR). Table 2.13 shows three indicators of fertility preference for
currently married women aged 15-49 in Pakistan at the provincial level from 1990 to
2006. The vital concern of the family planning and maternal health services is to iden-
tify the potential demand and need of contraception among married women who are
not currently pregnant. The unmet needs defined in PDHS 2006-07 as “last birth of
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child or the current pregnancy of the women was mistimed or unwanted or currently
who are not using contraception but do not want the children soon”. Table 2.13 shows
the unmet needs (in percent of the total demand of contraception) in Pakistan at the
provincial level during last two decades. In 2006-07, women in Punjab have the lowest
unmet needs of the contraception, while the women in Balochistan have the highest
unmet needs (41 percent and 68 percent respectively). As expected, the total demand
of family planning was higher for limiting the childbearing rather of spacing the births
in Pakistan. The unmet needs for spacing is higher in young women whereas, the un-
met needs of limiting births was higher in older women in the latest PDHS 2006-07 in
Pakistan. Nevertheless, more than half of the demand of family planning was met in
2006-07 for currently married women (54 percent). However, only 30 percent demand
of family planning had accomplished in 1990-91 in Pakistan. A significant improve-
ment was seeing for the services and availability of family planning in Punjab. A 30
percent of the demand has met during the period of 1990 to 2006 –70 percent in 1990
and 41 percent in 2006. On average, more than 20 percent of the demand has provided
in remaining three provinces in Pakistan over the same period.
One of the major indicators to assess the fertility preference is the ideal number of
children a woman had in her reproductive life. The question to capture the response
of the women in PDHS is “how many children she would choose to have in her whole
life regardless of the number (if any) that she had already born?" In this context, the
sex of the woman’s child had played a vital role in Pakistan. In a male-oriented society
such as Pakistan, where the son preference is very high, if women have no sons, than
her ideal number would be higher as compared to the women who have two or three
sons. In Pakistan, PDHS 2006-07 reveals that about six in ten ever-married women
consider the ideal family size would be at least four children, and only 13 percent of
married women would prefer a two-child family (data not shown here). Table 2.13
shows that the mean ideal family size in Pakistan was 4.1 children in 2006-07 (Which
is also the TFR level in Pakistan). It is worth mentioning that the mean ideal family
size does not change during the last two decades (in 1990-91 the ideal family size was
also 4.1 children) in Pakistan which reflect that the larger family size in Pakistan is
favorable. A considerable differential is found at the provincial level, with a higher
mean ideal number of children in Balochistan (5.9 children), compared to be lowest in
Punjab (3.8 children). Substantial improvement observed over time for each province
in Pakistan, ranging from 5.4 children in 1990-91 to 3.8 in 2006-07 in Punjab, and 5.5
to 4.3 from 1990 to 2006 in KPK. The family-size preference has almost stagnated in
Balochistan during the 1990 to 2006. Based on the trend in ideal family size, heed
policies are necessary to bring down the larger family size preference in Pakistan.
Another measure to capture the trend of fertility preference in recent years is a wanted
total fertility rate. The wanted births are defined in PDHS as “whether a birth was
planned (wanted) or mistimed (wanted later), or not wanted at all (unwanted)” shed
the light on the extent of wanted childbearing. Wanted total fertility rate is calculated
by subtracting all unwanted births.Table 2.13 also illustrate that the WTFR in Pakistan
at provincial level during last two decades. It is evident that if the unwanted births
curtail then the TFR of Pakistan would be one child less to the current level (from
4.1 to 3.1 children per women). However, there was a 13 percent difference observed
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Table 2.13: Wanted TFR, TFR and Unmet needs (in percent) in Pakistan at Provincial level:
1990-2006
Region
PDHS 1990-91 PDHS 2006-07
WTFR TFR Ideal
Unmet
WTFR TFR Ideal
Unmet
Need Need
Pakistan 4.7 5.4 4.1 70 3.1 4.1 4.1 46
Punjab 4.8 5.4 4.0 70 3.0 3.9 3.8 41
Sindh 4.4 5.1 4.0 66 3.2 4.3 4.3 49
KPK 4.9 5.5 4.3 78 3.2 4.3 4.4 55
Balochistan 5.7 5.8 6.3 86 3.5 4.1 5.9 68
Note: TFR=Total Fertility rate;WTFR= Wanted TFR;
Ideal= Mean Ideal No. of Children, Unmet Need=Unmet need of contraception
between WTFR and TFR in Pakistan in 1990-91, which reflects that lack of the access
of family planning that hindered the unwanted births in Pakistan. These measures
suggest the provision of family planning, information, services and induced abortion,
are required to reduce unwanted pregnancies.
2.6 Mortality
2.6.1 Life expectancy at birth
The assessment of mortality in Pakistan is a difficult task due to lack of vital reg-
istration system. The birth and death registrations system officially exists in Pak-
istan, however, the coverage and accuracy is far from being satisfactory. In the post-
independence period, Pakistan experienced a relatively linear improvement in mortal-
ity pattern for both genders. Life expectancy at birth increased from 41 in 1950-55
to 48.2 in 1960-65 for male and from 41.5 to 48.5 for female during the same period.
The rising tendency in life expectancy at birth in Pakistan had observed in the next
two decades of 1970s and 1980s for male and female, where on average, 5.4 years for
female and 5.0 years for male life expectancy at birth has improved. These develop-
ments contributed by the improvement in better health facilities, improving hygiene
conditions and reducing the infant and maternal deaths in Pakistan. During the next
two decades of 1990s and 2000s, the improvement came to a moderate level, life ex-
pectancy at birth increased by 2.4 years for female and 2.2 years for male.
Gender differences in life expectancy at birth in Pakistan have also evolved signif-
icantly over the past six decades. In the early 1950s, life expectancy at birth for
women was slightly higher than male in Pakistan, as shown in Figure 2.14. The index
shown in figure 2.14 is based on the female/male ratio of the life expectancy at birth in
Pakistan from 1950-55 to 2005-10. As expected, female life expectancy at birth had
higher than male in 1950s. Interestingly the differentials vanished over time and in
early the 1970s and the life expectancy at birth for male and female leveled off. These
results divert from the finding that the biological and environmental norms that are
liable for men having higher mortality than women at all ages, which led to a shorter
50
Figure 2.14: Gender differential mortality index in Pakistan from 1950-2010; Source: UN
2010
life expectancy for males than for females.9 This implies that the infant mortality rates
for girls and maternal deaths was substantially higher in early 1970s in Pakistan. Al-
though, the maternal and infant deaths are not the sole factors to determine the higher
mortality among females in the past, low level of education, low status of the women
in society and in family are also responsible. From the late 1970s and onward, the dif-
ferentials of male and female life expectancy at birth had been significantly stronger.
Pakistan has not achieved significant progress in mortality decline during the past 50
years, as its neighboring countries do have. Regarding the provincial differences in
life expectancy, there is not much wealth of the data available except few studies in
Pakistan. Irfan, 1986 estimated the life expectancy at birth for male and female for
four provinces of Pakistan for the period of 1976-1979 from Population Growth Sur-
vey II. Punjab and KPK seemed to have a somewhat higher life expectancy at birth
for male in Pakistan—56.4 and 56.5 years for Punjab and Sindh respectively. Fur-
thermore, females in Punjab and Sindh lived longer as compared to other provinces in
Pakistan during 1976-79—the life expectancy at birth for female was 57.5 and 57.3
years for Punjab and Sindh respectively. The lowest life expectancy at births for male
and female found in Balochistan—52.5 and 52.0 years for male and female respec-
tively in 1976-79. Punjab and Sindh considered socioeconomically better developed
provinces in Pakistan and experienced lower overall mortality, while Balochistan, be-
ing least-developed province in Pakistan, has the highest overall mortality.
For developing countries, the mortality levels are often estimated from infant and child
mortality rate that is measured from surveys such as DHS (and adjusted the adult mor-
tality levels by model lift table, for instance, United Nations Population division did
9http://www.prb.org/Articles/2007/genderdisparities.aspx
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this for developing countries where the data on deaths has limited). There is the vari-
ety of methods that exist for the estimation of adult mortality in the literature; such as
census survival methods, growth balance method, the extinct generation methods. Es-
timates are derived on survival of parents and siblings and model life tables (Division,
2002). There are various data limitation that exists for mortality at provincial levels in
Pakistan. For example, in census survival methods, the period between two successive
censuses often considered a multiplier of five years and the period should not exceed
15 years (in case of Pakistan, the last two successive censuses have not multiplier of
five years; 1998 and 1981 census also exceed 15 years). Moreover, Census survival
ratios are appropriate only to population that experience negligible migration. It is
also susceptible to age heaping, and in some cases, it gives poor results. Age report-
ing errors, in particular, can result in large variations in calculated survival ratios and
inconsistent estimates of mortality. Census survival methods can also by seriously
biased by relative difference in completeness of censuses. Historically, Pakistan has
experienced a significant migration either internally or internationally. The significant
amount of age heaping has been observed in the censuses of Pakistan (Zakaria, 2009).
Thus, it not viable to used the above mentioned methods in the case of Pakistan partic-
ularly at provincial level in Pakistan. Therefore, we used the infant and child mortality
rate by sex from Pakistan Demographic and Health survey for each province and us-
ing the age and sex pattern of mortality at national level and developed the life table
at provincial levels. The procedure is as follows.
1. Life table for Pakistan in 2005-2010 from UN 2010 World Population Prospects.
2. Estimate the Infant and Child mortality rate for male and female by level of
education of mothers from PDHS 2006-0710.
3. Due to under-reporting and small sample size in some regions (i.e. KPK and
Balochistan), we estimate the Infant and child mortality as the weighted average
of education specific infant and child mortality at national level to the education
specific distribution of women of reproductive age (15-49) for each province in
Pakistan.
4. The model pattern (age specific probability qx at national level) has been utilized
with an iterative procedure to find the model corresponding to a given level of
mortality. The iterative procedure is described in United-Nations, 1982. The
level of mortality has been specified by the probability of death (qx at national
level) and designating the value of (1q0, 1q4) for each province to estimate the
life table for each province in Pakistan.11
5. Age and sex specific number of deaths at provincial level were estimated from
the life table estimated at step 3. These numbers were then aggregated over
and compare with the national level. The remaining residual discrepancies were
proportionally adjusted.
6. The adjusted age and sex specific life table at provincial level were drawn.
10Rates are based on ten years preceding the survey
11Mortpak software has been utilized for this purpose.
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Table 2.14: Estimated life expectancy at birth by sex, at provincial level of Pakistan: 2000-05
Region Male Female
Pakistan 62.9 64.5
Punjab 62.9 64.5
Sindh 62.7 64.3
KPK 62.3 63.8
Balochistan 62.2 63.7
Source: Own Calculation
2.6.2 Infant Mortality Rate
The child mortality and infant mortality rate (IMR) have a profound effect on the
population growth and is an indicator of the health status of the population. The
infants are highly susceptible to the new diseases, environment and social status of the
parents. Figure 2.15 shows the infant mortality rate in Pakistan for male, female and
both sexes from 1950 to 2010. Literature on the trend in infant mortality in Pakistan
shows that the IMR declined since 1950s. A significant decline in IMR for male,
female and both gender occurred in 1950s and 1960s. In the decades of 1950s, the
level of IMR for both sexes in Pakistan declined by 21 percent (from 176.6 in 1950-55
to 139.5 in 1960-65). During the next decade of 1960s, IMR declined significantly
from 139.5 in 1960-65 to 114.8 in 1970-75 (18 percent decline). This implies that
large-scale public health programs were implemented by the government of Pakistan
during the decades of 1960s and 1970s. The pace of decline of IMR for both sexes
slow in 1970s and 1980s—12 and 11 percent decline respectively had observed (see
Figure 2.15). These trends confirmed the earlier conclusion that the pace of decline
in IMR in Pakistan in early 1960s and late 1970s had slowed down (Agha, 2000;
Sathar, 1987). Figure 2.15 also illustrates that during the late 1980s and early 1990s
the decline in IMR in Pakistan appears to stagnated. It is worth mentioning that the
sex differential in IMR in Pakistan have always been in favor of female with lower
IMR for females observed as compared to males over the past five decades.
The substantially high infant mortality has been prevalent in Pakistan at the provincial
level in the recent past. Table 2.15 reveals the differentials of the IMR at province
level in Pakistan from DHS. The IMR declined in each province significantly with
a different pace during the last two decades. For instance, in Punjab and KPK, 22
and 21 percent decline has been occurred during the period of 1990-2006. The IMR
decreased from 104 to 81 deaths per 1000 live births during 1990 to 2006 in Pun-
jab, whereas in KPK, IMR declined from 80 to 63 deaths per 1000 live births during
1990 to 2006. Meanwhile, a noteworthy decline occurred in Balochistan in last two
decades. The IMR declined by 32 percent from 1990 to 2006–from 72 in 1990-91 to
49 in 2006-07 deaths per 1000 lives birth. Interestingly, the IMR is least in Balochis-
tan. However, the Balochistan considered to be least-developed province in Pakistan.
This needs a further investigation to unveil the determinant of IMR in Balochistan. It
is also important to note that the neonatal mortality rate plays a vital role in IMR de-
cline in Pakistan. The neonatal mortality in Balochistan has 30 deaths per 1000 lives
births in 2006-07, whereas in Punjab, the neonatal mortality accounts for 58 deaths
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Figure 2.15: Infant Mortality Rate in Pakistan from 1950-2010; Source: UN 2010
per 1000 lives birth.
The maternal mortality ratio (MMR) defines as the ratio of the number of maternal
deaths per 100,000 live births. The least MMR indicates the quality of the health care
system in a country. Due to the sensitivity and importance of the maternal deaths in
recent years, United Nations adopted MMR as an indicator and set the goals as “reduc-
ing maternal mortality from the 1990 level by 75 percent before 2015”.12 Table 2.15
shows the MMR at the provincial level in Pakistan for 2006-07. The data reveals that
maternal mortality ratio was very high in early 1990s in Pakistan (nearly 530 maternal
deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990-91). Approximately, 50 percent improvement
occurred in MMR in Pakistan during the last two decades—MMR reduced to 276
deaths per 100,000 live births in 2006-07. The PDHS 2006-07 data imply that 1 in 89
women in Pakistan will die due to maternal reason during her lifetime. The progress
of maternal mortality remained slow as compared to other development sector indica-
tions. For example, 40 percent of pregnant women did not receive any prenatal care.
Furthermore, nearly two in three births in Pakistan delivered at home with 60 percent
of these births are attended by unskilled medical practitioners (PDHS 2006-07). The
targets of MDG-5 goals in Pakistan are to reduce to MMR less than 140 and to in-
crease skilled birth’s attendance to 90 percent by the year 2015 (Ministry of Health
2005). The availability of the data of MMR at the provincial level in Pakistan has
scarce in the past. The latest PDHS reveals that maternal mortality ratio has been very
high in Balochistan and Sindh in 2006-07—785 and 314 maternal deaths per 100,000
live births in 2006-07 respectively. Moreover, the MMR is least in Punjab with 227
deaths in 2006-07. The goals needed to heed health policies should achieve the targets
particular, in rural areas and least-developed provinces in Pakistan.
12http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/maternal.shtml
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Table 2.15: Infant Mortality and Maternal Mortality ratio in Pakistan at provincial level;
Source: PDHS
Region
1990-91 2006-07
IMR NN PNN MMR IMR NN PNN MMR
Pakistan 91 51 39 533 78 54 24 276
Punjab 104 58 46 - 81 58 23 227
Sindh 81 44 36 - 81 53 28 314
KPK 80 48 31 - 63 41 22 275
Balochistan 72 46 26 - 49 30 18 785
Note: IMR=Infant Mortality Rate, NN=Neo-natal mortality rate,
PNN=Post-neonatal mortality, MMR=Maternal mortality ratio
2.7 Migration
2.7.1 International migration
Pakistan is considered an emigration country in the South Asian region. Migration
flows tend to be the most volatile in Pakistan. The flow of international migration is
observed from Pakistan towards many regions of the world, such as North America,
the European Union, Persian Gulf and East Asia. Although international migration
taken place in Pakistan since independence in 1947, in recent past, this phenomenon
has become more important. In 1990, there were roughly 6.5 million Pakistani living
and working aboard (approximately 5.7 percent of the total population of Pakistan).
The recent estimate of the international migration from Pakistan has 0.4 million in
2010 (United-Nations 2010)13. In another study, Jan (2008) argued that, “Pakistan
was also among those countries that supplied labor force to European economic boom
in the 1950s. Later in 1970s, these trends resulted in sharp decline due to geopolit-
ical changes and economic recession. The most significant pattern of international
migration from Pakistan was to East Asia, specifically to Persian Gulf states.” Table
2.16 illustrates that the distribution of international migration stock of Pakistani ori-
gin (Country of birth) to the different parts of the world (Country of enumeration).
The statistics in the table is evident that the largest emigration to the Middle East-
ern countries, mainly to Saudi Arabia—in 1995 nearly 0.8 million migrants—mostly
labor migrants. In the recent year, the range of destination countries for Pakistani mi-
grants has widened. The second most popular destination country for Pakistani is the
United Kingdom—nearly 0.32 million migrants stocks were in 2001. The economic
importance of international migration in Pakistan has been measured from the remit-
tance send by the Pakistani migrants. In 2002, remittances transfer by the Pakistani
aboard was 8.9 percent of the GDP income of Pakistan (OECD 2006).
2.7.2 Internal migration
The census in Pakistan includes the question on the person place of last residence,
place of birth and period of stay at the current residence at the time of enumeration.
13http://esa.un.org/migration/p2k0data.asp
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Table 2.16: International migration stock of Pakistani around the world
Country Year Total % Female
Australia 2006 16990 42.7
Austria 2001 3753 -
Canada 1991 25185 -
China, Hong Kong 2006 7253 40.5
Denmark 2008 10475 46.6
France 1999 10854 40.9
Germany 2008 28540 41.3
Greece 2006 15830 1.2
Iran 1996 8836 41.4
Ireland 2002 3391 35.9
Italy 2007 49334 30.0
Japan 2006 9086 -
Netherlands 2008 11101 39.4
Norway 2007 15850 48.1
Saudi Arabia 1995 778668 -
Spain 2008 47715 12.4
Switzerland 2000 2301 29.5
Sweden 2008 7687 31.0
USA 2005 262442 44.7
UK 2001 321167 49.0
Source: UN International migrant stock, The 2008 revision
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Table 2.17: Percentage distribution of the internal migration in Pakistan
Region 2008-09 1998
Punjab 7.75 3.2
Sindh 2.99 6.7
KPK 1.52 1.1
Balochistan 0.06 2.1
Source: LFS 2008-09, Census 1998
Table 2.17 illustrates the percentage distribution of internal migration from the last
census 1998 and Labor Force Survey (LFS) 2008-09. The LFS also includes the same
question that was asked in the census. In 1998, 6.7 percent of the Sindh population
had migrant status in Pakistan with major inflows toward the Karachi city. However,
in the recent past, the proportion declined to 3 percent in 2008-09. The Punjab is the
second biggest place to attract people from other provinces—3.2 percent population
had migrant status in 1998, whereas the proportion has more than twice in 2008-09
(See table 2.17).
The searching for a better living condition, higher wages and declining land produc-
tivity and higher opportunities for job and education are often considered significant
factor for migration either internal or international from less-developed region or more
advanced region. In case of internal migration, this process also accelerates the pro-
cess of urbanization. The process of internal migration between provinces is not a
new phenomenon in Pakistan. Several studies shed the light on the in-and-out flows
and determinant of internal migration in Pakistan. These include are Faroooqui and
Rukanuddin, 1987; Irfan, 1979; Shah, 1986; Afzal, 1974; and Perveen, 1993.
The table 2.18 shows the net internal migration in Pakistan between provinces from
the last three inter-census period of 1951-61, 1971-81 and 1981-1998. The statistics
are based on the question asked in the census about the place of birth data in the cen-
sus. During the inter-censual period of 1951-1961, the migratory movements show the
Sindh becoming a very popular place, particularly Karachi for internal migration—a
net gain of 0.26 million during 1951-61. This inter-censual period reflects the migra-
tion account after the independence of Pakistan which may also include the migration
from India as well. The share of the migrants from Punjab to Sindh during 1951-61
was two-third while, the remaining was from KPK. The Balochistan also gains the
migrants from other provinces—a net gain of 15441 during 1951-61. This may oc-
cur due to the immigrants from India to main big cities in Balochistan, e.g. Quetta.
The Punjab and KPK lost their population during the inter-censual period of 1951-
61—0.14 and 0.13 million respectively. The peoples from Punjab mostly settled in
Sindh and from KPK, the flows towards both Sindh and Punjab (Afzal, 1974).
The inter-censual internal migration during the period of 1971-81 was estimated by
censual survival ratio method at the provincial level in Pakistan (Perveen 1993). The
results show that considerable variation in the migration where nearly 1.4 million mi-
grants leave Punjab to the other provinces and the remaining three provinces gains
the migrants. Balochistan was the most attractive place for the migrants—nearly 0.96
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Table 2.18: Net Internal migration in Pakistan
Region 1951-61 1971-81 1981-98
Punjab -141,844 -1,428,037 -141,159
Sindh 259,752 123,661 369,847
KPK -133,349 301,211 -337,083
Balochistan 15,441 961,341 -1074
Source: Census 1971report (Afzal 1974)
Perveen A, 1993, Pop Assessment report 2003
million migrants to Balochistan from Punjab. The KPK and Sindh were second and
third most favorable place to attractive peoples from Punjab. Table 2.18 also illus-
trates that the internal migrations flow in the last census in 1998. The total number
of persons internally migrated between provinces during last ten years preceding the
1998 census was estimated 1.3 million (UNFPA, 2003). In 1998, Sindh was the only
provinces that attracted people from other provinces—0.37 million internal migrants.
Nearly 0.48 million people left in 1998 from Punjab and KPK respectively. The in-
ter province migrations (in-and-out internal migration) statistics signify that “over 60
percent of those migrants who had left Punjab were settled in Sindh and 25 percent
in Islamabad. Meanwhile, 16 percent of those migrants who settled in Punjab had
originated from KHP and 33 percent from Sindh. Approximately, 50 percent settled
in Punjab and 40 percent in Sindh of those who originated from KHP. On the other
hand, 75 percent migrated to Punjab and less than 5 percent to KHP of those who had
originated from Sindh” (UNFPA, 2003). Therefore, internal migration is liable for a
substantial amount of relocation of population between provinces. This evidence may
contribute largely to the rapid pace of urbanization in the country.
2.8 History of Population Policies in Pakistan
Pakistan was one of the first countries in the South Asian region who had begun the
family planning program in 1965 and developed the population policies to curb the
rapid population growth rate. However, Pakistan has not been able to hinder the pop-
ulation growth since independence and currently Pakistan has one of the largest coun-
ties in the world. This needed a deeper look into the history of population policies in
Pakistan and try to figure out what is the cause of the failure of the population program
in a broader context. In this context, the important question in formulating the con-
temporary population policies that: what should be the goals of population policies.
What is the range of concern envisioned? Should the object is only to curtail fertility
and provide the family planning services? Do they also consider the mortality, migra-
tion and urbanization? What is the main rational of the population policy—to improve
socioeconomic development, individual well-being and better health? In this regard,
Lutz (2008) argued that;
“People are the wealth of nations. But it is not only the number of people that
counts; it is also the skills, abilities and health status of the people that matter. All
these aspects viewed together can be called the human resources base or human cap-
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ital in more economic language. This broadened view of population also implies that
political goals should not be defined in terms of population size but rather in terms of
human resources available for producing the best possible quality of life for all citi-
zens.”
The effective population policies required the strong political commitment together
with the development of other sectors such the economy, education and health. Some-
time, the failures of the policies are inefficient bureaucratic structure, weak implemen-
tation strategies, insufficient funds allocated for the implementation, poor quality and
not enough availability of services and in some situation formulating unrealistic pol-
icy goals in the future. According to Jain 1998, two questions are needed to address
in formulating the population policies;
1. What is the role of a government in creating a desire to control fertility?
2. What is the role of a government in providing means of fertility regulations?
Jain, 1998 also argues that, the family planning services only effective for those who
have experienced an unwanted fertility. The program does not work where the large
segment of society has a strong desire of large family size (as in case of Pakistan).
Therefore, promoting the trend of small family size is essentials for limit their child-
bearing by postpone the marriages. Female education, age at marriage, employment
opportunities for women, women autonomy and social security and better health ser-
vices to curb the infant mortality are more likely to be associated with the aspiration
of small families and postponing childbearing. These factors are contributed as sig-
nificantly as the family planning services to the fertility decline at different stages of
demographic transition.
Since 1965, Pakistan had an anti-natalist population policy to restrain the population
growth and fertility. Although the Family planning Association of Pakistan (FPAP)
was found in 1952 to provide the availability of contraception service voluntarily on
a limited scale. The population growth had put on the agenda of the government of
Pakistan under President Ayub regime in 1959, when he addressed publicly and spoke
about the threat of overpopulation. He established a National Board of family plan-
ning with the help of Planning commission and FPAP to address the population issue.
The board addresses the policy to the government while the ministry of health was
responsible to implement the campaign. In lieu of these developments, the third five-
year plan (1965-70) had mentioned the importance of population growth and advises
the direction to limit the population growth. Figure 2.19 illustrates that the overview
of the population policies in Pakistan from 1965 to 2010. The targets of the third five
year plan (1965-70) were to reduce the annual birth rate from 50 to 40 per 1000 by
1970 and provide the access of family planning services to 20 million fertility couple.
In the onset of the five-year plan, it had interrupted due to the war with India in 1965
but resumed shortly after the war.
The third five-year plan had not achieved its goals due to many political and adminis-
trative reasons. Due to agitation movement against President Ayub Khan Government
in 1969, he was removed from power. The major relational against his constituent
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who, he was a military dictator and in power since 11 years. He had a little concern
for the religious support on family planning, and did not seek a religious mandate for
his government. The religious parties, who joined the protest, used the population
program and particularly family planning program against him and chanted “Family
planning for those who want free sex." The second major reason for the failure of the
program was that President Ayub wants to accelerate industrialization and rapid eco-
nomic growth in the county, and during the second five-year plan (1960-65), govern-
ment realized that the 1.4 percent of population growth hinders the economic progress.
The major setback of this program was the centralized administration of the program
with the single-minded provision of the services, setting unrealistic goals and extreme
supply side shortage of the services of family planning. To access the effectiveness of
the program and national targets, the National Impact survey (1968-69) had conducted
and it reveals that after the three year of the program begun, shows that only 6 percent
of the married women were using any contraceptive method (Khan, 1996).
In 1969, President Ayub had left the office and replace by another military dicta-
tor General Yahya Khan (1969-1971). During the Yahya regime, a pilot experiment
(called “sialkot experiment”) had set up with improved execution and re-oriented the
program from a supply to the client based approach. This program was designed to
prove or disprove the debate that demography could or could not be changed through
family planning in international community. Initial results of the experiment show
that the contraceptive prevalence rate improved at Sialkot, which attracts international
community and serves at the basis for next population and family planning policies
through Continuous Motivation System (CMS) and Contraceptive Inundation Scheme
(1970-77). Figure 2.19 reveals that the particular objectives of the Scheme, which
stated that reduce the birth rate from 45 to 40 per 1000 and 34 percent of the married
women will practice contraception by 1975. The civil war in 1971 intruded on the
scheme. Due to the partition of the country, that hindered the implementation of the
program. In 1971, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took charge of the government, and initially he
was suspended the scheme because Bhutto also chanted the family planning program
against military regimes. Furthermore, Bhutto was also reluctant to develop the family
planning program because he had not been giving any opportunities to the religious
right-wing parties to use the same slogans against him. This situation did not last long
because USAID consistently delivered the message to the government that population
growth was the major issue of the coming decades in Pakistan. This was confirmed
when the results of 1972 censuses were made public, which reveals that the population
of Pakistan had grown from 43 million in 1961 to 65 million in 1972 and fertility level
were stagnated over the decade. Thus, Bhutto had accepted the assistance of USAID
and formed a committee to review the population program. The committed had pro-
posed the recommendation that; federalization of the program under health ministry,
liberalization of abortion laws, and increasing the age at marriage for women (Khan,
1996). Moreover, the committee approved the CMS as the national program for fam-
ily planning with contraceptive Inundation Scheme (1974-77). The programs were
never successful, mainly because USAID funding was frozen due to the political and
Islamic bomb crisis.
The population policies during the period of 1977-88 were very complex in Pakistan’s
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history. Another military rule was put into action by Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq Mar-
tial law in 1977. The population program was suspended and froze any field activity
during the period of 1977-80. Zia had adopted the religious right wing ideology as
his political ideologies to protect his military overtake. He had also dissolved the
population welfare division and brought it under Ministry of Health. He considered
fundamental Islamic thought and banned the publicity of family planning services and
opposed the birth control program, that he was considered serious about Islamiza-
tion. CMS had also disbanded, and half of family planning staff removed to other
departments. The international support to population program was frozen during the
period of 1977-81 due to political reasons. A report was promulgated and published
by Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), which stated that the population program in
Pakistan should be abandoned. Because of the family planning, Pakistan will undergo
with scarcity of manpower, which is needed for national defense and economic de-
velopment (Khan, 1996). Due to the invasion of Russian into Afghanistan, Pakistan
has an important ally to USA due to geo-strategic position. USAID mission had been
re-assumed, and the financial resources were allocated by other donors as well for the
population program. Therefore, Zia ignored the recommendation of CII and never
made it to parliament. A Sixth five-year plan (1983-87) was set up with new popula-
tion and family planning goals as illustrated in Figure 2.19. The ban has lifted on the
publicity for family planning. The Non-Government Organization Co-coordinating
Council (NGOCC) had begun its function to allocating the funds to local NGOs for
providing family planning services.
After the death of Zia in 1988, Benazir Bhutto (daughter of Zulfiqar Bhutto) came into
power, and her focus was to start family planning in urban center of Pakistan. She had
created the Ministry of Population Welfare in 1989-90. Qisas and Diyat Ordinance had
passed in which abortion is included as an act of murder and prescribe the punishment
of murder. The content of the population policies during the next two decades had
taken many turns into this period. The program had lacked firm political commitment
and suffered with the financial crisis. The government officials addressed the issue
of population growth as a national priority and addressed publicly and more impor-
tantly the funding for the program had been increased significantly over the decades
of 1990s. An important development in the eight five-year plan (1993-1998) was that
the family planning program was based in the village-based family planning worker
scheme where the workers were recruited, trained and put into the field to provide the
family planning services at the village level. The post-ICPD period even makes the
greatest interest of the government of Pakistan in population policies. While rapid
population growth was on the priority agenda of the government of Pakistan in recent
years and greater emphasis on the providing the service, access and availability of
better quality services at the individual level.
In a nutshell, the population policies in Pakistan since 1965 had so far failed to ac-
complish the target due to various social, political and religious reasons. The content
of the policies, which is the most sole organ through which population policy is ad-
dressed and executed, have solely focused on the provision of the family planning
program. It has been lacking of other development goals such as the health, urbaniza-
tion, human capital development, and, particularly the MDGs. Therefore, promoting
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the desire of small family size, socio-economic development, female education and
more importantly balanced human capital (as cited by Lutz, 2008) are the core factors
in population policies, which have neglected so far in Pakistan. That is as significant
as the family planning services to curb population growth.
2.9 Conclusion and Discussion
The picture of population growth and human development in Pakistan was grim in the
past. Albeit successive governments in the past announced various policies to cope
with the population explosion, they were incapable of implement these policy actions
due to various political, social and cultural obstacles. The population growth rate in
Pakistan had been incessantly increasing during the second half of the 20th century.
Due to rapid decline in mortality and slow decline in fertility during past four decades,
Pakistan is currently experiencing the window of opportunities—a phase where the
country has a young age structure in next 30 to 40 years–as the majority of the pop-
ulation is young with fewer dependents (Children and elderly population). In 2010,
35.4 percent (61.4 million) of the population of Pakistan under age 15 and 60.3 percent
(104.7 million) population in working age (15-64) group. The low dependency ratio
which led to increased in saving and long-term investment trends has been encouraged
during this phase. This outcome has a direct effect on economic growth. However,
the population has such a large momentum, the window of action is actually not very
wide. In this context, human capital will play a significant role in the realization of
this opportunity for rapid economic growth and further investment in education and
infrastructure. Any delay in investment in education now will have a repercussion in
the future.
A similar story of the difference between intention and action of the successive gov-
ernments of Pakistan as was reported for population policy can be told regarding pub-
lic policy towards population growth and fertility reductions. The first anti-natalist
population policy in Pakistan was written in 1965 and pursued under the population
program with, in fact, very little success due to a lack of commitment and financial
constraints. If the government of Pakistan recognized the need for fertility to pull
down, especially by reducing unwanted pregnancies and investing consequently in the
provision and utilization of adequate services for reproductive health and family plan-
ning, surely the lack of social and economic progress – in education, health, poverty –
has been hindering the fertility decline and the efficiency of population policies. The
education of females shown would be the key to the impact of the fertility of women
by levels of education that are much responding to these since women in Pakistan have
been experiencing lower levels of fertility for a long period of time. Already in 1993,
Sathar, 1993 were inkling at the fact that women’s education is a “potentially power-
ful force for fertility change in urban Pakistan” not only as a unintended consequence
of women’s schooling which mechanically delays entry at marriage, but also changed
the behavior of parents who had the need and the will to limit the number of children
they would have.
Fertility transition is under way at the different pace within the provinces in Pakistan.
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Table 2.19: Overview of the Population Policies in Pakistan: 1965-2010; Source: Khan 1996
and Ministry of Population Welfare Pakistan
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In terms of development, each province broadly faced the same challenges, unemploy-
ment for large working-age population, reducing poverty, pushing economic growth
and creating better health facilities and social protection for the poor particularly in the
rural area. Women were at a predominant disadvantage and this had affected various
forms of discrimination in every sector, from education to autonomy, and from em-
ployment to health facilities. Another contemporary challenge facing each province
that rapid urbanization and urban growth which build the pressure on economies of
big cities and creating a social problem among the different ethnic groups in main
urban agglomerations. Population policies have mostly failed so far in terms of the
provision and quality because of the poor involvement of the state in improving the
socioeconomic status and human capital accumulation of the peoples. Pakistan’s de-
velopment is highly dependent on the capacity of the county to educate its population
and advance the socio-economic status of an inhabitant so that 284 million Pakistanis
in 2060 can live prosperous, lives in a nation economically, socially and politically
successful.
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3
Probabilistic Population Projections for the
Provinces of Pakistan
Summary
This chapter presets the first attempt to implement the probabilistic projection model at
the provincial level for Pakistan. The uncertainty of demographic variables at provin-
cial levels in Pakistan particularly, internal and international migration renders sub-
national population projection more difficult. Deterministic approach is utilized to
project the sub-national population which fails to address the issue of demographic un-
certainty. Probabilistic population projection models have the potential to overcome
these shortcomings, but these models have often been implemented at the national
level. The paper sets out the projection framework at the regional level, outlines the
methodology, and presents the probabilistic forecasts for 2010-2060 for Pakistan at
the sub-national level. The projection shows that there are 31% chances that popula-
tion of Pakistan will start to decline in 2060. The 80% prediction interval shows that
Pakistan’s population in 2060 will be between 241.5 and 326.2 million. The greater
uncertainty exists about the demographic future of provincial level compared to the
national level.
65
3.1 Introduction
The uncertainty of demographic variables at sub national level, particularly internal
and international migration, renders provincial level population projections more com-
plexly. The uncertainty of the demographic variables, particularly for the internal
migration in future, is therefore, a vital element in any sub-national population pro-
jections. Currently, the deterministic approach is utilized to project the sub-national
population which fails to address the issue of demographic uncertainty for internal mi-
gration. Probabilistic population projection models have the potential to prevail these
shortcomings. However, in contemporary research, these models have often been ex-
ecuted at a national level. This paper applies the probabilistic population projection
technique at the provincial level in Pakistan to present the first comprehensive set of
projections and associated uncertainties for all demographic variables including inter-
nal migration in Pakistan. It is a first attempt to implement the probabilistic population
projection model at provincial level for Pakistan. The paper sets out the projection
framework at a provincial level in Pakistan, outlines the approach adopted for each
demographic parameter (fertility, mortality, internal and international migration) and
their assumptions, and presents the probabilistic population projections for 2010-2060
for national and provincial level of Pakistan. A particular feature of our projections is
an age breakdown into the five-year age groups with open-ended age group of 100+
for male and female at each province in Pakistan. Our model desegregates the inter-
nal in-and-out internal migration flows between provinces in Pakistan separately. Our
model also considers the strong correlation between demographic variables within and
between provinces in Pakistan. The details of the model will be discussed in next sec-
tion.
Indeed, we have been familiar with one thing with a high degree of certainty about
the deterministic population projections: that they are uncertain. Contemporary deter-
ministic population projections turn out to be rather imprecise, particularly for longer
time periods (i.e. 40 or 50 years) due to the number of factors, such as an imper-
fect understanding of the drivers of demographic component, inherent randomness in
demographic processes, and errors in jump-off population (Wilson and Bell, 2004b;
De Beer, 2000). Undoubtedly, there is an uncertainty existed in all three components
of the demographic change (fertility, mortality and migration) in population projec-
tions. In current research, the vital concern of the demographers is that how to deal
with this uncertainty in a statistically reliable manner which is both revealing and ac-
ceptable to the users, national and international agencies. A contemporary way to deal
with uncertainty in deterministic population projections is produced “high” and “low”
variants to accommodate uncertainty around the medium trajectory of fertility, mor-
tality and migration. Many national and international agencies had followed the vari-
ant approach to produce the future path of the component of demographic changes.
Closer assessment reveals that variant approach undergoes from several drawbacks.
The most significant are: 1) lack of the probability interval attached to the variable,
the probability interval covered by the low and high variant has not specified (Lutz
and Scherbov, 1998); 2) In many circumstances, high-low variant only assumed for
fertility, ignoring mortality and migration (e.g. the population projections produced
by United Nations); 3) The variant approach does not allow the sudden demographic
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discontinuities in the projection that change the age structure substantially (Lee and
Tuljapurkar, 1994); 4) Variant approach also probabilistically incompatible between
variables and over time (De Beer and Alders, 1999). The probabilistic population pro-
jection’s techniques overcome these shortcomings in a statistically consistent manner.
During the last two decades, techniques of probabilistic population projections have
been developed and applied extensively to many countries in the world and global re-
gions including, Austria (Lutz and Scherbov, 1998), Norway (Keilman et al., 2002),
the Netherland (De Beer and Alders, 1999), Sweden (Cohen, 1986), Finland (Alho,
2002), United States (Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1994), Australia (Wilson and Bell, 2004b),
China (Li et al., 2009), Germany (Hardle and Mysickova, 2009), New Zealand (Wil-
son, 2005), Japan (Okita et al., 2009) and Poland (Matysiak and Nowok, 2007). In
fact, (Lutz et al., 2001; Lutz et al., 003a) have taken the lead to produce the first
comprehensive set of probabilistic population projections for the world as whole and
13 regions of the world, in particular. In another study, the authors have produced
the 95% confidence interval by utilizing United Nations past projection errors and
applied these confidence intervals to the deterministic population projections of the
United Nations World Population Prospects (Bongaarts and Bulatao, 2000a). In ad-
dition, the Uncertain Population of Europe (UPE) project has applied the consistent
method of probabilistic population projection and produced the comprehensive set of
projections for European counties (EEA+ countreis). The important feature of the
UPE was that they considered the correlation in the demographic processes between
the countries in Europe (Alders et al., 2005).
However, the application of probabilistic population projection at the sub-national
level has been meager. Notwithstanding, the sub-national projection has been applied
in some cases including, Wilson and Bell, 2007; Miller, 2002; Gullickson and Moen,
2001; Gullickson, 2001; Frees, 1992; and Cameron and Poot, 2010. Gullickson and
Moen, 2001 extended the probabilistic population projection at the sub-national level
in a multi-regional framework and suggesting log-linear models to forecast the inter-
nal migration. In other papers, Miller, 2002 had presented the probabilistic projection
of California, which is somewhat based on single state model and accounts for the
net interstate and net international migration. Considering the total population size
of the selected US states, Smith and Tayman, 2004 have applied the ARIMA model
to forecast the total population in the future. In the recent work,Wilson and Bell,
2007 , have extended the probabilistic population projections at the sub-national level
in Australia. They have extensively developed the bi-regional frame work to fore-
cast the population of Queensland and rest of Australia and internal migration from
and to Queensland to rest of Australia has forecasted by using the GMRs. At one
point, this lack of attention for using sub-national probabilistic population projection
is not astonishing because sub-national projection requires additional components of
internal migration to be considered in the model which brings further challenges in
the modeling practice. This is mainly because of two reasons; first, there is an addi-
tional variable consider in the existing complex model, and internal migration is also
a more volatile component of population change to be modeled in the future. Sec-
ond, the availability of time series data at sub-national level particularly for internal
migration between different regions in a county has considered scarcer. In the case of
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Pakistan, virtually, the data on internal migration between provinces has been limited.
Therefore, projecting the population of Pakistan at the provincial level has been more
difficult than that of the country as a whole.
3.2 Methodology
The standard cohort component model was utilized to obtain the probabilistic popula-
tion projection at provincial level in Pakistan. The difference, however, is that instead
of formulating low and high variant; the probabilistic population projection required
the prediction intervals for future vital rates (fertility, mortality, migration) which is
incorporated by running the cohort component model several thousand times by spec-
ifying the distribution of each vital rate. Traditionally, three principal approaches have
been used for producing these distributions of fertility, mortality and migration. The
three methods are: 1) model-based approach (Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1994); 2) expert
arguments and judgment (Lutz and Scherbov, 1998); 3) based on past forecast er-
rors (Keilman, 2001; Stoto, 1983). In practice, a combination of at least two of these
methods have extensively used for probabilistic population projection. The method
of probabilistic population projection that has been applied here is based on the time-
series model and formulates the assumptions for future course of fertility, mortality
and international migration and on the range of their uncertainty (see details in Lutz
et al., 2001). In order to produce the probabilistic population projections for Pakistan
at the provincial level, we proceed as follows:
1. Six summary indicators were chosen for fertility, mortality and migration at a
national and provincial level in Pakistan for the reference year 2010; TFR, male
and female life expectancy at birth (e0), net international migration and in-out
internal migration probabilities between provinces.
2. In order to generate the probability distribution for all summary indicators in
future for each province in Pakistan, a moving average model with annual fluc-
tuations has been chosen based on the Lutz et al., 2001. The model described
as, Let “ f ” be the one of the summary indicators of the base year and to be pro-
jected for the period 1 through t and “ ft” would be its forecasted value at a time
“t”. i.e. ft = f¯t + εt . The f¯t be the future value of any summary indicator at a
time “t” and are chosen based on the assumptions. The error term εt is assumed
to be normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ(εt). we
have assumed that the error term εt would be auto-correlated over time. To cap-
ture the auto-correlation over time of εt , we used the moving average model of
order “q”, where “q” is the number of lagged term in moving average. The fol-
lowing moving average model specification has been utilized εt = ∑qi=0λiµt−i,
where µt−i is independently distributed standard normal random variables. We
set that λi = σ(εt)√q+1 , to make sure that the standard deviation of εt is equal to its
pre-specified value. The auto-correlation chosen for all components is based on
31-years moving average process value (See more details in Lutz et al. (2001)).
3. The future path of each summary indicator (TFR, Life expectancy at birth for
male and female, net international migration, and in-and-out internal migration)
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and their uncertainty rang were formulated. The details of these assumptions
covered in the next section.
4. The future level of TFR between provinces assumes to be correlated. Life ex-
pectancy at births between provinces and life expectancy at birth for male and
female within each province are highly correlated. Therefore, in our simulation,
correlated random numbers for male and female life expectancy at birth within
each province and TFR between provinces were produced via Cholesky decom-
position of the variance-covariance matrix. Furthermore, we have assumed no
correlation between fertility and mortality.
5. The medians and other selected confidence intervals of the predictive distribu-
tion for each summary indicator were computed.
6. For each indicators 10,000 simulations were generated covering the projection
period 2010-2060 by using model explain in step 2. Fixed age specific rates
(for fertility, net international migration and in-and-out migration) were used
during each sample path to obtain the age-sex specific rates. For age specific
mortality rate, we used the UN model life table (2010). The male and female
life expectancy at birth of each sample path was linked to the corresponding set
of UN model life table and extracts the survivor function (Lx).
7. Using a cohort component method of projection, 10,000 simulations over the
period of 2010-60 at national and provincial level were computed. Compare the
results for provincial level to the national level; the remaining difference was
adjusted proportionally. The final results of the probabilistic projection were
generated in term of pyramid and other indicators.
In the following sections, we proceed as follows, turing to the baseline data and as-
sumptions used to construct model inputs, and how the predictive distributions for
fertility, mortality, international and internal migration were created. Moreover, we
discuss the results and draw the conclusion from the projection results. We have im-
plemented the probabilistic population projection for each province of Pakistan in
R-Statistical Programming Language.1
3.2.1 Jump-off Population
In Pakistan, five censuses had conducted since 1950, and last census was carried out
in 1998. The census in Pakistan administratively done in four provinces, Federally
Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) and Islamabad Capital Tertiary .The official cen-
sus methodology in Pakistan consists of two rounds, in the first round the housing
units enumerated with detail’s characteristics of household and in a second step the
individual counting carried out. The canvasser methodology was used in which in-
formation about household and individuals are recorded by enumerator through door
to door visit. A De-Jour methodology was utilized to count the population in which
individuals count at their usual place of residence and foreign nationals also counted.
We carried out the probabilistic population projections for four provinces in Pakistan
1http://cran.r-project.org/
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and excluded the FATA and Islamabad which respectively make up 2.4 and 0.6 percent
of the total population of Pakistan.
The reliable estimate of age and sex distribution at a provincial level in Pakistan is a
challenging task. The jump-of population of Pakistan at the national and provincial
level by five years of the age interval and sex (0-4,5-9,.....100+) based on the results
of the latest Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS) 2006-07 and United
Nations (UN) World Population Prospects 2010. There are several reasons for choos-
ing the estimate from these resources. The Pakistan population census 1998 suffered
from serious age heaping (Kemal et al., 2003; Zakaria, 2009) and out-dated because
the last census was carried out 14 years ago. Virtually, in the recent years no consis-
tent estimate of total population by age and sex at the provincial level in Pakistan was
found except UN. Thus, we relied on above international resources. There are sev-
eral reasons to adopt the age and sex distribution for each province from PDHS. First,
the PDHS 2006-07 has the largest household and national representative survey con-
ducted in Pakistan. The sample size of the PDHS (95,441 household sample size and
727,493 individual sample size) had designed to provide reliable estimates for a vari-
ety of demographic and health indicators in Pakistan. Second, we have compared the
age and sex distribution from PDHS and UN 2010 Population Prospects for Pakistan.
Practically, the difference between the two age-sex distributions has been negligible.
Therefore, we computed the proportion of age and sex distribution of each province
from PDHS (2006-07) and acquire final age and sex distribution for each province in
Pakistan proportionally.
3.2.2 Fertility
The fertility transition in Pakistan passed through different stages over the last four
decades. The government of Pakistan recognized the need that fertility was pulled
down, especially by reducing unwanted pregnancies and consequently, investing in
the provision and utilization of adequate services for reproductive health and family
planning. However, the lack of social and economic progress – in education, health,
poverty – has been hindering the fertility decline and the efficiency of population poli-
cies in Pakistan (see details in Chapter 2 for determinants of fertility and history of
population policies in Pakistan).
Currently, Pakistan is undergoing the middle phase of the fertility transition and will
certainly continue to fall in coming decades. The important question arises here: what
is the pace of future decline in fertility? In this context, the main argument considered
here is, according to Bongaarts and Bulatao, 2000a; “the pace of decline slows af-
ter mid-transition is reached and this deceleration progresses as fertility falls further”.
Our fertility assumption is consistent with this view.
The levels and trend of fertility in past implies that Pakistan’s TFR at a national and
provincial level will continue to fall in coming decades. The important question in the
projection exercise that how we specify the level and pace of the fertility decline in
particular situation. To specify the level of total fertility rate in Pakistan, we assumed
that the pace of decline in fertility for Pakistan will be slow in future. This is due to the
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Figure 3.1: Total fertility rate in Pakistan from 1950-2060 with selected predication interval:
Source: Own Calculation
past experience of fertility decline in Pakistan and consistent with the Bongaarts and
Bulatao (2000b) view that after the mid-transition stage the pace of decline in fertility
slows. Thus, future trend in mean level of fertility in Pakistan is defined for the period
2010-2060 similar to those chosen by United Nations 2010. According to the UN
2010, TFR in Pakistan will steadily decline from 3.65 in 2005-2010 to 2.1 in 2035-40
and 1.79 in 2055-60 which is consistent with above arguments. For instance, based
on the pace of decline of fertility during last two decades (1990-2010), Pakistan will
attain replacement level in 20 years from 2005 onward. Whereas, the UN assumed
the replacement level in Pakistan will attain in 30 years (in 2040). The most recently
empirical estimates of TFR at the provincial level observed from Pakistan Demo-
graphic and health survey are: Punjab-3.9, Sindh-4.3, KPK-4.3, and Balochistan-4.1
in 2006-07 and at the national level: 4.1 in 2006-07. We assumes that the TFR of
each province will decline in future with same pace as observed at the national level
in Pakistan. Thus, the scaling factor of TFR for each province to the national level
TFR in Pakistan is calculated from PDHS 2006-07 and is held constant. These are
the factors needed throughout the projection period in order to obtain the provincial
level TFR. i.e. T FRprovni (t) = T FR
national(t)∗ scaling. f actori(t). The key parameter
in our projection is the uncertainty range of our summary indicator (TFR, e0 etc.) and
specification of the standard deviation. The uncertainty of our assumption on fertility
rates is described by a probability distribution of our point forecast. We do not have a
long time series on fertility and other demographic indicators and official forecast of
population dating far back into the past for Pakistan that would allow us for its com-
putation. The availability of such information’s at provincial level in Pakistan is even
scarcer. Therefore, we use the assumption of the uncertainty distribution calculated by
Lutz et al., 2001. There are two reasons to support this view. First, there is substantive
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Figure 3.2: Total fertility rate and Selected predictive distribution of Pakistan at Provincial
level: 2010-2060; Source: Own Calculation
evidence that can be found in the literature based on argument-based expert judgment
(Lutz and Scherbov, 1998) to support this view. Second, in the recent United Nation-
als World Population Prospects 2010, the probabilistic projection of fertility that has
been carried out for all the countries in the world was based on the long time series
by using Bayesian hierarchical models. Given the long forecast period and the change
in fertility pattern over the last 50 years in Pakistan, the 80 percent prediction interval
for fertility in Pakistan in UN 2010 Population Prospects is likely consistent with our
assumptions about uncertainty range in the projection considered here.
As Lutz et al., 2001 illustrated that, “the variances in the total fertility rates are as-
sumed to depend on the level of fertility. If the total fertility rate is above 3.0 there
is an 80 per cent chance that fertility would be within one child of the mean. When
it is below 2.0, the same probability is attached to a range within one half a child
of the mean. Between the two total fertility rate levels, the variance is interpolated.”
These assumptions applied on each province and national level in Pakistan. Within
provinces in Pakistan, the increasing role of media (exchanging the norms and fashion
with respect to fertility and family life) as well as transmission of the reproductive
technologies in the Pakistan from the developed region to under-developed areas is
shown (i.e. from Punjab to Balochistan). Therefore, we expect that the deviation
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from assuming trends of fertility between provinces has correlated. We assumed the
inter-provincial correlation of 0.7 for fertility deviations in Pakistan. The 80 percent
prediction interval for Pakistan yields the TFR [1.89, 2.88] in 2025-30 and [1.29, 2.31]
in 2055-60 (See 3.1 and 3.2).
3.2.3 Mortality
Based on mortality levels and trends for each province in Pakistan described in previ-
ous chapter, we assume that the progress in mortality observed in Pakistan at the na-
tional and provincial level will continue in the future. We assume that life expectancy
at birth will rise in all provinces with same pace as assumed at the national level in
Pakistan. Specifically, the life expectancy at birth (e0) for male and female increases
by two years per decades (Lutz et al., 1996) at the national and for each province in
Pakistan and uncertainty range of life expectancy at birth for each province in Pak-
istan will be; 80 percent probability that the increase in life expectancy is between
zero to four years. We also considered that the inter-provincial correlation of 0.9 for
the mortality deviation between provinces in Pakistan and prefect correlation between
male and female mortality deviation within each provinces in Pakistan (adopted from
Lutz et al., 2001). The main motivation behind our choice of correlation between life
expectancy between provinces and gender in Pakistan is that faster communication of
medical technologies and the spread of new health exposure. No correlation between
fertility and mortality will be assumed in our projection. The age-sex specific mortal-
ity schedules at the provincial and national level in Pakistan have been derived from
UN model life table 2010 based on the life expectancy at birth.
3.2.4 Migration
3.2.4.1 International migration
In Pakistan, roughly no estimates are available for international immigration and em-
igration. The situation is even worst at the provincial level. The procedure to produce
the future path of net international migration is analogous to fertility and mortality.
The net international migration flow at base year and in the future has chosen from
UN 2010 Population Prospects. Furthermore, these flows are distributed proportion-
ally among the provinces. The uncertainty range at the national and provincial level
is assumed as; 80 percent probability that the increase is between the twice (up and
below) of the mean trend of net international migration. The age and sex distribution
of international migration was estimated through residual analysis. Furthermore, the
age and sex specific net international migration numbers are distributed proportionally
between provinces.
3.2.4.2 Internal migration
The forecasting of internal in-and-out migration is more challenging than any other
demographic components because internal migration is vulnerable by unpredictable
factors. During the last two decades, forecasting of internal migration has been made
in several studies such as Segal, 1985, Frees, 1992 and Gullickson and Moen, 2001.
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Figure 3.3: Projected life expectancy at birth for Punjab with prediction interval; Source:
Own Calculation
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Table 3.1: Distribution of inter-provincial migrants of Pakistan-1998
Region
In migration Out migration Net migration
Number percent Number percent Number Rate
Punjab 326,671 28.9 467830 41.4 -141159 -1.917
Sindh 500,223 44.2 130376 11.5 369847 12.150
KHP 81,736 7.2 464233 37.0 -382497 -18.284
Balochistan 55,894 4.9 56968 5.0 -1074 -0.164
Total 1,130,858 1,130,858
Source: Population Census 1998, UNFPA, 2003
All these models are requiring the reasonable time series data for internal migration,
which is not the case in Pakistan. Therefore, we rather used the simplest model for
projection of internal migration between provinces and named it as “Pooled Migra-
tion Method”. To describe the method, we proceed as follows, from census 1998,
origin-destination internal migration matrix for four provinces in Pakistan was ob-
tained. For each province, out internal migration proportion is calculated for each
province and for each projection step used these proportions to calculate out number
of internal migrants for each province. Moreover, in the second step, out migrants
from one province is distributed among the remaining three provinces proportionally
through origin destination matrix in each projection period. This procedure will be
repeated for each province from 2010 to 2060. For example, in Punjab, out-migrants
have computed by applying the corresponding destination proportion and distribute
these migrants in the remaining three provinces proportionally via origin-destination
matrix. This procedure applied for all provinces in Pakistan, for each projection step
and for each simulation. In this study, migration (internal and international) treated as
independent of the other two components and between provinces.
3.3 Results and Discussion
3.3.1 Total Population
Rapid population growth is practically unavoidable in Pakistan, at least in the near
future. Even though we assume that Pakistan will manage to achieve replacement
level fertility by 2035-40, the population would grow 174 million in 2005-10 to 288
millions in 2055-60 according to the median of the predictive distribution. Figure 3.4
shows that the projected total population and selected prediction interval of Pakistan
at the national and provincial level from 2005-10 to 2055-10. The median of the
distribution shows that the population of Pakistan reaches 249 million in 2035-40
with an 80 percent prediction interval between 234 and 266, and in 2055-60, the size
of the total population of Pakistan would reach 288 million with 80 percent prediction
interval between [246.9, 334.9]. The Punjab and Balochistan province, which has
a diverse and heterogeneous characteristics, are likely to follow the similar trends.
Owing to an earlier fertility transition, both provinces will have an identical speed
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Figure 3.4: Total Population of Pakistan with selected prediction Intervals:2010-2060;
Source: Own Calculation
of convergence and a higher probability that the population will start to decline in
2055-60 as compared to other provinces. The population of Punjab would grow by
fifty percent during 2005-10 to 2055-60–from 101 million in 2005-10 to 160 million
in 2055-60. The median of the predictive distribution pointed out that population of
Balochistan will be at 12.3 million in 2055-60 with an 80 percent prediction interval
between [10.1, 14.9]. The Sindh province which is the second largest province (in
population size) in Pakistan with a large business hub and active seaport (Karachi).
The population of Sindh estimated at 40.6 million in 2005-2010, and median of the
distribution demonstrates that population would increased to 74.1 million in 2055-60
with an 80 percent prediction interval between [61.4, 89.0].
Figure 3.5 also shows the total population of KPK and Balochistan from 2010 to
2060. If KPK population follows the median of the predictive distribution, this will
accounts for a 38 percent increase in the total population over the period of fifty years
from 2010-2060-from 24 million in 2005-10 to 40 million in 2055-60 with an 80 per-
cent prediction interval between [32.8, 48.1]. A significant proportion of population
growth during this period will be due to population momentum. The trend of the
total population over time in Balochistan is quite surprising. The Balochistan, the
largest province in Pakistan (44 percent of the total land area in Pakistan), consists of
5 percent of the total population of Pakistan (estimated total population of Balochis-
tan was 7.6 million in 2005-2010). Figure 3.5 also shows the population change in
Balochistan from 2005-10 to 2055-60. According to the median of the predictive
distribution, the total population of Balochistan will be 12.3 million in 2055-60 and
falls between [10.1, 14.9] with 80 percent confidence interval. Although, Balochis-
tan has considered developing province in Pakistan. Human development index for
Balochistan (HDI: 0.555) was low in 2005 in Pakistan. Low level of literacy and ed-
ucational attainment, particularly for women and fundamental tribal systems, are the
major issues concerning the development framework. The PDHS 2006-07 reveals the
stunning results that fertility transition in Balochistan was well advanced as compered
76
Figure 3.5: Total Population of Pakistan at Provincial level and selected prediction
Intervals:2010-2060; Source: Own Calculation
to other province in Pakistan, except for Punjab and our projections also point out that
the probability that the population will start to decline will be highest in Balochistan.
Until recently, the causes of fertility transition has not veiled in Balochistan. How-
ever, it is possibly correlated with a level of women education and socio-economic
development.
Although Pakistan was one of the first countries in South Asia to have initiated a fam-
ily planning program in 1965, unprecedented population growth has been observed in
Pakistan in the past and will likely be experienced in the future. Our projections show
a 31 percent probability that Pakistan’s population will start to decline in 2055-60. For
different provinces, the probability of start to decline will vary substantially.
Figure 3.6 shows the probability that the Pakistan population size at the national and
provincial level would start to decline at or before the indicated year. It sheds the light
to the fact that there is around 2 percent chance that the peak of the Pakistan population
would be reached by 2035-40, and around 31 percent chance that it would reach by
2055-60. In other words, until 2035, the population size of Pakistan will not turn down
due to population momentum. The highest probability that the population will start to
decline is observed in Balochistan. For instance, 43 percent chance that the population
of Balochistan will start to decline in 2055-60. It implies that internal migration and
high mortality are the main drivers responsible for the higher probability of decline
in Balochistan. There is around 3 percent chance that the peak of the population of
Punjab will be reached by 2035-40 and 40 percent chance by 2055-60. For Sindh, the
probability of reaching the peak of the population in the next two decades will be very
low and even lower in 2060 as compared to other provinces. In 2055-60, there is a 26
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Figure 3.6: Forecasted Probability that population will start to decline at or before the indi-
cated date; Source: Own Calculation
percent probability that the population size of Sindh will start to decline. There is a
significant improvement of health and education level in KPK in the past two decades
which shown that the probability of decline in 2055-60 reaches 36 percent as high as
from Sindh and lower from Punjab.
3.3.2 Population Momentum’s
During the demographic transition—particularly in the early and middle stage of the
transition—country shift from high death and birth rate to low death and low birth
rate—is a period of rapid population growth. During this phase, population growth
rate typically does not stop growing even the fertility has fallen to or below the re-
placement level. This phenomenon refers typically to “Population Momentum.” The
reason behind the non-stop population growth is that the age structure of the pop-
ulation was very young before the fertility transition; the huge bulk of youth will
sooner enter the childbearing year. Therefore, even if these generations only have two
children, they will produce more than enough births to maintain significant high pop-
ulation growth over the next few decades.
For countries that have undergone the middle phase of the demographic transition,
population momentum contributed significantly to the future population growth. Bon-
gaarts, 1994 had estimated that population momentum will account for nearly half of
the population growth of the developing countries in twenty-first century. The level
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Table 3.2: Population Momentum in Pakistan
Region 2005-10 2030-35 2055-60
Pakistan 1.52 1.22 0.96
Punjab 1.50 1.20 0.94
Sindh 1.52 1.23 0.99
KPK 1.61 1.26 0.98
Balochistan 1.55 1.21 0.93
Source: Own Calculation
of population momentum2 in Pakistan at the provincial level during the period 2010-
2060 has shown in table 3.2. In 2005-10, nearly half of the population growth at a
national level in Pakistan accounts due to momentum (1.52). Momentum generally
peaks between 1.5 to 1.6 for all provinces in Pakistan during 2005-10. Punjab and
KPK has represented two extremes on the momentum scale in Pakistan. The highest
momentum was achieved in KPK and Balochistan in 2005-10–1.61 and 1.55 respec-
tively, whereas the lowest momentum was in Punjab (1.50) due to the fact that the
fertility transition has started earlier in Punjab as compared to other provinces in Pak-
istan. During the next five decades, the momentum would be a vital factor in future
population growth in Pakistan and each province. Our projection results show that,
median of the total population of Pakistan would grow by an additional 22 percent
in 2030-35 and momentum will be vanished in 2050-55 if the fertility rates decline
immediately to replacement level. The largest momentum in KPK and lowest in Pun-
jab will be observed in 2035-30. Over the next 50 years, momentum would play a
significant role in Pakistan, which need a immediate policy implications.
3.3.3 Age and Sex Population distribution
Figure 3.7 and 3.8 illustrate the age and sex distribution of the population of Pakistan
at national and provincial levels for 2055-60. For most of the users, the population
projection by age and sex is as important as the total population size. The population
by age and sex in Pakistan shows that the significant amount of uncertainty across
age groups over time. In the early year of the projection, the high uncertainty exists
in the childhood ages because wide ambiguity for the birth rate whilst fairly narrow
prediction interval reflects for working and older ages (Figures not shown here). The
mortality uncertainty takes longer time horizon to become evident in the pyramid in
Pakistan, by 2040 it will start to become apparent in the older ages and continues
to widen. The migration virtually will not be the greatest contributor in the change
of age structure in Pakistan, although high uncertainty in migration has assumed in
the projection period. This is partly because the population growth has very high and
natural increase in the population is dominant over the migration. Table 3.3 enlightens
the total population size of broad age groups (0-14, 15-64 and 65+) at national and
provincial level in Pakistan with 80 percent prediction interval in the parenthesis. It
is interesting to note the population of working age (15-64) in Pakistan will likely
increase during the next 50 years from 104.7 million (60.3% of total population) in
2Momentum is calculated according to the formula describes in Samuel et al., 2001 pp-165
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Figure 3.7: Population Pyramid of Pakistan with selected prediction interval in 2060; Source:
Own Calculation
2005-10 to 193.6 million (67.5% of total population) in 2055-60 with an 80 percent
prediction interval between [165.0, 223.3]. The number of children aged (0-14) will
be declining with a medium pace in next five decades in Pakistan. It is important to
point out that during the next three decades, the population in the childhood age group
(0-14) will significantly decline due to high fertility in the past and possibly with
population momentum. The population of the age group (0-14) will likely decrease
from 61.5 million (35.4%) in 2005-10, to 51.6 million (17.9%) in 2055-60, with an 80
percent prediction interval between [33.7, 72.8].
By most indicators, Punjab is the more advanced province in Pakistan. In 2010, the es-
timated population of Punjab was 101.3 million inhabitants, comprising 58 percent of
the total population of Pakistan. The population pyramid of Punjab with selected pre-
diction interval has been illustrated in Figure 3.8. The fairly high uncertainty seen over
the birth rate translates into the ample prediction interval in the youngest childhood
ages in 2055-60, while the uncertainty over the death rate becomes more prominent in
the older ages of Punjab. On the contrary, the changes in age structure in Sindh and
those in Punjab are particularly interesting in view of the fact that, the wide prediction
interval for younger ages in Sindh are observed, as compared to Punjab. In 2005-10,
the younger population aged (0-14) in Punjab has 34.3 million (34 percent of total
population of Punjab) and projection shows that the population aged (0-14) in Pun-
jab will likely to decline to 27.1 million (17 percent of total population of Punjab) in
2055-60 with an 80 percent prediction interval between 17.3 and 39.9 million. In case
of Sindh, the population aged (0-14) will be declining from 14.8 million (37 percent
of total population of Sindh) to 13.6 million (19 percent) during the next 50 years. It
is worth mentioning that in absolute term, the decline is not significant in Sindh as
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compared to Punjab in younger ages. However, if we look in terms of percentage,
almost 50 percent decline is observed in both provinces. In KPK and Balochistan, the
situation does not vary significantly. Both provinces have smaller population size in
Pakistan. The younger age population (0-14) will declining in KPK from 9.2 million,
to 7.1 million in 2055-60 with an 80 percent prediction interval between [4.3, 11.0].
Contrary, the decline of one million inhabitants in younger age (0-14) population in
Balochistan will be observed in 50 year time horizon.
In Punjab and Sindh, 62.1 (61 percent of the total population of Punjab) and 24.5 (60
percent of the total population of Sindh) million population were in the working ages
(15-64) in 2005-2010 respectively. By 2055-60, the median of the prediction interval
for the working age population will be 107.2 million (67%) and 49.6 million (68%) for
Punjab and Sindh respectively, with an 80 percent confidence interval between [90.7,
124.9] for Punjab and [41.2, 59.1] for Sindh. In KPK, working age population will be
double in 50 years. The median of predictive distribution reveals that the working age
population in KPK would increase from 13.8 million in 2005-10 to 26.9 million 2055-
60. Thus, the rising share of the working age population for each province in Pakistan
can translate into a subsequent rise in the rate of economic growth if the economy
employs them effectively and productively. Pakistan has experienced a phase of the
demographic window of opportunities, which is closely linked the onset and pace of
the fertility transition, which influences the age structure. However, the recognition
of this demographic window is dependent on numerous factors. Levels of educational
attainment are substantial in this regards as too low level of education particularly, for
women could limit economic growth. Furthermore, the unemployment rate is crucial
in this regard because it may limit the impact of those favorable age structures.
Population aging is one of the prominent themes in the western world and now has
become more dominant in South Asian countries in recent times. The traditional indi-
cator to assess the impact of aging in a country is the percentage of population 65 and
older and elderly dependency ratio. Table 3.3 illustrates the proportion of elderly pop-
ulation aged 65 and older at provincial level in Pakistan from 2010 to 2060. In 2010,
the population pyramid of Pakistan was very young. The proportion of the population
aged 65 and older was 4 percent (7.5 million) in Pakistan in 2010. Approximately,
similar proportion has been found in 2010 for all provinces for elderly population,
except Balochistan where the proportion of 65 and older people was 2.9 percent (0.22
million). The median of predictive distribution reveals that, the substantial rise in the
population aged 65 and older will be notified in Pakistan, approximately six times in
50 years, from 7.5 million (4%) in 2005-10 to 42.5 million (15%) in 2055-60 with 80
percent confidence interval between [38.4, 47.5]. A substantial rise will be observed
in elderly population for all provinces in Pakistan (See Table 3.3).
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Figure 3.8: Population Pyramid of Pakistan at provincial level with selected prediction inter-
val in 2060; Source: Own Calculation
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Table 3.3: Population (in million) in Pakistan at provincial level for broad age group with 80% prediction interval; Source: Own Calculation
Region
2005-10 2030-35 2055-60
0-14 15-64 65+ 0-14 15-64 65+ 0-14 15-64 65+
Pakistan 61.4 104.7 7.5
61.5 171.1 16.9 51.6 193.6 42.5
(48.8,74.3) (164.5,177.8) (15.8,17.2) (33.7,72.8) (165.0,223.3) (38.4,47.5)
Punjab 34.3 62.1 4.9
33.9 97.7 10.4 27.1 107.2 24.9
(26.7,41.6) (93.7,101.7) (9.8,10.9) (17.3,39.9) (90.7,124.9) (22.3,28.2)
Sindh 14.8 24.5 1.4
15.4 42.2 3.8 13.6 49.6 10.4
(11.8,19.4) (40.2,44.2) (3.6,4.1) (8.4,20.7) (41.2,59.1) (9.0,12.0)
KPK 9.2 13.8 0.95
8.8 23.5 2.1 7.1 26.9 5.4
(6.8,11.2) (22.4,24.7) (1.9,2.3) (4.3,11.0) (22.2,32.4) (4.6,6.2)
Balochistan 3.1 4.4 0.22
2.7 7.6 0.64 2.1 8.4 1.7
(2.0,3.4) (7.2,7.8) (0.59,0.69) (1.2,3.2) (6.9,10.2) (1.4,2.0)
83
3.4 Conclusion
Untamable population growth has led to growing pressure on land, high unemploy-
ment, poverty and overall grave economic scenarios. In this study, we described the
initial attempt at producing the sub-national probabilistic population projections of
Pakistan. The model incorporates in and out internal migration at the provincial level
in Pakistan to avoid the conceptual and practical problem of net internal migration. It
also deals with the correlation of vital rates between sexes and between regions. Our
key projection results are summarized as follows:
• Approximately, 31 percent probability that the population of Pakistan will start
to decline in 2055-60. The highest probability of the decline will attach to
Punjab and Balochistan (40 and 43 percent respectively in 2055-60) and lowest
probability of decline for Sindh (26 percent in 2055-60). [Figure 3.6]
• The median of the predictive distributions reveals that the total population of
Pakistan will be 288 million in 2055-60 and an 80 percent prediction interval
gives that population of Pakistan’s will lie between 246.9 and 334.9 million by
2055-60. According to median of predictive distribution, the population of Pun-
jab would be 159.6 million in 2055-60 with and 80 percent prediction interval
between [136.2, 187.1]. ( Figure 3.4)
• During the next 50 years, population momentum would contribute significantly
in population growth in Pakistan at provincial level and consequently at national
level (Table 3.2).
• A very young age structure, according to the median of the prediction interval,
the working age population of Pakistan would increase to194 million inhabitants
(68 percent of total population of Pakistan) in 2055-60. Therefore, heed policies
in Pakistan should be addressed for the utilization of this demographic window
of opportunities, by inducing them into the job market. (See Figure 3.7 and
Table 3.3)
Faced with the unprecedented population growth rate and a rapid increase in its labor
force in the future, Pakistan will have to adopt a development model that is capable of
absorbing the increase. The age structure will become very young and more favorable
in next 50 years, the large working age population, if the well-educated and employes
could be a major asset for the country, and Pakistan will be prosperous socially and
economically. If a country fails, it will be confronted with many problems. This study
pinpoints two major concerns; demographic dividend and the population momentum,
where policies will be highly needed.
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Part II
Evolution of Education
85
4
Educational Attainment and Literacy in
Pakistan
Summary
This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the state of education in Pakistan.
It offers a broad overview of the educational attainment and literacy during last four
decades at the provincial level in Pakistan. In the introduction, it is pointed out how
education influences the different socio-economic indicators in Pakistan. The chapter
pays attention to show the historical perspective and development over the last four
decades in the education sector at the provincial level in Pakistan. It also reviews
the educational policies in Pakistan since 1950s. We rely on three main indicators to
assess the education development in Pakistan: Educational attainment, literacy and
enrollment rates. We show the failure of the education, particularly toward females in
Pakistan, shedding light on the expenditures spent on education in Pakistan.
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4.1 Introduction
Any assessment of the education sector in Pakistan today is submerged by the abun-
dance of negative aspects ranging from inadequate physical infrastructure, shortage
of school facilities and qualified staff and poorer student performances than any other
Asian developing country. In 1947, when Pakistan received independence from Great
Britain after 100 years of colonial rule, one of the first aims of the government, follow-
ing the recommendations of the 1947 education conference, was to provide free and
compulsory elementary education. Again in 1973, under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto, the newly adopted constitution included an article stipulating that “the State
shall remove illiteracy and provide free and compulsory secondary education within a
minimum possible period.” Indeed, human capital formation, the result of education,
is essential in raising the efficiency and productivity of the labor force. This obvious
link which should result in the prioritization of education in the development policy
of a country is not always taken into account mostly because of the short and medium
term time span in which politicians are thinking, whereas returns to investment in ed-
ucation will happen in the long term. Similar to many developing countries, the low
levels of educational attainment in Pakistan are, firstly, attributable to extremely low
levels of public investment in the education sector.
Pakistan considered the most illiterate country in the world after sub-Saharan Africa.
In 2011, 58 percent of the total population of Pakistan was literate. Furthermore,
Pakistan ranks 160th out of the 183 countries in the world by literacy rate in 2011.1
The literacy rate of the total population in Pakistan during last three decades has been
rising significantly—from 26 percent in 1981 to 43 percent in 1998. A significant
variation in literacy rate exists between the provinces in Pakistan. During the period
of 1981 and 1998, the literacy rate of the total population in Punjab increased signifi-
cantly as compared to other provinces in Pakistan. Even in the socioeconomically and
educationally backward provinces of Pakistan–Balochistan and KPK–the literacy rate
accelerated substantially in recent years. Current school attendance also rose rapidly
in every province in Pakistan. For instance, the Net attendance ratio in primary level
for the age group 5-9 in Punjab was 75 percent for total population in 2006. The cor-
responding figures for other provinces in Pakistan was 54, 62 and 42 percent in Sindh,
KPK and Balochistan respectively (PDHS 2006-07).
At the beginning of the 1990s, Pakistan achieved a reasonable level of economic
growth, but failed to raise human development, particularly in the education sector.
For this reason, the government launched the Social Action Program (SAP) in 1992,
with the support mainly of the World Bank and other international donors. This was
an open-ended action plan, carried in several phases, which was aimed at increasing
the quality and quantity of social services such as the education sector, wherein the
objectives were to increase enrollment and school quality as well as eliminate gender
and regional disparities.The SAP yielded unsatisfactory education outcomes, with al-
most no increase in primary enrollment rates, and little reduction of the gender and
regional gap. As it can be seen from Figure 4.2, education expenditures have been
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_literacy_rate
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Figure 4.1: Generation of Human Capacity in Pakistan compared to countries in Southern
Asia, Source: Goujon and Wazir, 2011
increasing since 2002, mainly as part of the National Plan of Action (NAP 2001 to
2015), whose basis for planning was the UNESCO Education for All, aiming mostly
at achieving universal primary education by 2015 for both girls and boys. Other gov-
ernmental objectives are set in terms of increasing participation at lower secondary
level and are producing more higher education graduates. Until the end of the 1990s,
Pakistan was doing worse than the average of least developing countries across the
indicators of enrollment and budget allocation (e.g. the primary school enrollment
rates in Pakistan were 62 per cent compared to 76 percent for the average for low in-
come countries (UNDP 2003)). In 2010, as shown in Figure 4.1, Pakistan scores less
than its regional neighbors in terms of indicators related to the generation of human
capacity, such as access (enrollment of both girls and boys at primary and secondary
levels), investment, performance (measured by literacy and primary completion rates),
and quality of education–dependent for instance upon grade repetition and pupil to the
teacher ratio.
The “problem” with education is that it takes time to influence society. Levels of edu-
cational attainment are acquired mostly during childhood. Hence, any improvements
in enrollment and completion rates will not have diffused through the entire working
population until some 50 years later2 , meaning that any lack of improvement in edu-
cational policies in Pakistan will plague the human capital characteristics of the labor
force for many decades. Educational momentum is visible in the evolution of three
types of indicators: (1) literacy rates, and the share of the population distributed be-
tween levels of educational attainment; (2) the translation of past investments (or lack
thereof); (3) enrollment ratios that reflect present education flows and, which later
2Education occurs mostly in schools, adult education being marginal. Any change, for instance in
the intake level of primary education, will take a few decades before it has reached the whole working
age population by the process of generation replacement, the old and less educated generations being
replaced by the new generations who have benefited from increased education.
88
translate into human capital stocks. In the following sections, we will emphasis on
these three indicators.
4.2 Educational development in Pakistan: Past and Present
4.2.1 Policy Development Regarding Education in Pakistan
The illiteracy and neglect of education sector in Pakistan were inherited from the
British legacy. The first post-independence census in 1951 indicates that only 16 per-
cent of the total populations were literate, and female literacy was low as compared
to the male–12 percent and 19 percent respectively. Since the independence in 1947,
numbers of attempts have been made to identify the problems in the education sys-
tem in Pakistan and propose several policy recommendations. The first All-Pakistan
Education Conference was held in 1947, in the will of the founder of Pakistan. Quaid-
e-Azam, who had provided the fundamental guidelines for the future development of
education in Pakistan. The conference therefore recommended three basic guidelines;
1) education should be inspired from Islam; 2) free and compulsory elementary edu-
cation; 3) emphasis of technical education (Khan, 1997). In 1951, the first educational
policy was formulated in the Six-year National education plan for Education and trans-
lates the policy recommendation purposed in 1947 into physical targets. The lack of
firm political commitment and financial constraint were the main factors explaining
the failure of the first educational policy (Khan, 1997). In addition, migration from
India after the partition into Pakistan significantly affected the educational structure
and policy because of the sheer number of enrollment at all levels of education. Fur-
thermore, the segmentation of the education sector has also played a substantial role
in the development of education. Contemporary education system in Pakistan frag-
mented into many different systems, such as English and Urdu medium and public
and private sector. The major factor of this fragmentation of the education system in
Pakistan is considered primarily the British rule made some changes into the education
system in pre-independence of India and was paid attention mainly to educate the elite
which would help to administer the country. Perhaps, this has the major step for the
segmentation of the education system currently prevail in Pakistan. It has therefore,
create intractable problems in the optimal use of the resources in the country. The
pre-independence educational system had not changed in Pakistan and even further
strengthens.
The first ambitious goals of education were set in the Second Five-year plan (1960-
65). The National Educational commission were reviewing thoroughly the education
system in Pakistan and emphasized three basic recommendation that; 1) compulsory
primary schooling for age group 6-11 within next 10 years and for age group 11-
14 within next 15 years; 2) introduce the technical/vocational subjects in secondary
stage; and 3) Bachelor level degree extended from two to three years (Khan, 1997).
The educational goals in Second Five-years plan was seen as an reasonable progress.
Approximately 96 percent of intended investment for the education allocated in the
plan was utilized, although the targets set for primary and technical education were
still lagging behind for implementation and goals for basic primary education have not
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been accomplished. It is worth mentioning that the growth of school aged children was
one of the causes for the failure of educational goals during 1960s in Pakistan–the pro-
portion of the children aged 5-14 in Pakistan were increasing from 24 percent in 1960
to 26 percent in 1970.
Aly (2007), in his white paper for a national education policy, summarizes with elegant
severity educational policy developments in the past since independence of the coun-
try in 1947: “Periodically, the State of Pakistan addressed the educational needs of the
people and the aspirations of the State in this regard, in 1947, 1951, 1959, 1966, 1969,
1970, 1972, 1979, 1992 and lastly in 1998. Apart from the common denominator of
Islam and national cohesion, the statements of vision and purpose for the national ed-
ucation system in Pakistan have tended to reflect the dominant political paradigm and
compulsions of the day. Impliedly, most of these noble assertions remained rhetoric,
now confined to the dustbins of history.” It is noteworthy that several educational poli-
cies have been formulated in Pakistan from 1970s to 2010. However, in every five
year plan, Govt. of Pakistan has set the goals for basic education. However, the goals
for education have not been met in the history of Pakistan. The education goals in
Pakistan have been reiterated and absurd targets have been set repeatedly since 1970s.
For example, the attainment of universal primary education goal in Pakistan has been
still far behind in 2010 although, it was formulated in early 1960s and Pakistan has
also signatory of Education for All (EFA) and MDGs goals.
4.2.2 Historical development in Literacy
Literacy in Pakistan has been expanding since the beginning of the 1970s. In 1972,
only 22 percent of the population aged 15+ was literate compared to the 54 percent in
2008. Table 4.1 shows in 2006 that the population became majority literate. The over-
all literacy rate for age group 15+ in 2008 was estimated at 54 percent, 67 percent for
males and 40 percent for females. These rates are among the 10 lowest in the world
for the countries with data available in 2008 – data was not available for Afghanistan,
where rates of illiteracy are presumably higher than in Pakistan – , and Pakistan is the
only Asian country as all the others are sub-Saharan African countries. The differ-
ence in literacy levels of the 15+ population and the 15-24 population is striking, and
show that literacy is gaining ground in the population. Still Pakistan is among the 10
countries with the lowest scores in terms of literacy of the 15-24 population, meaning
that the pace of change for the youngest age group is not any faster than in the other
least-literate countries. Since the overall population of Pakistan is large, the absolute
number of illiterate men and women is very large as well, 51 million in 2008—about
the whole population of South Africa for the same year. Table 4.1 also shows that the
increase in literacy rates is not keeping up with the population growth rates as the total
illiterate population is more or less staying in constant at about 50 million.
Literacy rate has been gaining ground in every provinces in Pakistan since the begin-
ning of the decade of 1970s. Figure 4.2 shows the literacy rate of the population aged
15 years and older and 15-24 year older at the provincial level from 1972 to 2006. The
literacy rates for the population aged 15-24 years is a reflection of recent educational
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Table 4.1: Literacy rate in Pakistan from 1972-2008
Literacy
Rate
(percent)
illiterate
Population
(million)
illiterate
Population
Age group Year Total Male Female Total Male Female Percent
Female
15+
1972 22 30 12 31 14 17 54
1981 26 35 15 36 17 19 54
1998 43 55 29 47 19 28 60
2005 50 64 35 51 19 32 63
2008 54 67 40 51 19 32 63
15-24
1972 36 49 20 7 3 4 56
1981 35 45 24 10 4 6 56
1998 55 67 43 12 5 7 62
2005 65 77 53 12 4 8 65
2008 69 79 59 12 4 7 64
Source: Goujon & Wazir (2011)
achievement in a country. The literacy rate for the population aged 15+ in Punjab
increased more than double from 23 percent to 55 percent, from 1972 to 2010. More
than four times improvements in the literacy rate for female (aged 15+) were observed
during the past four decades in Punjab–from 10 percent in 1972 to 42 percent in 2010.
It is interesting to note that during the decade of 1970s and 1980s the progress in Pun-
jab was not impressive in female enrollments. However, over the past two decades,
attractive progress has seen in Punjab, which is the reflection of the investment and
commitment in education sector, particularly adult literacy for female by the govern-
ment of Punjab. Several projects for improving adult literacy and female enrollment
in Punjab has launched in 1990s and earlier of the first decade of 21st century—for
example, Social Action Program funded by World Bank in early 1990s. It is worth
mentioning that the illiterate population in Punjab has been almost double from 1972
to 2010—from 15.5 million to 30.2 million—about the whole population of Nepal in
2010. Moreover, more than 60 percent of illiterate population in Punjab was female in
2010. The literacy rate for the population aged 15-24 in Punjab was rapidly growing
from 37 percent in 1972 to 74 percent in 2006. However, more than three times the
female population (aged 15-24) in Punjab has been gaining literacy during the period
from 1972-2006–from 20 percent in 1972 to 68 percent in 2006. Not surprisingly,
persistent high levels of illiteracy is visible in KPK and Balochistan in the recent and
distant past for the population aged 15+ and 15-24. The literacy rate for total popula-
tion aged 15+ increased 26 percentage points in KPK (from 19 percent in 1972 to 46
percent in 2010) and 27 percentage points in Balochistan (from 10 percent in 1972 to
37 percent in 2010) over the period of 1972-2010. Approximately, 8 million inhab-
itants in KPK are illiterate in 2010—about the whole population of Austria in 2010.
Furthermore, in Balochistan, the literacy has also been gaining—from 10 percent to
37 percent from 1972-2010 for total population aged 15+. Approximately, 65 percent
in population aged 15-24 in KPK and 55 percent in Balochistan has been literate in
2006, which reflect the fact that pace of change for the youngest age group (15-24) in
91
those province has slow as compared to other provinces in Pakistan.
As expected, gender disparities were extremely high in Pakistan in literacy rate (for
population aged 15-24 as well as for population 15+), particularly in KPK and Balochis-
tan in the recent and distant past. The Gender Parity’s Index (GPI) is used here to
access the gender inequality in the literacy . A value of less than one of GPI indicates
the difference in favor of boys, whereas values close to one show that the equal oppor-
tunities was provided for girls and boys alike. The GPI extremely low in KPK during
the last four decades—0.19 for population aged 15+ in 1972, and was significantly
high in Sindh 1972 (GPI: 0.41). The pace of change in GPI for Punjab was astonish-
ing during the last four decades, particularly in recent years for population aged 15
years and older—from 0.29 in 1972 to 0.63 in 2010. Table 4.2 shows by all criteria,
the KPK and Balochistan were at the bottom of the ladder for literacy rates, like the
GPI in Pakistan during last four decades (for population aged 15+ and 15-24).
4.2.3 Educational Attainment
Not surprisingly, the persistent high levels of illiteracy are visible in the levels of
educational attainment of the working age population in Pakistan—the age group 20-
64—which is dominated by a large proportion with no education3 (Table 4.3). Still
the share of men who have completed primary education increased from 13 percent
in 1972 to 16 percent in 2010, pointing at imbalances in the development of the ed-
ucation sector with a barrier restricting access to primary education; however, once
this level has been accessed, there are fewer obstacles to higher levels. The higher
educated are very few in the working-age population in Pakistan and as of 2010 only
15 percent of men have a university equivalent education in Pakistan. The situation is
far worse for women, where the barrier to primary education has been impervious in
many settings, especially in rural areas. Only 12 percent of the working age female
population has completed a primary education in 2010—increasing from 4 percent in
1972—and only 8 percent had a tertiary education, as compare to 1 percent in 1972.
Table 4.3 shows the progress and most of the time, the lack of progress in levels of
educational attainment as can be seen from the population across censuses with a ma-
jority of that population being uneducated until the 21st century, and it was still the
case of two-third of women in 2010. For those who had access to education, the path
often stopped at the level of secondary education and a small share of the male and
female population gained an upper education i.e., university education.
Table 4.4 shows the educational attainment of working age population (WAP) aged
20-64 at provincial level in Pakistan from 1972 to 2010. The persistent low levels of
educational attainment has been visible in the WAP at the provincial level in Pakistan
during last four decades. For instance, in Punjab, 92 percent of the female and 68
percent of male of WAP received no education in 1972. However, this declined to
59 percent for female and 32 percent for male in 2010. On the other hand, the share
3The category “No Education” underestimates the number of illiterates on one hand because some
children who enter the school for a short period may not acquire all literacy skills. On the other hand, is
concurrently overestimates since some children and adults can learn to read and write while not being
in school.
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Table 4.2: Literacy rate in Pakistan at provincial levels: 1972-2010
Province Literacy
Rate
(percent)
illiterate
Population
(million)
Age group Year Total Male Female GPI Total Male Female
Punjab
15+
1972 23 34 10 0.29 15.5 7.2 8.3
1981 26 36 14 0.39 19.7 9.0 10.7
1998 44 56 31 0.55 24.0 9.8 14.2
2010 55 67 42 0.63 30.2 11.1 19.3
15-24
1972 37 50 20 0.40 3.6 1.6 2.0
1981 36 47 24 0.51 5.2 2.3 2.9
1998 59 69 48 0.70 5.9 2.2 3.7
2006 74 81 68 0.83 - - -
Sindh
15+
1972 27 37 15 0.41 5.8 2.8 3.1
1981 29 38 19 0.50 7.4 3.5 3.9
1998 43 54 32 0.59 9.9 4.3 5.6
2010 58 71 43 0.61 10.9 3.9 7.0
15-24
1972 38 49 24 0.49 1.4 0.6 0.8
1981 37 44 29 0.66 2.0 0.9 1.1
1998 51 61 41 0.67 3.0 1.2 1.8
2006 64 74 53 0.72 - - -
KPK
15+
1972 19 31 6 0.19 2.7 1.2 1.5
1981 16 26 5 0.19 4.9 2.3 2.6
1998 32 48 15 0.31 6.6 2.5 4.1
2010 46 65 28 0.43 7.9 2.5 5.4
15-24
1972 30 48 11 0.23 0.7 0.3 0.4
1981 22 34 9 0.26 1.4 0.6 0.8
1998 45 65 25 0.38 1.9 0.6 1.3
2006 65 84 48 0.57 - - -
Balochistan
15+
1972 10 15 4 0.27 1.4 0.7 0.7
1981 10 15 3 0.20 2.0 1.0 1.0
1998 23 33 12 0.36 2.8 1.3 1.5
2010 37 56 15 0.27 3.0 1.1 1.9
15-24
1972 16 23 7 0.30 0.4 0.2 0.2
1981 12 17 6 0.35 0.6 0.3 0.3
1998 31 42 18 0.43 0.9 0.4 0.5
2006 55 69 41 0.60 - - -
Source: IPUMS, PDHS 2006-07,PSLM 2010-11, GPI=Gender Parity Index
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Table 4.3: Educational attainment of the working age population (20-64) in Pakistan, in
percent
Census Gender
No
Primary Secondary Tertiary
Education
1972 Male 68 13 17 2
Female 92 4 3 1
1981 Male 66 12 19 3
Female 88 5 6 1
1998 Male 48 18 28 6
Female 74 11 12 3
2010 Male 35 16 34 15
Female 65 12 15 8
Source: IPUMS, PDHS 2006-07
of male and female of WAP who have at least completed primary education in Pun-
jab increased from 19 percent and 5 percent in 1972 to 33 percent and 17 percent in
1998 respectively. However, the proportion of males and females who have completed
primary education in Punjab in fact declined in 2010–16 percent, and 15 percent for
male and female, respectively. The declining share of primary education for male and
female for WAP alike in Punjab during the last decades is pointing the fact that, major-
ity of the population who attained the primary education, enroll to higher levels. The
share of the secondary education of the WAP in Punjab was very low in 1972—only
11 percent of male and 3 percent of female have attained secondary education. More-
over, the percentage of secondary educated peoples in Punjab increased to 37 percent
for male and 17 percent for female in 2010. The percentage of tertiary educated per-
sons of the WAP of Punjab was disappointing in the past. In 1972, only 2 percent of
males had a university degree in Punjab. The situation is far worse for women where
the barriers to tertiary education have been impervious in many settings, especially in
rural areas—zero percentage of the female in Punjab had a university degree in 1972
and approximately 10 percent in 2010 (See Table 4.4).
In the early 1970s, the situation of the educational attainment of the WAP in Sindh
was not inspiring. Roughly 89 percent of female and 65 percent of male in Sindh had
never attended school in 1972. Furthermore, the share of of uneducated population
of WAP in Sindh declined to 65 percent for female and 35 percent for male in 2010.
Whereas the share of primary education of WAP in Sindh had 22 percent, and 6 per-
cent for male and female respectively in 1972 and improved to 10 percent for female
in 2010 and is declining for male–i.e., 17 percent. On one hand, it shows that access
of primary education to girls increased in Sindh, whereas the dropout rates for boys
were substantially higher in rural areas. Consequently, only 9 percent of male and 3
percent of female had been secondary educated in Sindh during early 1970s, whereas
the progress in producing university graduates had very slow in Sindh—4 percent of
male and 1 percent of female had tertiary education in 1972. The picture of the higher
education has not look pretty in Sindh. The share of secondary and tertiary educated
females in Sindh increased to 13 percent and 11 percent, respectively in 2010. On
the other hand, the male is in a relatively better position in Sindh. The share of sec-
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Table 4.4: Educational attainment (in percent) of the working age population (20-64) of Pak-
istan at provincial level from 1972-2010
Category
1972 1981 1998 2010
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Balochistan
No Education 87 97 84 97 69 91 49 84
Primary 7 2 9 2 15 5 8 5
Secondary 5 2 5 1 12 3 26 7
Tertiary 1 0 1 0 4 1 17 4
KPK
No Education 72 95 74 96 54 88 35 79
Primary 16 2 14 3 23 7 11 7
Secondary 10 2 10 1 18 4 37 9
Tertiary 2 0 2 0 5 1 17 5
Punjab
No Education 68 92 64 87 45 72 32 59
Primary 19 5 21 8 33 17 16 15
Secondary 11 3 12 4 18 8 37 17
Tertiary 2 0 2 1 4 2 15 10
Sindh
No Education 65 89 62 83 47 71 35 65
Primary 22 6 21 10 26 15 17 10
Secondary 9 3 11 5 18 10 25 13
Tertiary 4 1 5 2 9 5 23 11
Source: Own Calculation from Census 1972,1981,1998 (IPUMS), PDHS 2006-07
ondary and tertiary educated males improved to 25 percent and 23 percent in 2010
respectively (See Table 4.4).
In 1972, 72 percent of the male and 95 percent of the female of WAP in KPK, and
87 percent of the male and 97 percent of the female of WAP in Balochistan received
no education. This has declined to 84 percent for female and 49 percent for male in
Balochistan, and 79 percent of female and 35 percent of male of WAP in KPK in 2010.
The share of at least primary education for males in KPK increased to 23 percent in
1998 from 16 percent in 1972, and further declined to 11 percent in 2010. It is evident
from Table 4.4 that, during the early 1970s, the transition from primary to secondary
education for male was not significant in Sindh, whereas in 2010, this transition was
sustainability high in reflecting the fact that the probability to move into secondary
level was high in Sindh and dropout rates were low. Also, the proportion of primary
education of female WAP increased from 2 percent to 7 percent from 1972 to 2010
in KPK respectively. Furthermore, the picture of primary education in Balochistan
has been gloomy during the last four decades—only 7 percent of male and 2 per-
cent of female in 1972 had primary education and as of 2010, only 8 percent of male
and 5 percent of female have acquired to primary education—reflecting the access to
primary education which hinder the development of education in Balochistan. The
situation disgruntled for secondary and particularly for tertiary education in KPK and
Balochistan. Approximately, 37 percent of the male and 9 percent of female of WAP
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in KPK completed at least secondary education in 2010—increasing from 10 percent
and 2 percent in 1972, for male and female respectively. Only 1 percent of males
in Balochistan completed a university degree in 1972 and females never attended the
university in the same year. However, significant improvement in tertiary education
in Balochistan has been seen during last four decades. The share of tertiary educated
increased to 17 percent for male and 4 percent for female of WAP in 2010. As ex-
pected, the situation has become even worse in 1972 for tertiary education for male
and female alike in KPK (See Table 4.4). The share of tertiary educated person of
WAP in KPK had been substantially low during the last four decades–only 17 percent
of male had tertiary education in 2010, as compared to 2 percent in 1972. The females
of WAP had never attend the university in early 1970s in KPK and this has to confirm
in 1998 that the proportion of female university graduate was one percent. Recently,
the female enrollment in universities in KPK increased considerably–the share of ter-
tiary educated female rose to 5 percent in 2010.
Table 4.5 shows that the percentage distribution for four broad age groups, sex and
by level of educational attainment in Pakistan at the provincial level for the period
of 2005-2010. The table shows a very gloomy picture. It shows that the inheritance
of past education policies and outcomes into the current educational distribution. It
is quite reasonable that before making any policy paradigm for the future, to identify
the trend in educational distribution of population and examine some of the obstacles
that hindered to reaching a highly educated society, which ultimately affects the eco-
nomic growth of the country. In Pakistan, 81 percent of females aged 35 and older
have no formal education in 2010. Whereas, their males counterpart have better edu-
cated (47 percent in 2010). The situation has been inferior in KPK and Balochistan in
2010, where 92 and 94 percent of females aged 35 and over have never been to school
in KPK and Balochistan respectively. The gender equity is quite higher in the older
cohort rather than in the younger cohort in primary and secondary level in Pakistan.
Approximately more than 80 percent of females aged 35 years and older have never
attended school in all four provinces in Pakistan.
Table 4.5 gives comparable information of educational level for Pakistan at provincial
level in 2010. On average, the males in Punjab and KPK have been better educated
at all levels of education (particularly at the primary and secondary level) for older
cohorts (i.e. 25-34 and 35+) as compared to Balochistan and Sindh. Whereas, the sit-
uation for females of similar cohorts deteriorates in all provinces except Punjab. The
large proportion of younger cohorts (age group 15-19) of males in Balochistan and
Sindh had never attended the school–30 percent and 27 percent in 2010 respectively
and significant proportion (approximately 50 percent) of females aged 15-19 had no
formal education in remaining three provinces except Punjab in 2010. Female en-
rollments in primary education for older cohorts (25-34 and 35+) as well as younger
cohorts (15-19) in Punjab and Sindh improved as compared to other provinces in Pak-
istan. For instance, 22 percent and 21 percent of females aged 15-19 have at least a
primary education in Punjab and Sindh in 2010. The proportion with at least primary
education never reached even 25 percent for older cohorts (age groups 35+) for all
provinces in Pakistan, even though the national and provincial governments had higher
priorities for providing primary education and adult literacy in recent years. The pro-
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portion of females (age group 15-19) with at least secondary education in Punjab and
Sindh has much higher as compared to other provinces–39 percent and 28 percent re-
spectively. This development over time has been pervasive in Pakistan, with only 4
percent for women and 12 percent of men in Pakistan, having a tertiary education in
the age group 35+. It is interesting to note that the proportion of tertiary education
for males are higher than females for older cohorts (25-34, 35+). However, in recent
decades, the higher proportion of females observed in age group 15-19 which reflect
that the access to university for girls and the priority of government was high in recent
years. The gender parity has wide in secondary and tertiary education in all provinces
but the situation was alarming in Balochistan and KPK, where 10 percent of females
in KPK and 8 percent in Balochistan in the age group 20-24 have completed tertiary
education whereas, the proportions of males are almost doubled in these provinces as
compared to females. During the last two decades, the improvement in education par-
ticularly for female in Punjab has seen which is reflected by the fact that the fraction
of women with a tertiary education is higher than males in the age group 20-24.
4.2.4 Enrollment and Educational Expenditures
Enrollment ratios inform the present situation in school and represent the engine of
future human capital. Table 4.6 is showing the data for gross enrollment ratio for the
last 10 years, and those demonstrates quite strong progress at the level of primary and
lower secondary education. However net enrollment ratios4 show that all children are
far from entering primary schools at the official school age – 72 per cent for boys and
60 per cent for girls in 2009 – and even more so in secondary schools – 36 per cent for
boys and 29 per cent for girls in 2009. Also only 6 per cent of the children who have
entered primary complete the level and only 72 per cent of those move onto secondary
level studies.
Level of enrollment indicates that an increase in the number of students at all levels fu-
ture progress in the education of the labor force, although these net enrollment rates do
not automatically translate into levels of educational attainment because of dropouts
and grade repetition. Table 4.7 presents the Net Enrollment Rate (NER) in primary
level at the provincial level in Pakistan from 1995 to 2006 from PIHS and PSLM.5
The NER in Pakistan increased from 44 percent in 1995 to 56 percent in 2006 for
both sexes. The NER in Punjab has been higher in Pakistan in 2006-07 as well as,
was higher in 1995. Nearly a 12 percentage increase in NER occurred from 1995 to
2006 in Pakistan for both sexes. The Punjab and KPK have attained significant gain
in NER from 1995 to 2006—38 percent and 40 percent for both sexes—reflecting the
significant amount of budget spent on education during the last decade. Surprisingly,
4Gross enrollment ratio is defined as the number of pupils (of any age) who are enrolled in a partic-
ular level as a percentage of the total children of official school age population for that level. The net
enrollment ratio is defined as the number of children of official school age for a particular level that are
enrolled in that level as a percentage of the total children of the official school age population. Hence
the difference between gross and net enrollment ratio indicates the extent of over-aged and under-aged
enrollment.
5PIHS: Pakistan Integrated Household Survey and PSLM: Pakistan Social and Living Standard
Measurement Survey
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Table 4.5: Percentage distribution of four broad age groups by age-sex and educational level
in Pakistan at provincial level: 2005-2010
Region
Male Female
E1 E2 E3 E4 E1 E2 E3 E4
Pakistan
15-19 20 22 50 8 37 21 34 8
20-24 21 17 42 19 43 16 24 17
25-34 27 15 38 20 58 14 17 12
35+ 47 15 25 12 81 9 7 4
Punjab
15-19 18 23 52 7 30 22 39 9
20-24 19 19 44 17 35 19 27 19
25-34 25 16 42 17 51 17 20 12
35+ 46 15 28 11 78 10 8 3
Sindh
15-19 27 21 41 11 45 18 28 9
20-24 25 16 35 24 49 14 20 17
25-34 31 15 28 26 60 11 15 14
35+ 44 19 18 18 78 8 8 6
KPK
15-19 15 20 58 7 48 21 27 4
20-24 18 12 49 20 58 14 18 10
25-34 25 11 44 21 74 9 11 6
35+ 53 11 25 11 92 3 3 1
Balochistan
15-19 30 20 45 4 53 18 26 4
20-24 33 11 38 19 67 9 16 8
25-34 41 8 30 21 83 5 7 5
35+ 65 7 16 12 94 2 3 2
Source: PDHS 2006-07, E1=No Education
E2=Primary,E3=Secondary,E4=Tertiary
Table 4.6: Gross enrollment ratios in percent, 2000-2009
Level Gender 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Primary
Male 82 83 84 85 91 94 89 93 93 92
Female 56 56 57 62 66 71 69 76 77 77
Lower Male - - - 38 41 43 47 51 50 49
Secondary Female - - - 26 29 32 35 38 38 38
Upper Male - - - 24 27 24 24 26 28 28
Secondary Female - - - 21 23 20 19 20 21 22
Tertiary
Male - - 3 3 3 5 5 6 6 -
Female - - 2 2 3 4 4 5 5 -
Source: Goujon & Wazir (2011)
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Table 4.7: Net enrollment rate in primary (in percent) at provincial level in Pakistan: 1995-
2006
Region
2006-07 2000-01 1995-96
Male Female Both Male Female Both Male Female Both
Pakistan 60 51 56 46 38 42 49 38 44
Punjab 64 59 62 47 43 45 50 39 45
Sindh 56 43 50 46 34 40 50 39 45
KPK 56 41 49 48 33 41 42 28 35
Balochistan 49 32 41 39 39 32 51 39 45
Source: PSLM 2006-07, PIHS-2000-01 and 1995-96
the trend in NER declined in Balochistan for both sexes. A significant gender parity is
seen from the table 4.7 in the decades of 1990s. The gender discrimination in primary
education has been declining over time, however in some regions it has existed sub-
stantially — e.g. in Balochistan in 2006-07( See Table 4.7). The progress in Punjab
in the education sector has been striking, particularly for girls, which show that com-
mitment and access of basic primary education has been provided to all segments of
the society in the recent past in Punjab.
Pakistan is one of the largest countries in the world with largest out-of-school popula-
tion—nearly 7 million of primary school age were out of school in 2008, of which
60 percent are girls—about the population of the Lahore city (Capital of Punjab
Province). This means that one in ten of the world school-aged children who never
attended school lives in Pakistan–approximately, 67 million primary school ages chil-
dren were out of school in the world in 2008–reflecting that Pakistan was the second
(after Nigeria) in global ranking of out-of school children in 2008.6 Furthermore, the
access to education for poor household hindered the enrollment in the school particu-
larly in rural areas in Pakistan. Nearly 49 percent of children aged 7 to 16 years from
the poorest households in Pakistan were out of school in 2007, as compared to five
percent for the children from wealthier households. This needs the call for further
investment in the education sector in Pakistan, particularly in rural areas to bring out
of school children into school. Figure 4.2 illustrates the spending on education as a
percentage of GDP versus the spending on the military expenditure as a percentage
of GPD in Pakistan from 1980 to 2008. The huge difference was existed in priorities
of the government of Pakistan in the past. In 1980, more than 6 percent of GDP had
been spent on the military whereas, the less than 2 percent being utilized on education.
However, the difference between the two has been narrow over the past two decades.
The research shows that, only one-fifth of the current military expenditures would be
sufficient to attain the universal primary education in Pakistan (UNESCO, 2011).
Pakistan is committed to spend at least 4 percent of the GDP on education recom-
mended by UNESCO. However, the expenditures on education have fallen in recent
years—from 2.5 percent in 2006-07 to 2 percent in 2009-10. Recently, the spending
on education was actually less than that of actual allocated budget—some provinces
6http://www.unicef.org/education/files/OOSCI_flyer_FINAL.pdf
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Figure 4.2: Education and Military expenditures as percentage of GDP in Pakistan; Source:
Goujon and Wazir (2011)
spent almost 60 percent of their education budget in recent years. The estimate sug-
gests that to achieve the national and international (MDGs and EFA) targets in 2015,
a 50 percent increment would be essential on current educational expenditures in Pak-
istan (Force, 2011).
4.3 Conclusion and Discussion
The current progress of the educational achievement in Pakistan makes an interesting
contrast with the past. Since the illiteracy and failure of educational sector was in-
herited from British rules at the time of the independence of Pakistan in 1947. The
newborn state Pakistan agreed at the time of independence to provide free and compul-
sory education (i.e primary education) to all schooling age children (age group 5-9).
However, the targets for compulsory primary education in Pakistan had formulated
more than a decade later from Independence in 1960s. Since that time, the targets for
free and compulsory primary education had not been achieved in Pakistan and targeted
dates for the goals repeatedly extended until recently. For instance, in 2010, Pakistan
is far from attaining its elusive goals of free and compulsory primary education. How-
ever, Punjab recently seemed on a track towards universal primary education. It is
worth mentioning that rapid population growth rate in Pakistan has been hindering
the task of educational goals (particularly universal primary education) in Pakistan in
the past. An addition of large numbers of school age children every year has spoiled
the educational structure and need significant expenditures to meet the requirement of
educational goals. Unfortunately, Pakistan was unable to provide the basic infrastruc-
tures and upgrade the educational system in the past.
The state of education in Pakistan become deteriorated by a number of factors, in-
cluding insufficient physical infrastructure and facilities, strong and motivated polit-
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ical commitment and fragmented education structure. A vital setback of failure of
education in Pakistan has been an under-investment in education since four decades.
Consequently, the poor quality of services and lack of access cripple the enrollment
at all levels of education in Pakistan. The expenditure in the education sector in Pak-
istan was dismally low. The investments in education have been too low in the distant
and recent past. In 1980, the government was spending four times more on military
expenditures than on education. In 2002, the ratio of military to education spending
was still above two. Pakistan was one of only 12 world countries that spent less than
2 percent of its GDP on education. With 44 percent of the working-age population
has never been to school and education expenditure was less than 3 percent of its
GDP in 2010, increasing from less than 2 percent for the period of 2000-2005. Gov-
ernance related problems evident themselves in lack of transparency, accountability
and tracking mechanisms as well as of partnerships between policy maker and ser-
vice providers. The military expenditures in the recent and distant past have been
significantly higher as compared to education expenditure or development budget in
Pakistan. Whenever there is a financial constraint faced by government in Pakistan,
education was the first choice to be axed. The educational system in Pakistan has
been highly segmented—into English and Urdu medium and public and private—
which creates the lack of optimal utilization of human resource and division of the
societies persistent. Government of Pakistan announced that 2011 as the year of ed-
ucation and implemented emergency in education sector in Pakistan. Our projections
(in next two chapters) reveal that the Millennium development goals for education for
each province in Pakistan will not be achieved in 2015, if Pakistan retained the pace of
enrollment in primary level in the recent past. This would require the radical changes
in education structure and increase the budget for education.
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Population projection by age, sex and level of
education in Pakistan: 2010-2060
Summary1
This chapter offers a comprehensive overview of the development of educational at-
tainment during next five decades in Pakistan. By using the multistate cohort com-
ponent population projection methodology, the population projection of Pakistan by
age, sex and level of educational attainment has been executed from 2010 to 2060.
First, we briefly explained the methodology and construct the input data for popula-
tion projection of Pakistan. Based on projections results, we illustrated what could be
the implications of future fertility and education developments on the size of the Pak-
istan population until 2060, according to several educational and fertility scenarios.
This chapter also provides the potential of achieving the MDGs goals that of universal
primary education and gender equity in Pakistan. Furthermore, we assess the demo-
graphic window of opportunities in Pakistan and discuss the role of education in this
regard. Moreover, the analysis presented in this chapter indicates that the influence of
female education on the future level of fertility and prospective of population growth
in Pakistan.
1This chapter is largely based on the Wazir et al., 2011
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5.1 Introduction
The history of education is closely intertwined with the past and present demographic
history of Pakistan. There are two explanations. First of all, levels of education are
clearly influencing the demographic behavior of the people and the most visible im-
pact of education is on women’s fertility, which is systematically lower at higher levels
of educational attainment as we will see in the case of Pakistan. Repercussions of ed-
ucation can be seen on other demographic indicators such as mortality e.g., maternal
education lowers infant and child mortality, as well as maternal mortality.
Secondly, education at the macro-level acts as a good proxy for development. Hence
measuring population levels of educational attainment, whether in the work force or
in the overall population, is a valid measure of the well-being of individuals in terms
of economic well-being (i.e. poverty and competitiveness of the economy or social
well being e.g., autonomy of women, civil freedom). The case of Pakistan is puzzling.
On one hand, education has been one of the top priorities in the political discourse for
many decades, while at the same time, very little has actually been done in terms of
investments in education and in 2000, with about one-third of the young population
not enrolling in school.
Human capital usually refers to the people who are in the labor force, differentiated
by their health status and their skill levels, conveniently approximated by levels of
educational attainment. Contemporary research reveals that, education has a positive
effect on socio-economic status and health of the people. Universal basic education
was proved to be a key factor for the macro economic development (Lutz et al., 2008).
It is well established fact that better education leads to higher individual income and
long-term economic growth. The research shows that not only universal primary ed-
ucation would drive the country toward higher economic growth, but together with at
least lower secondary education, is necessary to bring the large segment of society out
of poverty. Education is a long-term investment and considered one of the best in-
vestment societies can make for better life of their next generations (Lutz et al., 2008).
Universally, higher education is associated with healthier and longer life for males and
females alike: highly educated peoples lived on average longer than their counterparts
who have no education (See details in KC and Lentzner, 2010). Virtually in every
society, female education has a significant negative effect on infant mortality rates and
maternal mortality rates (Fuchs et al., 2010; Bhat, 2001). The number of children
highly dependent on the level of the education of women—better educated women
have fewer children and find better access to birth control than less educated ones
(Bongaarts, 2008). Furthermore, literacy is an essential tool for eradicating poverty
and increased participation in labor force (Cameron and Cameron, 2006). Birdsall
et al., 1993 looked at the cost of low schooling and large gender gap. They found
that, in 1985, Pakistan’s income would have been 25 percent higher had they achieved
Indonesia’s 1960 primary enrollment rate and about 16 percent higher if female enroll-
ment rates had been at the same level as for boys. Therefore, if Pakistan had invested
more in education in 1960, it would have much higher economic growth rates today.
As well, Nasir and Nazli, 2000a showed also that “the allocation of government funds
is skewed towards higher education so that the benefits of public subsidy on education
103
are largely reaped by the upper-income class.” Special efforts by the government to
promote education started mainly in the 1980s but were very unsuccessful due to po-
litical instability. In his distinguished lecture, Stern, 2001 has argued that, education
plays a vital role in the development because of two reasons. On one hand, the quality
and quantity of education, particularly primary education greatly influencing the gov-
ernance (See also Lutz et al., 2010 for this argument) and labor force. On the other
hand, the universal primary education is obligatory for ensuring that all segments of
society will benefit evenly from macroeconomic growth. The attainment of universal
primary education has a significant effect on wage employment. An increase of ad-
ditional one year of the schooling raised the wages by 10 percent (Stern, 2001). It is
also evident in Pakistan that, the districts that have been higher level of education and
literacy have higher level of development (SPDC, 2003). Therefore, the importance
of education in bringing economic and social change is lucid.
Investments increased in the last ten years, but the inertia of education diffusion is such
that it will take many more years before Pakistan can benefit from a well-educated
work force in a country where population growth remains very high – slightly below
2 percent. As an effect of fertility reductions, the schooling age population (5-19)
started to decline since 2008 – after growing at a yearly rate above 3 per cent be-
tween 1967 and 1996. This implies a relative decrease of pressures on the Pakistani
school system that will be facing the challenge of increasing the “quantity” of educa-
tion offered (school facilities, teachers, etc.), while not compromising on the quality
(Behrman et al., 1997). Another challenge will be to create the economic conditions
to employ those populations since the working age population is growing very fast in
Pakistan, above 3 per cent per year on average. In this chapter we review changes in
the literacy and education levels of the population over the last few decades. Based on
projections, we will show what could the implications of future fertility and education
developments on the size and quality of the Pakistani population until 2050 based on
several scenarios.
5.2 Methodology
5.2.1 Multistate Population Projection Methodology
The methodology is based on the multi-state population projection method and exe-
cuted by using the PDE population projection software2 . The multistate approach is
primarily based on the multidimensional expansions of mortality, fertility and migra-
tion. The concept of the multistate model is based on the decomposition of population
by age and sex into the desired number of “states” originally developed for geographi-
cal units with movement between the “states” being migration steam (Rogers, 1975a).
However, it can reflect any clearly defined subgroup of the population, such as educa-
tion, religion, etc. The details of the methodology can be found elsewhere (KC et al.,
2010; Lutz et al., 1998).
2Developed at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in 1993, it can be down-
loaded free of charge from this link: www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/pub/software/pde/pdesetup.zip
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In projecting the cohorts forward, differential survival rates are applied to the different
education groups in the population. The information on the differentials was assessed
from large literature reviews in Pakistan as well from modeling exercises based on past
data. The details of these adjustments are provided below. The different education
groups essentially treated as a separate sub-population in Pakistan. At younger ages,
transitions between the education categories may also occur. The analysis is based
on the assumption that changes in educational attainment are uni-directional, in other
words, individuals can only move from the ‘no education’ status to primary, and on
to secondary, but never revert to a lower status. We collect the data (typically around
the year 2010) which gives the total population by sex, five-year age groups and the
four education categories for Pakistan. Our methodology for population projection of
Pakistan can be summarized as follows:
• A jump-of population composition by five-year age group, sex and four level of
educational attainment for Pakistan was derived.
• Age-sex and educational level specific mortality rates derives in Pakistan. Sur-
vival ratios for each educational group applies to project the population at the
next time step.
• Age and sex-specific educational transition rates applies.
• Age-sex and education specific net international migrants is added or removed.
• Age-sex and education specific in-and-out internal migrants adjusted.
• Age education specific fertility rates applies to determine the new born cohorts
in Pakistan.
• Using a bottom-up approach: each province projects one (five years) step
ahead separately. Sum up the age-sex and education specific population for all
provinces and adjusted (if needed) proportionally to the national level. (Used in
next chapter)
5.2.2 Jump-off population by age, sex and level of educational at-
tainment
The first step of the population projection by level of education requires population
distribution by age, sex and educational level. We already discussed and constructed
the age and sex distribution of each province in Pakistan in chapter three of this book.
Before proceeding further, it is important to define the education categories in Pak-
istan, which is later used in our projection. The education system in Pakistan consists
of six levels—starting with Primary education to University degree. It is necessary
to cover the entire educational level in a precise and consistent manner. The large
number of educational categories would limit the availability of the vital rates for
each educational category particular in developing countries such a Pakistan. Like-
wise, the small number of educational categories would not attract the audience and
policy makers in Pakistan. For instance, economists would need the distinction be-
tween secondary and tertiary education to access the rate of return of education on
individual income. Therefore, we have defined the four categories for each province
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in Pakistan namely into: No Education, Primary, Secondary and Tertiary. Table 5.1
presents a more precise definition of the categories and the correspondence between
the national educational structure and the international framework (ISCED). Based on
the definition of categories presented in Table 5.1, the population by age, sex and level
of education for each province computed from Pakistan demographic health survey
(PDHS 2006-07).
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Table 5.1: Pakistan ISCED Mapping
Category ISCED97 National educational level
Duration Official Entrance
(in years) age (in years)
Primary
Pre-Primary (0) Pre-Primary education 3 3
Primary (1) Primary (Grade I-V) 5 5
Secondary
Lower Secondary (2)
Middle level (Grade VI-VIII) 3 10
Vocational Institutes 2 10
Upper Secondary (3)
Metric level (Grade IX-X) 2 13
Intermediate (Grade XI-XII) 2 15
Technical education 3 15
Nursing 3 15
Primary teaching certificate
2 16
(PTC)
Post-Secondary & Certificate in Training (CT) 2 17
Non-Tertiary (4) Paramedical 1-2 17
Tertiary
B.A, B.Sc. 2 17
B.Sc. (hons) 3 17
Bachelor of Edu. (B.Ed.) 3 17+
First stage of Engineering 4 17
Tertiary (5) Medical degree (M.B.B.S.) 5 17
M.A, M.Sc., M.Ed. 2 19+
Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) 2 22
Second stage of
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) 3-5 22
Tertiary (6)
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Figure 5.1: Population Pyramid of Pakistan in 2010, by level of education; Source: Own
Calculation
The population of Pakistan is subdivided into four educational categories - no edu-
cation, primary education, secondary education and tertiary education based on the
above classification. Each sub population is further stratified by five years age-group
and sex to which are applied education specific fertility, mortality and migration. Fur-
thermore, transition rates between education categories allow the modeling of changes
in the education sector. The Population pyramid of Pakistan in 2010 by four levels of
education is shown in Figure 5.1.
5.3 The future path
5.3.1 Fertility
The pace of fertility decline in Pakistan, which started in the early 1990s, had been
very slow compared to other countries in the South Asian region. The basic premise
for the scenario making on future fertility is that the fertility transition that is underway
essentially continues in future. The evidence shows that Pakistan is in the middle of its
demographic transition and forecasts further fertility decline in the future (see chapter
two for more details about fertility levels and trends in Pakistan). In the longer hori-
zon, the future level of fertility will determine the general socio-economic and cultural
changes. The prediction of these trends is not easier than that of the direction of fertil-
ity change itself. In this context, the national policies and family-planning programs
will play a significant role, if these policies are well integrated into other government
policies (e.g. on education and health) and particularly, if the socio-economic devel-
opment of the population has reached a certain point at which large segment of the
society considered the family size limitation advantageous.
We need to consider three scenarios of fertility (Table 5.2), namely High, Medium
and National Fertility Goal (NG) to answer the following question: Based on the
past experience of fertility stagnation and slower decline in Pakistan, whether
fertility transition have the right pace to achieve the national population policy
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Table 5.2: Projection of TFR by level of education in Pakistan from 2010-2060
Observed in Base-year High Medium NG
2006-07 2005-2010 2025-30 2025-30 2025-
30
No Education 4.8 4.2 3.4 2.8 2.4
Primary 4.0 3.6 2.8 2.4 2.1
Secondary 3.1 2.8 2.2 2.0 1.8
Tertiary 2.3 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.4
Total 4.1 3.7 2.9 2.4 2.1
Total in 2055-60 2.3 1.8 1.3
Source:PDHS 2006-07 and author’s calculation base on UN 2010
Table 5.3: Education specific and total TFRs for Andhra-Pradesh (India) 2005-06
Mother’s education Total fertility rates
No Education 2.1
Primary 1.9
Secondary 1.8
Tertiary 1.6
Total 1.8
Source:NFHS-3 India 2005-06
goals 2010 (National Goal scenario), and most importantly what will be the con-
sequence in term of population growth if these goals are achieved or not? The
TFR in the High and Medium scenarios follow the assumption of the United Nations
2010 World Population Prospects (TFR respectively 2.3 and 1.8 in 2055-60) and the
NG scenario typically implements the target set by the government of Pakistan in its
National Population Policy (NPP) 2010: 3 children per women by the year 2015-2020,
and replacement fertility level fertility (i.e. 2.1 children per women) by 2025-30. Be-
yond 2025-30, the NPP does not assume any specific goal. Because of the pace of
decline in the NG scenario in the near future will be much faster than in the High and
Medium scenarios, we assumed a continuation of the rapid pace using the low fertility
scenario of the UN leading to a TFR of 1.3 in 2055-60.
In the High scenario, the educational fertility differentials obtained by keeping the
relative ratio of different education specific fertility to the overall total fertility rate
in 2005-10 constant over the projection period. For the Medium and the NG scenar-
ios, we assumed convergence, meaning that fertility differentials by education tend to
diminish as fertility declines. We chose the relative ratios of the different education
specific fertility to the overall total fertility rate observed in the Indian state of Andhra
Pradesh that had reached below replacement fertility level in 2005-06 – TFR is 1.8
according to the National Fertility and Health Survey 3 (NFHS) – as a target and as-
sume that in 2055-60, Pakistan will have education-specific fertility rates to those of
Andhra Pradesh state (India) today (See Table 5.3).
It is important to note that Andhra Pradesh had experienced a rapid fertility decline
in very short time period (TFR 4.5 in 1971-73 to 2.7 in 1992-94 and 1.79 in 2005-
06) like some other southern India States e.g. Kerala and Tamil Nadu, where on
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an aggregate level, female education and literacy has been proven to be one of the
strongest variable explaining fertility decline (Bhat and Rajan, 1990), together with
improved health facilities (James, 1999).
5.3.2 Education
Pakistan records on the education front have not been impressive due to low levels of
public expenditure on education. In chapter 4, we have clearly shown that the Pak-
istani educational system has thus failed to provide the basic infrastructure, eliminate
gender imbalances and the quality of education, which would be required to enjoy
the full collateral benefits of education such as high levels of economic growth and
well-being. In this context, we defined three scenarios of educational attainment (see
Table 5.4) based on the assumption that education will be crucial for socio-economic
development in Pakistan. The assumptions are set in terms of age and sex specific tran-
sition probabilities between levels of education to model the age specific proportion of
young men and women (here between age 5 to 24 years) who make the transition from
no education to primary, from primary to secondary, and from secondary to tertiary
education3.
The essential element of the human capital projection is the transitions between edu-
cational categories. This means how people moves between educational groups. The
education categories are uni-directional. Indeed, once the people have attained the
higher level of education, they never go back to the previous groups throughout their
life span. This follows from the definition of formal level of educational attainment
chosen here, which is only possible approach based the available empirical data.
In the case of forward projection, four education groups need three sets of transition
rates by age and sex for each province in Pakistan. First transition happened in age
group 5-9 from No education (E1) to Primary (E2). The timing of the transition re-
flects the particular feature of the national school system in Pakistan. For example, the
official age of entry into school, number of grades in primary, lower and upper sec-
ondary and so on in Pakistan (See the details of entry age into each educational level in
Pakistan in 5.1). The definition of each education category with ISCED level is shown
in table 5.1. The current education structure in Pakistan has been divided into six
levels: primary, middle, metric, and intermediate, bachelor and university graduates.
The primary level consisted of grade one to five (ISCED 1). The usual entry age and
duration of primary level is 5 years and compulsory for all children in all provinces
in Pakistan. This is clearly the case for the transition from no formal education (E1)
to primary (E2) at age group 5-9, but the transition also happened in age group 10-14
because some children entered late into school and repetition rate at the primary level
has been very high particularly, it is true for poor regions like Balochistan and KPK.
Therefore, we have assumed that, the transition from no education (E1) to primary
(E2) happened in two age groups, 5-9 and 10-14 for all provinces in Pakistan.
3Although transitions can in theory happen at any age – for instance, those who become literate by
the mean of adult literacy campaigns.
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The issue becomes more problematic for transition from primary (E2) to secondary
(E3) in Pakistan, in which certain proportion may be expected to happen in age groups
10-14 and 15-19. The secondary category consists of three levels: middle (lower sec-
ondary), Metric and higher secondary (intermediate). The duration of middle-level
education is three years starting from the age of ten (10) until the age of 13 in all
provinces in Pakistan. The second level of secondary education comprises metric
level education (grades 9-10). The duration of metric level is two years with an offi-
cial entry age of 13 years and will complete until the age of 15 years for every regions
in Pakistan. After matriculation, the secondary schools issue the certificate of matric-
ulation. The third level of secondary education contains the intermediate level (grades
11-12). The duration of intermediate level is also two years, and after matriculation
students either do intermediate or poly-technical education, nursing and/or PTC (see
table 5.1). Our definition of secondary categories includes the lower and upper sec-
ondary levels, which starts from the age of 10 and will continue until the age of 17.
Thus, we have assumed here that the transition from primary education (E2) to sec-
ondary education (E3) will happen in the age group 10-14 and 15-19 for each province
in Pakistan.
The timing of transition to E4 will require more consideration as compared to E3 in
Pakistan. The transitions to tertiary education (E4) clearly happen in a broad range
of age groups, i.e., 15-19 and 20-24 and beyond. The main problem is that the age at
transition to E4 varies greatly between provinces. For example, in Sindh and Balochis-
tan, students enter late into college and universities. Therefore, some transition from
E3 to E4 is happened in age group 25-29. The bachelor degree is considered as the
first level tertiary degree in ISCED framework. Table 5.1 shows the entry age to the
first tertiary level is 17 years. Student either take bachelor level (honor), engineering
or medical degree. After completion, students receive the graduate degree from the
university. Accordingly, we have assumed here, that the transition from secondary ed-
ucation (E3) to tertiary education (E4) will happen in the age group 15-19 and 20-24
(in some cases 25-29) for each province in Pakistan.
The transition probabilities between the level of education which models the flow of
the population of schooling age—from no education to primary, from primary to sec-
ondary and from secondary to tertiary education. Here, we are considering three sce-
narios of education namely “Constant," “Trend” and “National Goal (NG)” to answer
the following question: “Based on the trend in educational improvement in the last
15 year (Scenario Trend), does each province have the right pace of educational im-
provement to reach the goals set by the national4 and international agenda5 (Scenario
Goal), and more importantly, What will be the consequence in terms of the future ed-
ucational attainment of the working-age population?”
4NEP: National educational Policy (1998-210) http://www.moe.gov.pk/edupolicy.htm
5Such as that of the United Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for education and the UNESCO
Education For All (EFA) initiative http://www.unesco.org/en/efa/
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5.3.2.1 Constant Education Scenario
The “Constant” scenario assumes that the transition probabilities at the base year from
no education to primary, primary to secondary and secondary to tertiary are kept con-
stant throughout the projection period. It means that the zero expansion of schooling
enrollments. This scenario is not presented as a likely future, but shows the progress
already embedded in the educational structure of today—the education momentum.
Regardless of constant transition rates, the adult education levels improve as younger
and more educated cohorts, as a result of recent improvement in education, are replac-
ing the older cohorts.
The Constant scenario assumes constant transition as observed in the population aged
5-24 in 2010, to show the progress that already embedded in the present levels of
educational attainment. The Trend scenario looks at the pace of change in the last
two decades and prolongs it into the future. It will be compared to the Goal scenario
that shows the unlikely case that Pakistan attains the national and international targets
in terms of education. A comparison between the Trend and the Goal Scenarios will
show to what extent Pakistan has adopted the right pace of educational improvements
to attain the targets set by national and international agencies.
5.3.2.2 Trend Education Scenario
Informally, the trend scenario assumes that the educational expansion will converge
on an expansion trajectory based on the cohort trends for individual provinces. It is
assumed here that the rate of change in the transition probabilities for some specified
cohorts at the primary and secondary level as observed in the past would continue
into the future in specific province in Pakistan. To estimate the historical cohort trend,
it is implicitly assumed that each births cohort’s age specific educational attainment
should be used as a substitute for schooling at the time birth cohort was of primary
or secondary level. It further assumes that primary school entry occurs a maximum
at age 10. This would imply that at least by the age of 10; children are enrolled in
the primary level, while for secondary school entrance took place at age 15. In this
fashion, the educational attainment at the primary level of the birth cohort of 1980-85
is an indication of the transition into the primary level in 1990-95. Table 4.4 shows
the percentage distribution of educational attainment at the primary, secondary and
tertiary level by birth cohorts for male and female in Pakistan. It is evident from the
table that, the females are legging behind the males in enrollment at all levels. The
primary school attainment was 21 percent of the birth cohort 1960-65 (aged 45-49 in
2010) for females who enrolled in primary school approximately 35 years ago, while
the males of the same cohort, who have enjoyed much progress in primary attainment
(57 percent was attained primary level). The primary school attainment was 75 percent
for birth cohort 1980-85; 79 percent for birth cohort 1985-90; and 80 percent among
birth cohort 1990-95. Therefore, based on this cohort extrapolation method, these
trends are assumed to continue into the future (fit a logarithmic trend line on the birth
cohorts at primary, secondary and tertiary levels). The cohort extrapolation method
was applied for each education category in each province as well as at national level
up to 2060. The targeted transition probabilities for primary, secondary and tertiary
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Table 5.4: Proportion of respective age groups in education (in percent)
Mother’s education
Base year Trend Scenario Goal Scenario
2010 2055-60 2055-60
M F M F Both Sexes
No Education 17 30 12 11 0
Primary 83 70 88 89 100
Secondary 61 45 55 46 80
Tertiary 18 16 19 20 50
Source: Own Calculation
education6 in 2060 are linearly interpolated from 2010 to 2060 in all provinces in
Pakistan.
5.3.2.3 National Goal Scenario
In addition to the above education trajectories, an optimistic scenario has been defined.
The objectives in terms of education set on the national7 and international agenda are
the following:
• Universal primary education: All children should be able to complete primary
education by 2015-20 (MDGs and National Education Policy).
• All gender disparities will be eliminated from all levels of education by 2015-
2020.
• Enrollment in secondary and tertiary education should increase. We translated
this into specific targets: 80 per cent of 10-14 years (male and female) old would
be enrolled in secondary and 50 per cent of 20-24 years (male and female) old
would be enrolled in tertiary education by 2055-60.
5.3.3 Mortality and Migration
The age and sex specific mortality and migration rates8 follows the latest medium
variant of the United Nations world population prospects (2010). The mortality dif-
ferentials are set according to findings of KC et al., 20109 . Age and sex specific
net international migration figures are further distributed proportionally among edu-
cational categories.
6Transition are set in age group 5-9 for primary, 10-14 for Secondary and 15-19 for tertiary educa-
tion
7In fact, the government has not formulated specific numerical goals for secondary and tertiary
education. The targets are interpretations of the wish of the government to increase participation in
higher level of education. The policies for education and population has formulated at federal level,
there is no specific targets set by the government of Pakistan at provincial level.
8UN 2010 provides the total number of migrants but not the age and sex specific structure which we
estimated through a residual analysis.
9According to K.C. et al. (2010), the life expectancy at age 15 of the population in the no-education
category is on average one year less than that of the population in the primary education category, three
years less than that of the population in the secondary education category and five years less than that
of population in the tertiary education category.
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Table 5.5: Scenario Matrix
Education
Constant (Ec) Trend (Et) National Education goal (Eng)
Fertility
High (Fh) FhEc FhEt FhEng
Medium (Fm) FmEc FmEt FmEng
National Fertility Goal (Fng) FngEc FngEt FngEng
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Table 5.6: Total Population (in million) of Pakistan from 2010 to 2060 under different educa-
tion and fertility scenarios
Fertility
education
Base year Constant Trend NG
2010 2030 2060 2030 2060 2030 2060
High
174
249 345 249 341 248 320
Medium 233 279 233 278 233 271
NG 235 267 235 266 234 259
Source: Own Calculation
Table 5.5 shows the matrix of the nine scenarios derived from the different fertility
(3 sets) and education (3 sets) assumptions, aiming at studying the concomitant ef-
fect of fertility and education on future population and human capital. Due to space
limitation, each scenario cannot be mentioned.
5.4 Results and Discussion
Rapid population growth rate is unavoidable in Pakistan, at least in the near future, as
shown in Table 5.6. Even if we assume that Pakistan will manage to achieve below
replacement fertility in the low variant – TFR of 1.3 in 2055-60, the population would
still grow significantly from 174 million in 2010 to 259 million under the national
goal education scenario. A doubling (to 345 million in 2060) of population would
only occur in the case of the High fertility scenario, where fertility is declining slowly
to reach 2.3 in 2055-60 and enrollment stagnates (Constant education scenario). Ed-
ucation attainment could have a profound effect on the total population: Under the
High fertility scenario, if Pakistan would achieve the national educational goals, then
the total population would be 25 million less compared to the Constant education sce-
nario – or 7 per cent in 2055-60. A lesser difference of 19 million in 2060 is found in
the total population between the scenario where Pakistan achieves its education and
fertility goals, and that would be more realistic, where it achieves Medium fertility
and follows the Trend in education development: 259 million vs. 278 million.
Figure 5.2 shows the population pyramids by age, sex and four educational level
of Pakistan in 2010 and the results of three alternative scenarios for education in
2060, under the assumption of a Medium fertility scenario. In 2010, the pyramid
clearly shows the improvements in school enrollments over the last three decades: The
younger cohorts are better educated than the older ones, both for men and women. In
2010, 50 per cent of the working age population (WAP) – aged 20-64 which accounted
for 49 percent of the total population –– had not received any education: one-third of
the male WAP and two-thirds of the female WAP (see also Figure 5.3. According
to the Trend education scenario (Figure 5.2), which assumes that all future cohorts
benefit from increase in enrollment ratios as observed over the recent past, the pace of
change would not be enough to ensure that all children enroll into primary education
as can be seen from the share with no education in age groups 5-9 and 10-14. Conse-
quently, Pakistan would not be able to achieve the Millennium Developments Goals
(MDGs) in 2015, and not even in 2060. Therefore, this calls for an intensification
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of investments in basic education to ensure that more children can enroll in schools,
particularly in rural and remote areas, especially for girls. The proportion of the WAP
with no education would decline to 20 percent in 2060 – 15 per cent for males and 23
per cent for female, based on the Trend education scenario.
This is far from the 7 per cent – 5 per cent for male and 9 per cent for female – that
would be achieved under the NG scenario. The momentum of education diffusion
is clearly visible on the pyramid for that particular optimistic scenario, where still in
2060, the population above 50 years of age still entails a large share of uneducated
people. Lack of education often results in illiteracy and the spread of adult literacy
campaign would need to intensify in order to bring literacy to the population who have
never or barely been enrolled, and are beyond schooling age, as was effectively im-
plemented in India. Historically adult literacy campaigns have not been a priority of
the government of Pakistan although some initiatives have been launched in the 1980s
and 1990s (Goujon and Wazir, 2011).
On the other hand, there will be significant increase in the share of the WAP with a
primary education, from 14 per cent in 2010 to 36 per cent 2060, according to Trend
scenario (see figure 5.3). Improvements will be significant for the share of the popula-
tion with a tertiary education, which will triple over the projection period from 11 per
cent in 2010 to 37 per cent in 2060 under the NG scenario (EngFm). The projection re-
sults show the overall long time horizon needed to see the effect of the implementation
of higher education in Pakistan. For instance, the Trend scenario shows a slight in-
crease in the proportion of highly educated – secondary and tertiary education together
– in the WAP, from 36 percent in 2010 to 46 per cent in 2060, while the corresponding
proportion for NG scenario will be 67 per cent in 2060.
Figure 5.2 also shows that the Trend education scenario would not be enough to re-
move the gender gap which persists at all levels. For example, the proportion of une-
ducated women aged 20-24 years in 2010 is twice than the share of uneducated men.
One out of four women aged 15 and over will be out of school, while the proportion
for men is “only” 16 per cent. Under the NG scenario, the proportion of uneducated
women of aged 15 and over would be 16 per cent compared to 8 per cent for men in
2060, all due to the momentum of education diffusion. The impact of educational im-
provement is clearly visible for secondary and tertiary education in the NG scenario,
which implements rapid improvements in education (i.e. universal primary educa-
tion). The gender gap that was noticeable regarding secondary education in 2010 will
persist although it will be attenuated. In 2010, the population with some secondary
education in female aged 20-64 years was 6 million (5 percent) compared to 15 mil-
lion (34 percent) for male. In 2060, according to the Trend education scenario, the
WAP would be 18 million (21 per cent) and 28 million (34 per cent) for female and
male respectively. The future educational attainment of the population under the edu-
cation Trend scenario reflects the education policy orientations of the government of
Pakistan in recent years. In 2010, the share of tertiary educated women of working
age was only 5 per cent (3.2 million), and corresponding share for men was 14 per
cent (6.4 million). The gender gap would be eliminated in 2060, based on the Trend
scenario; the share of female and male in the WAP with a tertiary education would
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Figure 5.2: Population pyramid by age, sex and educational attainment for Pakistan in 2010
and in 2060 according to three education scenarios, Constant, Trend and NG, and Medium
fertility variant; Source: Own Calculation
reach 18 per cent (15 million) and 20 per cent (16 million) respectively – which re-
flects that women have benefited from an increased access to tertiary education in the
recent past. Still, the lack of investments in female education in the past will hamper
the development of Pakistan far into the future as it is hindering the full participation
of women in the labor force. In 2008, according to the Labor Force Survey, women
accounted only for 20 per cent of the active labor force.
This calls for a need to increase the scope of the adult educational campaign to bring
literacy to almost all the working-age population in the country, as has been success-
fully implemented in India, and to a lesser extent in Egypt. Historically, tackling adult
literacy has not been a priority for the government of Pakistan, although some initia-
tives have been launched. During the Ayub era (1959-1969), literacy programs were
run under the community development program at the village level. In the 1980s, the
Literacy and Mass Education Commission (LAMEC) were set and started a new adult
literacy campaign through the “Nai Roshni School." Under this initiative, many adult
literacy schools were set up all around the country. Furthermore, under the slogan
“each one teaches one”, it was mandatory for those persons who had passed interme-
diate exams to convert one illiterate to literate. The Nai Roshni program taught a few
thousands adults how to read and write, but it was a mixed success, mainly because
of corruption, following its termination in the 1990s during the first Bhutto regime.
A benchmark effort was launched in 2002 during the Musharaf regime which estab-
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Figure 5.3: Share of working age population (20-64) by level of education in Pakistan for
2010-2060, different education and fertility scenarios; Source: Own Calculation
lished the National Commission for Human Development10 (NCHD) at the federal
and provincial level to set up adult literacy centers in local communities to provide
basic literacy skills to individuals (especially women) between the ages of 11 and 45,
who were either never enrolled before or dropped out of school before acquiring lit-
eracy skills. So far the 120,263 adult literacy centers of the NCHD have provided 2.5
million adults, 90 percent of which are females with literacy skills.
5.4.1 Meeting the education goals in Pakistan
Based on past experience, it does not come as a surprise that Pakistan will not be able
to achieve the educational development goals (either national or international) in the
future, if the pace of change witnessed in the recent past continues. Table 5.7 shows
the access to education of boys and girls according to the Trend education & Medium
fertility scenario, shedding some light on the feasibility to achieve the Millennium de-
velopment goals of universal primary education and gender gap elimination by 2015.
In view of those results, there would still be 31 per cent of the 5-9 age-group who
would not go to school by 2015 far from the full intake envisioned by the MDG for
education, with a large gender gap as 34 per cent of girls and 27 per cent of boys aged
5-9 would not be in school in 2015. In fact, the MDGs would not even be achieved by
2060 as 21 per cent of the children in that age group would still not be enrolled fifty
years from now, which calls for further investment in the education sector. Moreover,
10http://www.nchd.org.pk/ws/
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Table 5.7: Access to education of male and female, in per cent, Trend education scenario and
Medium fertility scenario, 2015-20 and 2055-60.
Fertility
2015-2020 2055-60
Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total
No Education 27 34 31 23 18 21
Primary 84 72 78 89 87 89
Secondary 50 34 42 55 46 50
Tertiary 19 15 16 19 21 20
Source: Own Calculation
gender disparities will be far from eliminated at both levels of primary and secondary
education in 2015 where girls would still have 12 per cent less chances than boys to
reach a primary education and 16 per cent less to enroll into secondary education in
2015.
Although improvements would be significant by 2060, the probability of girls en-
rolling in primary and secondary schools would still be 2 percent, and 9 per cent
respectively lower than for boys. Interestingly, and as mentioned before, gender dis-
parities would be eliminated at the level of tertiary education, where the increase in
the last few years has been substantial and even more so for girls than boys. Hence,
by 2015 female would still have 4 per cent less chances than male to enter a tertiary
education, but the relationship would be reversed by 2060 where more women than
men would enroll in tertiary education. Even though, the projection also shows that
the rapid increase at secondary and tertiary level foreseen by the national goals would
also be quasi-impossible to be reached by 2060 according to present pace.
5.4.2 Influence of education on fertility
Figure 5.4 compares the output of four different scenarios in terms of the educational
attainment of women of reproductive age (typically 15-49 years). In 2010, the share of
illiterate fecund women exceeded 50 per cent. According to the Trend education sce-
narios, two significant improvements will happen in the future. The share of women
with no formal education will decline from 55 per cent in 2010, to 19 per cent in
2060. In the meanwhile, the proportion of primary educated women will increase sig-
nificantly – from 15 per cent in 2010 to 40 per cent in 2060. The share women with
a tertiary level will increase from 10 per cent in 2010, to 18 per cent in 2060. Under
the NG scenario, the share of women with no formal education will be eliminated in
2060. The comparison of different education scenarios shows the tremendous poten-
tial impact of educational attainment of future mothers, and may serve as an input to
estimate future levels of fertility and of infant and child mortality.
Figure 5.5 clearly shows the significant difference in total fertility rates according to
different education scenarios, and hence education composition of women in fertile
ages. The Trend and Constant education scenarios are quite close, indicating from the
past two decades the improvements were not sufficient to impact on fertility levels.
If Pakistan would attain the national educational goals under the medium fertility,
total fertility rate in 2060 would be 0.12 children per woman less as compared to
Trend education scenario. On the other hand, according to NG fertility scenario, the
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Figure 5.4: Share of women aged (15-49) by level of education in Pakistan, 2010-2060;
Source: Own Calculation
Figure 5.5: Total Fertility rate in Pakistan under three fertility and three education scenarios;
Source: Own Calculation
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difference in TFR between national education goals and Trend education will be 0.13
children per women. It is worth noting here, although it is highly hypothetical and
counter intuitive, that, if national educational milestones are accomplished under a
high fertility scenario, the TFR in 2060 would be 0.42 children less as compared to
Trend education scenario – TFRs: 1.8 vs. 2.2.
5.5 Conclusion
The future of Pakistan and its ability to develop is highly dependent on progress in
the educational attainment of the population, in a context of rapid population growth.
This study demonstrates the importance of investments in education in the near future
so that Pakistan can harvest the fruit of long term human capital development. Lack
of investment in primary and secondary education, poor infrastructure and political
instability have failed Pakistan for the achievement of satisfactory levels of educa-
tion in Pakistan, especially for females. As a result, Pakistan will fail to achieve the
Millennium Development Education Goals, in terms of universal primary education
for boys and girls. The scenarios that we looked at in this paper show that Pakistan
needs to boost up the speed of change in education, especially since Pakistan will be
soon experiencing a demographic bonus, a relative increase in the size of the working
age population in comparison to the inactive part of the population – the young and
old generations – which is most favorable for socio-economic development, that is if
the country manages to increase the quality of human capital by 2060. We show that
female education is very crucial and high political commitments will be needed, for
advancing through the demographic transition, and economic development. The past
lack of investments in female education will hamper the development of Pakistan far
into the future unless effective adult educational campaign are implemented to bring
at least literacy to many women who come to adulthood without being able to read
and write.
Notwithstanding, the existence of population policy and family planning program
since 1965s, Pakistan has never, in reality, had a successful population policy. There-
fore, it is strongly suggested here that, the effective population policy must be assigned
top priority and need more investment in female enrollment and literacy. This study
pinpoints the three major areas where the urgent policy concern and investments will
be needed: exploiting the windows of opportunity, illiterate adult population and fe-
male education.
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6
Population projection by age, sex and level of
education by provinces of Pakistan: 2010-2060
Summary
In this chapter, we implement the multistate population projection at the provincial
level of Pakistan. The details about fertility scenarios and education scenarios will
be discussed. We extended the methodology presented in previous chapter at na-
tional level of Pakistan and applied for each province in Pakistan. The difference
between national and provincial level population projection is the internal migration.
We used the internal migration estimates presented in chapter three. Based on pro-
jection results, we demonstrated that what could be the implications of future fertility
and education developments on the size of the population of each province until 2060
according to several educational and fertility scenarios. The purpose of this study
is to explore present and future human capital of Pakistan at the provincial level by
age and sex. It will assess the potential for the achievement of the Millennium De-
velopment Goals (MDGs) and Education for all (EFA) for each province in Pakistan,
especially universal primary education and gender equality and how realistic are the
national goals for educational attainment in the view of the present speed of change
in the education sector for each province in Pakistan, using the population projection
methodology. The chapter also evaluates when each province enjoy the demographic
window of opportunities, how to utilize this demographic bonus, and importantly what
role did education play in this context.
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6.1 Introduction
Each province in Pakistan, particularly, Balochistan and KPK have been facing sev-
eral challenges in terms of human development and economic growth. Low level of
educational attainment, Poor health status and low standard of living has led the pop-
ulation into poverty. The provinces in Pakistan significantly diverged in the poverty
index. In 2005, KPK was the poorest province in Pakistan—38 percent of population
lives below poverty line—and Sindh has relatively better position as compared to other
regions—22 percent of the population lives below the poverty line (Chapman et al.,
2008). Women are particularly at a disadvantage in accessing education; 65 percent
of the working-age population (aged 20-64) are females with no education and hardly
make up one-fifth of the secondary and tertiary educated working-age population in
Punjab. On the other hand, in Balochistan, the situation of educational attainment has
been more dismal particular, for female. Nearly, 61 percent of total working age pop-
ulation (aged 20-64) has no formal education, whereas, the proportion of uneducated
women has 84 percent in 2010.
This study explores human capital development in Pakistan at the provincial level in
present and future. The population projection was carried out by level of educational
attainment of Pakistan at provincial level by age and sex. To our knowledge, this
is the first time that a population projection by age, sex and educational level at the
provincial level in Pakistan has been implemented. In the following analysis, we only
consider on the educational attainment aspects of human capital by age and sex at the
provincial level in Pakistan since the data on health, and labor-force participation are
scarce. The objectives of the paper are as follows:
• It will assess the potential for the achievement of the United Nations Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) and education for all, especially universal primary
education and gender equality at the provincial level in Pakistan. It will assess
how realistic national goals of educational attainment are in view of the current
speed of change observed in the education sector.
• We will assess when each province enjoy the demographic window of oppor-
tunities, how to utilize this demographic bonus, and importantly what role did
education play in this context?
6.2 The Future Path
6.2.1 Fertility
We are here considering two fertility scenarios of fertility for each province in Pak-
istan, namely “Medium (Fm)” and “National Fertility Goal (Fng)”. In fact, the targets
of fertility in each scenario is assumed at national level and using the relative ratio of
TFR of each province to the national-level TFR. The details of fertility scenario at na-
tional and provincial level can be found in chapter 3. For both scenarios (Medium and
NG) convergence will be assumed, meaning that fertility differentials by education
will converge to some specific level as the fertility declines. We choose the relative
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Table 6.1: Projection of TFR by level of education in Pakistan from 2010-2060
Base Year Medium NG
2005-2010 2025-30 2025-30
Punjab
No Education 4.20 2.71 2.38
Primary 3.65 2.40 2.10
Secondary 2.95 2.05 1.80
Tertiary 2.15 1.67 1.46
Total 3.47 2.28 2.00
Total TFR in 2055-60 1.70 1.23
Sindh
No Education 4.63 3.00 2.62
Primary 3.64 2.50 2.18
Secondary 2.49 1.96 1.72
Tertiary 2.22 1.79 1.56
Total 3.83 2.52 2.20
Total TFR in 2055-60 1.90 1.35
KPK
No Education 4.36 2.89 2.53
Primary 3.22 2.32 2.03
Secondary 2.95 2.14 1.87
Tertiary 1.88 1.64 1.43
Total 3.83 2.52 2.20
Total TFR in 2055-60 1.90 1.35
Balochistan
No Education 3.91 2.66 2.33
Primary 2.85 2.14 1.87
Secondary 2.66 1.99 1.74
Tertiary 1.17 1.32 1.16
Total 3.65 2.40 2.10
Total TFR in 2055-60 1.79 1.29
Source: PDHS 2006-07 and Own calculation
ratios of different education specific fertility to overall fertility levels observed in the
South Indian state of Andhra Pradesh and adopted these fertility differentials for all
provinces in Pakistan in 2055-60. Between the projections (2005-10 to 2055-60) pe-
riod relative ratios is interpolated.
6.2.2 Mortality
The pace of mortality decline in each province in Pakistan will essentially continue in
the future. A two-year gain in life expectancy at birth per decades will be assumed for
male and female at the provincial level and mortality differentials by education follow
the findings of (KC et al., 2010). The age and sex-specific mortality rate have been
derived from UN model life table 2010 for all projection period and for each province.
The estimated life expectancy at birth for each province in Pakistan is shows in table
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Table 6.2: Projected Education Transition probabilities at the provincial level in Pakistan (in
percent)
Categories
Base year (2010) Trend Scenario(2060)
Male Female Male Female
Punjab
No Education 13 22 08 04
Primary 87 78 92 96
Secondary 59 48 56 52
Tertiary 17 19 18 24
Sindh
No Education 26 40 23 26
Primary 74 60 77 74
Secondary 52 37 47 34
Tertiary 24 17 21 18
KPK
No Education 12 37 06 12
Primary 88 63 94 88
Secondary 65 31 66 41
Tertiary 20 10 21 13
Balochistan
No Education 31 47 23 18
Primary 69 53 77 82
Secondary 50 30 53 40
Tertiary 19 08 20 10
Source: Own Calculation
2.14.
6.2.3 International and internal migration
Migration trend is the most unpredictable part of the population projection. Age and
sex structure of migrants is sometime available from censuses or surveys for devel-
oped countries and virtually absent from the developing world. The updated estimates
of international migration in Pakistan as well as at provincial level is not available in
recent years. The future net international migration numbers at provincial level is dis-
tributed proportionally. Age and sex specific internal international migration numbers
are further distributed proportionally among educational categories in each province.
6.2.4 Education
We have assumed the three education scenarios for each provinces in Pakistan as was
assumed at the national level in the previous chapter. Table6.2 shows the projected
education transition of each province in Pakistan for 2010 and 2060 based on the
trend education of the respective province.
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Table 6.3: Total Population (in million) at the provincial level in Pakistan from 2010-2060
Region Fertility
Base year
Education
Constant Trend NG
2010 2060 2060 2060
Punjab
Medium
101.3
156.6 155.9 154.0
NG 145.0 144.3 141.9
Sindh
Medium
40.7
67.3 67.1 65.6
NG 62.1 61.9 60.9
KPK
Medium
24.0
47.0 46.6 45.2
NG 43.3 43.0 42.2
Balochistan
Medium
7.7
14.0 13.9 13.4
NG 12.9 12.9 12.6
Source: Own Calculation
6.3 Results and Discussion
6.3.1 Does education make a difference to the total population
size?
Rapid population growth is practically inevitable in each province in the past and at
least in the near future. Even though we assume that each province in Pakistan will
manage to achieve replacement fertility levels by 2025 under NG scenario, the pop-
ulation of each province would grow and almost double by the middle of the century
due to the population momentum. Table 6.3 shows the total population size for each
province of Pakistan from 2010 to 2060. A first look at the results show that (See Table
6.3) even though fertility will decline significantly by 2025-30 in all four provinces in
Pakistan, the population would still be increasing–from 101.3 million to 155.9 million
from 2010 to 2060 in Punjab, from 40.7 million to 67.1 millions in Sindh, from 24.0
million to 46.6 million in KPK and from 7.7 million to 13.9 million in Balochistan
under trend education scenario and medium fertility assumptions. This population
momentum would lead to further increase in the school age and working-age popula-
tion for each province in Pakistan— meaning that more children will be enrolled in
school, there is a need for more infrastructure for schools, particularly in rural areas
in less developed provinces. Although, each province will manage to achieve be-
low replacement fertility (Table 4.1) in National goal scenario, the population in each
province would still grow substantially from 2010 to 2060 (See table 6.3). Educational
attainment could have a profound effect on the total population size of each province;
the difference of 3 million people from constant education to the national education
goal scenario would attain in Punjab under the national goal scenario in 2060, one
million different in Sindh and KPK and 0.3 million difference in Balochistan would
have achieved under the similar scenario.
6.3.2 Age and Sex Population distribution by level of education
Figure 6.1 illustrates the population pyramid by age, sex and level of education of Pun-
jab in 2010 and the results of three alternative scenarios of education in 2060, under
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the assumption of two fertility scenarios (Fm and Fng) and two educational scenarios
(Et, Eng). In 2010, the pyramid (Figure 6.1 and 6.2) undoubtedly shows the improve-
ment in educational attainment over the generation of the people in Punjab and KPK.
The younger cohorts are better educated than the older cohorts, equally for both male
and female. In 2010, 55 percent of females in Punjab and 69 percent in KPK have
never been enrolled in the school whereas, the proportion of male who have no formal
education was 37 percent in Punjab and 39 percent in KPK. The situation is worse
at higher level of education-the proportion of male who have at-least secondary edu-
cation was 36 percent in Punjab and KPK, whereas 21 percent for females in Punjab
and 12 percent in KPK have at least secondary education in 2010. According to the
trend scenario-which assume that all future cohorts benefit from the increase in an
enrollment ratio as observed over the last two decade-the pace of change would not be
enough to ensure that all children enroll into primary education in Punjab in 2015-20
as can be seen of the age group 5-9 with no education (Figure 6.1). The similar pattern
in the age group 5-9 for male and female will be observed in all provinces (Figures not
shown here). Consequently, the MDGs would not be achieved for all provinces in Pak-
istan in 2015-20 and not even in 2060. This needs a call for the imperative attention to
investment in basic education on the emergency basis to ensure that more children will
be enrolled in school in all provinces, particularly in rural areas of each province. The
proportion of female with no education in Punjab would decline to 22 percent and 35
percent in KPK in 2060 and 17 percent for male in Punjab and KPK according to trend
education and medium fertility scenario. This is far from 15 and 22 percent for female
and 10 percent for male in Punjab and KPK respectively—that would be achieved in
2060 under National education and fertility goals scenarios in Punjab. The situation of
educational attainment is deteriorating in Balochistan, particularly for females, where
76 percent of female and 53 percent of male in 2010 were never enroll in school. In
2060, the proportion that never attends school would become 42 percent for female
and 33 percent for male under trend education and medium fertility goals (Figure has
not presented here for Balochistan).
The figure 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate that the trend education scenario would not be enough
to remove the gender gap in all provinces, which persists at all levels of education.
In 2010, the proportion of female with no education aged 20-24 years has twice than
the share of uneducated male in Punjab and Sindh. Whereas, the gender gap has
widened in KPK and Balochistan in the age group 20-24 for no education categories
(58 and 67 percent of females and 18 and 33 percent of males in KPK and Balochistan
were never attended the school respectively). The gender gap at the primary level has
been pervasive in all provinces in Pakistan. In 2010, the proportion of females with
primary education in age group 5-9 was 74 percent in Punjab and 58 percent in KPK,
while for males the proportion was 80 percent and 72 percent in Punjab and KPK
respectively. The gender gap would not be eliminated in 2060 at the primary level
in all provinces. Interestingly, gender disparities would be reversed at the primary
level in Punjab—where female enrollments in last few years have been tremendous
and even more so for girls than boys in future (92 percent girls and 85 percent boys in
primary level in Punjab in 2060).
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Figure 6.1: Population pyramid by age,sex and educational attainment for Punjab in 2010
and 2060; Source: Own Calculation
Figure 6.2: Population Pyramid by age, sex and level of educational attainment for KPK in
2010-2060; Source: Own Calculation
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6.3.3 The Window of Opportunities
Due to the population momentum, numerous cohorts born before the fall of fertility
will shift up to the next level and enter the working-age population. Therefore the next
challenge is to take appropriate action to get benefits from this youth bulge. If the suf-
ficient amount of opportunities existed in the labor market, these cohorts can be very
favorable to economic development for the country. Low level of the dependency ratio
to economically active people will create new opportunities for economic and social
development. During this period, household savings are encouraged, a reduction on
the burden on public schools and other government services; labor-force participation
increase and number of taxable adults per dependents will rise. Furthermore, families
can spend more money on each child due to lower family size. This phase is typi-
cally known as the “demographic window of opportunities” or “demographic bonus."
Nonetheless, this demographic bonus doet not have a sole factor that ensures the eco-
nomic and social development. Nor does the rising share of working-age population
lead straightforwardly and certainly to development. In fact, if the government does
not fabricate the employment opportunities, social and economic conditions are not
favorable and it cannot able to absorb the growing working-age population. This large
youth cohorts may become a heavy handicap for country, associated with political and
social disruption and civil conflicts.
In 2010, 46 percent in Punjab and 58 percent in KPK of the working age (20-64)
population had received no education. Figure 6.3 illustrates that according to trend
education and medium fertility scenarios in 2060, this proportion would decline to
respectively 13 percent and 18 percent in Punjab and KPK. This is far from the 5 per-
cent and 7 percent that would be achieved under the goal scenarios (EngFng) in Pun-
jab and KPK respectively. The share of illiterate working-age population of southern
provinces (Balochistan and Sindh) in 2010 was 66 percent and 49 percent respectively.
In 2060, this proportion would decline to 32 percent and 30 percent in Balochistan and
Sindh respectively according to trend education and medium fertility scenario. This is
far behind from 13 percent and 10 percent in Balochistan and Sindh respectively under
goal scenarios. The fact that this optimistic scenario does not lead to fully educated
working-age population is due to educational momentum. As we can see from Figure
(6.2), the uneducated proportion of the population of aged 50 year and older would
have a significant share in 2060.
There are several patterns of changes in the level of educational attainment in the fu-
ture that reflects the emphasis of education development in the recent past. In 2010,
the share of primary education to the working-age population was 15 percent in Pun-
jab. According to the trend scenario in Punjab, the share of primary education would
be 37 percent in 2060 which is far from 30 percent under goal scenario in 2060. There
is overwhelming evidence that the changes in past 15 years in secondary and ter-
tiary education in Punjab were tremendous. In 2010, 27 percent and 12 percent of
the working-age population in Punjab has secondary and tertiary level education re-
spectively. Under the trend scenario, the share of secondary and tertiary education
in Punjab would increase to 31 and 19 percent for working-age population in 2060.
The fact that government of Punjab has invested greatly in the education sector in the
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Figure 6.3: Share of the working age population (20-64) by level of education (EtFm) at
provincial level in Pakistan from 2010-2060; Source: Own Calculation
recent past, particularly in primary and secondary levels and since women have ben-
efited from an increasing access in universities in the recent past. Consequently, the
share of tertiary education for females would double—from 10 percent in 2010 to 20
percent in 2060 under the trend scenario.
Educational attainment of the population change slowly changes in enrollment pat-
terns which only affect the attainment of new cohorts reaching working age but not
for older cohorts. Because depending on the population growth rate, it takes a differ-
ent amount of time for each province before the changes in the education of the young
are reflected in the education profile of the population as a whole. This phenomenon
is known as educational momentum. For example, if the population growth rate is
high, young cohorts are large compared to their older cohorts and educational compo-
sition of the population is dominated by recent enrollment patterns. On the contrary,
if the population growth is low, the average educational composition of the population
depends on the educational attainment among the older cohorts and only when these
cohorts are replaced, then the population composition fully reflects improvement in
enrollments. These effects can be observed in all provinces in Pakistan except Punjab
where the population growth was low and educational enrollment was quite significant
in the recent past.
6.3.4 Meeting the Educational Goals
It does not seem plausible that Pakistan at the national nor at the provincial level will
be able to reach the international and national educational development goals in the
recent and distant future if it does not extend the pace of change witnessed in the recent
past. Table 6.4 illustrates the access1 of education of male, female and total population
1Access is based on the proportion of the relevant schooling age group achieving the relevant edu-
cation level
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Figure 6.4: Share of the working age population by level of Education (EngFng) at provincial
level in Pakistan from 2010-2060; Source: Own Calculation
by level of education according to trend education and medium fertility for 2015-20
and 2055-60. It shows that the feasibility to achieve the Millennium development
goals of universal primary education and gender disparities by 2015 and 2060 at the
provincial level in Pakistan. There would be still 21 percent of the age group 5-9
in Punjab-who would not be enrolled in school by 2015-20-far-off from full intake
envisaged by MDGs and EFA targets with substantial gender disparities observed,
as 24 percent for female and 19 percent for male would not be enrolled in school.
In fact, the universal primary education goal would not even be accomplished in all
provinces in Pakistan by 2015-20 or even will not in 2055-60, which require further
investment in the education sector in all provinces, particularly in rural areas. There
is enormous heterogeneity existing within provincial levels in Pakistan for attaining
the MDGs goals; there would be still 21 percent of age group 5-9 in Punjab for both
sexes, 44 percent in Sindh, 33 percent in KHP, and 55 percent in Balochistan for same
cohorts, respectively who would not go to school by 2015-20. Even this milestone will
not be met by 2060 for each province. However, Punjab will be in a better position
among other provinces in terms of children intake. Furthermore, according to the trend
scenario, the Sindh and Balochistan province will be far behind from other provinces
in educational development—35 percent and 36 percent student would complete the
secondary education by 2015-20 respectively. Moreover, the gender disparities at the
primary and secondary level will not be accomplished in all provinces by 2015-20 nor
even in 2060, the gender gap would be highest at the primary level in Balochistan,
where 14 percent fewer chances to enroll at the primary level for girls than boys in
2015-20.
Nevertheless, the improvement would be significant by 2060; the gender gap would
still exist at all levels of education for each province. Interestingly, the gender gap
would be eliminated or even reverse at one-level – tertiary education in Punjab, where
the increase in enrollment at the tertiary level for girls has been substantial in last
decade—24 percent for female and 18 percent for male in 2060—due to the fact that
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Table 6.4: Access to education of male and female at provincial level in Pakistan (in percent),
Trend Scenario for 2015 and 2060
Region
2015-20 2055-60
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Punjab
No Education 19 24 21 15 08 11
Primary 87 79 83 92 96 94
Secondary 52 39 46 56 52 54
Tertiary 16 17 17 18 24 21
Sindh
No Education 39 48 44 37 37 37
Primary 74 61 68 77 74 76
Secondary 41 28 35 47 34 41
Tertiary 20 15 17 21 18 20
KPK
No Education 27 39 33 23 18 20
Primary 88 65 77 94 88 91
Secondary 59 27 43 66 41 53
Tertiary 19 09 14 21 13 17
Balochistan
No Education 51 58 55 46 39 43
Primary 70 56 63 77 82 80
Secondary 46 26 36 53 40 46
Tertiary 17 08 13 20 10 15
Source: Own Calculation
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in recent decades, more investment and opportunities has encouraged for girls in Pun-
jab. Even though, the projection also shows that the rapid increase at the secondary
and tertiary level was foreseen by the national educational goals at the provincial level
in Pakistan, it would also be quasi-impossible to be reached by 2060 according to the
present pace.
If we access the progress of EFA goal in Pakistan that address the 50 percent im-
provement in level of adult literacy by 2015, then we assume that the “No Education”
category in the projection best represents the proportion of illiterate in the total pop-
ulation2. Table 6.5 shows the total population (in percent and in million) of Pakistan
at provincial level aged 15 year and older by 2010 and 2060 according to the trend
education and medium fertility scenario. The EFA goals of 50 percent improvement
of adult literacy would not be achieved in 2015-20 in all provinces in Pakistan. The
proportion of illiterate population aged 15 and older in Punjab would decline from
32 percent (10.9 million) in 2010 to 12 percent (8 million) in 2060. According to
trend scenario, more than 50 percent improvement will be attain in KPK from 2010 to
2060—from 33 percent (2.4 million) to 11 percent (2.1 million)—although in abso-
lute number the difference will be negligible. From Table 6.5, indeed the 50 percent
improvement in adult literacy would only be realized after 2050 in Punjab and KPK.
Moreover, in Sindh and Balochistan, the pace of decline will be slow during the pro-
jection period. It would be difficult to imagine the scale of the adult literacy campaign
needed to halve the number of illiterates from the 53 million persons above age 15 and
older lining in Pakistan at the moment.
The past lack of investment in female education will be hindering Pakistan’s devel-
opment far into the future unless adult education campaigns are reinforced to at least
render the many girls who come to adulthood without literacy skills, and are able to
read and write. The lack of qualification of women is a handicap for the development
of Pakistan as it prevents their full participation in the labor force. In 2005, according
to Labor Force Survey, women accounted for only 19 percent of the active labor force
population aged 20-64 in Pakistan, particularly female in Balochistan. According to
the trend scenario, the substantial decline would be accounted of illiterate female pop-
ulation from 57 percent in 2010 to 19 percent in 2060 in Punjab. Furthermore, in KPK
more than 50 percent improvement would be accomplished from 74 percent in 2010
to 33 percent in 2060 (See Table 6.5). Thus, though illiteracy of “future women” is
eradicated early in the population period, the problem of the many women without
education who already exist is unaddressed. In absolute terms, it means 34 million
women in 2010 will rise to those with no education to 31 million in 2060.
6.4 Conclusion and Policy Prescription
Each province in Pakistan will face rapid population growth in the near and distant
future as well as having a large proportion of working-age population. The future of
each province in Pakistan and its development is highly dependent on the ability to
progress towards the educational attainment of its population particularly for working
2See details in Chapter 4 for the difference between No Education and Illiteracy
133
Table 6.5: Share (in percent) and absolute population (in million) of male, female and total
population in Pakistan at provincial aged 15+ with No Education in 2010 and 2060, EtFm
Scenario
Region Year
Male Female Total
Share Absolute Share Absolute Share Absolute
Punjab
2010 32 10.9 57 18.9 44 29.8
2060 12 8.0 19 12.6 16 20.6
Sindh
2010 35 4.7 63 7.8 48 12.5
2060 24 6.7 37 10.1 31 16.8
KPK
2010 33 2.4 74 5.6 54 8.0
2060 11 2.1 33 6.3 22 8.3
Balochistan
2010 48 1.2 79 1.7 63 2.9
2060 28 1.6 40 2.2 34 3.9
Source: Own Calculation
age population. The attainment of certain levels of education in each province in Pak-
istan has failed so far in terms of provision, access and quality, particularly for females
and a number of factors are contributing such as: neglecting the education sector, po-
litical instability and poverty. Consequently, each province in Pakistan will fail to
achieve the MDGs for education, that of universal primary education and eliminating
gender disparities and other objectives on the national and international agenda such
as EFA. Even though, these goals cannot be met until 2060 in every region in Pakistan.
The scenarios that we looked at shows that the pace of advancing education has to be
dramatically improved if each province would like to achieve all these goals by mid-
century. In the next decades, the size of working-age population in every province
will be prominent and dependency ratios keep low; there is a “window of opportuni-
ties” waiting to be exploited. This is more vital, because age structure will be more
favorable in 2025, if well educated could be major assets in the government’s hands.
The bonus will not be automatic, but require sound economic policy and significant
investment in education and job market. To materialize the demographic bonus, gov-
ernment should strive for faster economic growth with potential to meet the targets of
industrialization and modernization particularly in the less-developed provinces such
as KPK and Balochistan. Therefore, investment should be made in education of the
population in general and the labor force, in particular.
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7
Conclusion and policy Implications
7.1 Conclusion and Discussion
Pakistan currently faces two enormous challenges, mounting population growth and a
vicious poverty trap. It copes with rapid population growth –increasing approximately
five times from the first census in 1951 from 32 million to 173 million to 2010. The
country has currently undergone in a middle phase of demographic transition, which
results in a large population of working age and unfortunately large share of the labor
force has been uneducated. Due to this huge uneducated youth , it will increasingly
put the country at risk of political unrest, particularly the large youth cohorts have
been associated with higher risk of political violence in developing countries, where
the youth has few alternatives besides unemployment and poverty (Urdal, 2006). Pak-
istan is at risk of similar destabilizing. The other danger that deteriorates the develop-
ment in Pakistan, is the country has been stuck in a poverty trap, where low levels of
education, particularly female education that hindered the country driving the road to
higher development.
Indeed, rapid population growth will be the prime trouble facing Pakistan in the first
half of 21st century. The probability that the population of Pakistan will start to decline
in 2060 seems very low. During next five decades, population momentum would con-
tribute significantly in population growth for each provinces in Pakistan. Currently,
Pakistan is passing through the period of demographic dividend. Therefore, Pakistan
will need to adopt a development model capable of absorbing the large working-age
population The age structure will become very youthful in next 50 years, the large
working-age population, if well educated, skilled and sufficiently employed, could be
a key asset for the country, and Pakistan will be prosperous socially and economically.
If this fails, it will be confronted with many problems. Moreover, the two key areas
where the prime concern of the government and immediate policies will be highly
needed, that is; demographic dividend and the population momentum. This implies
that in the process of formulating population policies in near future in Pakistan, these
two important factors will be considered.
The first objective of the study was to document the education and population dynam-
ics at provincial level in Pakistan and to assess the contribution of the momentum in
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the population growth over the next five decades in Pakistan at the provincial level.
Chapter two concluded that significant spatial variation exists in Pakistan in terms of
demographic and education dimension. Therefore, every demographic debate in Pak-
istan should consider the regional variation as well.
The second objective of this research was to execute the probabilistic population pro-
jection of Pakistan at provincial level. The projections that we have presented here
reveal that the population of Pakistan would increase to 281 million by 2060 with 80
percent probability that somewhere between 241 and 326 million. We have investi-
gated many implications for this prospect for Pakistan’s development, especially in
relation to education. One major conclusion drawn from our research is the signif-
icance of conducting analysis at the provincial level rather than the national level in
Pakistan. For example, the probabilistic population projections and the analysis of fu-
ture trends in education would both look significantly different if they were executed
on the national and provincial level separately. This implies that the considerable spa-
tial diversity exists in Pakistan as well as the significant socio-economic conditions
and trends prevails at the provincial level. The prospective addition of nearly 108 mil-
lion inhabitant to Pakistan’s population in 2060 will have major administrative and
political implications. It is worth mentioning that albeit the fertility will decline sig-
nificantly in Pakistan at national and provincial level at or below the replacement level
in 2060, even though the population grew substantially. This implies that the popula-
tion momentum would play a vital role in population growth in near and distant future
in Pakistan.
The rapid population growth rates in the past and as well as the future for each
province in Pakistan have also a political implication. It could work against the con-
tinuation of political cohesion. Since 1973, the representation of each province of
Pakistan in Parliament was on the basis of population of each province primarily ac-
cording to the 1972 census. On one hand, the rationalization of the continuation of
population growth in most of the provinces in Pakistan particularly in Punjab—which
have the largest share of seats in Parliament—they should not be penalize by a loss of
political representation in Parliament. On the other hand, the small provinces in Pak-
istan (KPK and Balochistan) have the least share in the current political structure. The
share of parliament seats solely depends on the size of the population of each province
in Pakistan. Therefore, each province in Pakistan have sustain the significant popu-
lation growth in the past and will likely to continue in future in order to sustain the
significant share in the parliament. This requires an immediate policy action to curb
the population growth. Our projections revealed a widening divergence of population
growth rates between the northern and southern provinces in Pakistan. It illustrates
that population growth rates in all provinces except Punjab will continue to signif-
icantly higher for coming five decades. Such high population growth signifies that
southern (particularly in Sindh and Balochistan) perceptions that those provinces are
economically backward and contributes less than their fair share to the federal gov-
ernment (particularly in revenue), and Punjab always dominates because of their large
population size. Punjab has always maintained the largest share of the total population
in Pakistan in the past and will sustain largest share of the total population in 2060.
Other provinces in Pakistan are also growing fast in the near future and increase their
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share in the total population in Pakistan. This factor needs a heed policy implication.
The third objective of this research was to evaluate the human capital development at
the provincial level in Pakistan and assess the concomitant effect of education on fer-
tility and population growth. The prospect of Pakistan and its capacity to develop
is highly dependent on advancement in the educational attainment of the popula-
tion. So far, shortage of investment in primary and secondary education, poor in-
frastructure and political instability hindered the achievement of satisfactory levels
of education in Pakistan, especially for females. Consequently, Pakistan will fail to
accomplish the Millennium Development Education Goals in terms of universal pri-
mary education and gender equity. The scenarios that we have looked, show that
Pakistan needs to enhance the speed of change in education, since Pakistan is expe-
riencing a demographic bonus and it will likely continue into the future-at least next
40 to 50 years. This window of opportunities, which is most favorable for socio-
economic development—if the country manages to increase the quality of human
capital by 2060. We show that female education is very critical and high politi-
cal commitments will be desirable, for advancing through the demographic transi-
tion and economic development. This study demonstrates that the significance of
investments in education in the near future so that Pakistan can reap the fruit of
long-term human capital development. The past lack of investments in female ed-
ucation impeded the development in Pakistan and will continue far into the future
unless effective adult educational campaigns are implemented to bring at least lit-
eracy to many women who come to adulthood without being able to read and write.
Our research reveals that considering the spatial heterogeneity in human capital de-
velopment and population growth in Pakistan has a substantial effect on the outcomes
and is necessary to evaluate the contribution of each province to the population growth
and the prospect for development. Each province in Pakistan faces rapid population
growth in the future as well as large proportion of working-age population. The fu-
ture of Pakistan is highly reliant on the ability to progress towards the educational
attainment of its population particularly for less-developed provinces (e.g. KPK and
Balochistan). The attainment of certain levels of education at the provincial level has
been disastrous so far in terms of provision, access and quality, particularly for fe-
males. Therefore, each province in Pakistan will fail to achieve the MDGs goals for
education at the provincial level—that of universal primary education and eliminat-
ing gender disparities and other objectives on the national and international agenda
(such as EFA). Although the speed of convergence in some province will be signif-
icant as compared to the others (e.g in Punjab). Even though, these goals cannot be
met until 2060 in all provinces in Pakistan. The scenarios of education that we have
looked at, shows that pace of advancing education has to be dramatically improved
if the country would like to achieve all these goals by mid-century. To materialize
the demographic dividend, government should struggle for faster economic growth
with potential to meet the targets of industrialization and modernization particularly
in the less-developed provinces such as KPK and Balochistan. Consequently, invest-
ment should be made in education of the population in general, and the labor force, in
particular.
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7.2 Policy Recommendations
7.2.1 Education, Education and Education
Almost universally, the importance of education as a major factors affective socio-
economic and human development has been widely recognized. The Human De-
velopment Index (HDI) most widely used indicator to evaluate the socio-economic
progress in a given country. HDI consists of three components, and education is one
of them. Virtually better education is associated with lower mortality and fertility,
better health, economic growth and democracy. Female education is negatively corre-
lated with fertility at the individual level—women with higher education have fewer
children. Therefore, universal primary education together with universal secondary
education, particularly for females has been necessary to boost the economic growth
and limit the population growth. The state of education in Pakistan constitutes a fore-
most reason for the country’s limited progress in every corner of the development.
Pakistan’s future development is solely reliant on the capacity of the country to edu-
cate it population so that people live prosperous economically and socially. Further-
more, the women in Pakistan, if sufficiently educated and socially empowered, will
become a dynamic member of the labor force and consequently, enabling Pakistan to
enjoy the fruits of a demographic dividend. Therefore, MDGs, adult literacy campaign
and female education should be the priority of the Pakistan into the coming decades.
Moreover, the committed policies, and resources will be highly needed to fulfill above
criteria.
7.2.2 Effective Population Policies
Since the formation of first population policy in 1965, population issues have long
been neglected in Pakistan. Technically, decline in the birth rates translate into the
significant reduction in the population growth rate only possible over the longer time
horizon. This need a better illustration of this requirement of the population policy
rather than the element of fantasy which has repeatedly characterized in Pakistan’s
stated objectives for lowering the birth rate. In 1983, for example, the population pol-
icy goal was the reduction of the birth rate from 40 to 37 per 1000 by 1987—a level
not attained by 2000, when the birth rate was still about 38. The Ministry of popu-
lation Welfare—issued the population policy documents in the year 2002—which set
the medium term objective of achieving replacement fertility by 2015. In 2006-07, the
latest Pakistan demographic and Health Survey reveals that the level of the total fertil-
ity rates in Pakistan was 4.1 children per women. The goals of the population policy
2002 has been look ambitious—a decline of two children per women in one decade.
Therefore, Ministry of Population Welfare has revised the policy draft and set the new
goals. It is unclear, what is achieved by setting such unrealistic goals? Thereby, ef-
fective population policies essentially required strong political commitment together
with the development of other sectors, such the economy, education and health.
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7.2.3 Recognize Spatial Dimension in Pakistan
As we have shown in the preceding chapters, the provincial dimension is an im-
portant source of heterogeneity in the socio-economic and demographic analysis in
Pakistan. Each province has different cultures, languages and socio-economic de-
velopment. This study considers such important dimension both retrospectively and
prospectively. Provincial demographic processes are interlinked and will jointly de-
termine the growth and structure of the population in the different provinces. It is im-
portant for policy makers to understand the provincial heterogeneity in demographic
processes and formulated the policies for Pakistan’s development accordingly.
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A
Abstract (German Version)
Alle Provinzen in Pakistan haben seit den 1970er Jahren ein bedeutendes Bevölkerun-
gswachstum zwischen 2 und 4 Prozent pro Jahr erfahren. Das rasante pakistanische
Bevölkerungswachstum hat die sozio-ökonomische Entwicklung in der Vergangenheit
behindert, und Pakistan steht vor der Aufgabe, ein Entwicklungsmodell zu erarbeiten,
das den künftigen Anstieg der Bevölkerung auffangen kann. Das Bevölkerungswach-
stum ist vor allem auf den großen zeitlichen Abstand zwischen dem Rückgang der
Sterblichkeit und dem Rückgang der Fertilität zurückzuführen. Folgt man der Theorie
des demographischen Übergangs, wäre als Reaktion auf den Rückgang der Sterberaten
seit den 1970er Jahren eine sinkende Geburtenrate zu erwarten gewesen. Aufgrund der
politischen Instabilität, der geringen sozio-ökonomischen Entwicklung und der inef-
fektiven Bevölkerungspolitik, konnten die Zielvereinbarungen für die Verringerung
der Fertilität jedoch bisher nicht umgesetzt werden. Das Hauptziel unserer Forschung
besteht darin, das Niveau und die Entwicklung sowohl der Bevölkerung als auch deren
Bildung für alle pakistanischen Provinzen zu untersuchen, und zwar sowohl rückblick-
end als auch die zukünftige Erwartung. Die Ergebnisse der Projektionen zeigen, dass
die Bevölkerung Pakistans (auf nationaler Ebene und in den Provinzen) in den näch-
sten fünf Jahrzehnten weiter stark wachsen wird. Für dieses zukünftige beträchtliche
Wachstum der Gesamtbevölkerung Pakistans ist das sogenannte „population momen-
tum“, also die Trägheit der Bevölkerungsentwicklung, verantwortlich. Im Jahr 2010
ist etwa die Hälfte des Bevölkerungswachstums auf dieses „population momentum“
zurückzuführen. Dies führt zu einem weiteren Anwachsen der Bevölkerung im er-
werbsfähigen Alter. Da das Bevölkerungswachstum beginnt, sich zu stabilisieren, als
Folge des demographischen Übergangs, wird Pakistan, einschließlich aller Provinzen,
eine Zeitfenster mit besonders günstige demographischer Konstellation durchschre-
iten: Für die nächsten 30 bis 40 Jahren wird die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung im erwerb-
sfähigen Alter sein. Unsere Projektionen zeigen aber auch, dass Pakistan Ergebnis
nicht in der Lage sein wird, die Millenniums-Entwicklungsziele (MDGs) in Bezug
auf Bildung bis zum Jahr 2015 zu erreichen, und selbst bis 2060 nicht, wenn die Bil-
dungsbeteiligung im Primarbereich nicht mit einer deutlich höheren Geschwindigkeit
verbessert wird als in der jüngsten Vergangenheit.
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